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SUMMARY 
The thesis seeks to interrogate historically the relationship between multinational healthcare 
service companies and states in the pursuit of market-oriented reforms for healthcare. It 
constitutes a critical reading of the idea of globalisation as a concept with substantive 
explanatory value to analyse the causal role of multinational service firms in a commercial 
transformation in national healthcare service sectors. It analyses the development and expansion 
of commercial (for-profit) healthcare service provision and financing in the healthcare systems 
of OECD countries. The hospital and health insurance sectors in the US and UK are analysed as 
case studies towards developing this critical reading from a more specific national setting. 
The thesis contributes to developing a framework for analysing the emergence of an 
international market for trade in healthcare services, which is a recently emerging area of 
research in the social sciences. As such, it uses an interdisciplinary approach, utilising insights 
from health policy and international political economy. The research entails a longitudinal study 
of secondary and primary sources of qualitative data broadly covering the period 1975-2005. I 
have also made extensive use of quantitative data to illustrate key economic trends that are 
relevant to the changes in the particular healthcare services sectors analysed.  
The research finds a substantive shift in the mixed economy of healthcare in which commercial 
healthcare service provision and financing are increasing. However, while the 
internationalisation of healthcare service firms is a key element in helping to drive some of this 
change, the changes are ultimately highly dependent on state-level decision making and 
regulation. In this context, the thesis argues that globalisation presents an inadequate and 
potentially misleading conceptual framework for analysing these changes without a historical 
grounding in the particular developments of national and international markets for healthcare 
services. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
By the late 1990s healthcare systems in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member countries had already been undergoing several years of incremental 
restructuring in which ‘the market’ had become a much more ubiquitous feature in the organisation 
and delivery of healthcare services.1 In the first decade of the 21st century this appears to be a firmly 
entrenched aspect in public policy for healthcare; as governments in most OECD countries, with 
state-based as much as with market-based healthcare systems, have continued to explore ways in 
which market-oriented institutional structures can be employed to address some of the core 
challenges in the financing and provision of healthcare (Cutler, 2002; Docteur & Oxley, 2001).2 
This trend has seen an array of reform measures across the OECD member states including, most 
commonly, increases in the share of costs for healthcare assumed by households and individuals, 
the introduction of competitive relations between health service providers and health financing 
institutions (whether insurers or other funding bodies), and the privatisation of various segments of 
national healthcare service capacity.  
The onset of the market form in healthcare systems has marked a profound disjuncture from 
the post-war period of incremental ‘de-commodification’ in social welfare provisions, such as 
healthcare, which has been a common trend amongst most developed countries in this period. Over 
the past three decades the emergence of market-oriented healthcare policy has also been 
accompanied by a steady proliferation of for-profit organizations involved in the provision and 
financing of healthcare services. An important aspect of this trend has been the penetration of such 
                                                   
1 At this stage I would like to distinguish between my use of the term ‘market’ when referring to the 
organisational changes I am examining (i.e. ‘market-style’ or ‘market-oriented’ public policies) which are 
aimed at fundamentally changing medical or administrative practices or the framework in which provider-
patient relations are carried out for instance, and the ‘market’ to refer to a particular segment or sector in 
healthcare (i.e. ‘the health insurance market’) as an analytically discrete area in which organisations examined 
share a common product. In the former case it is a reference to the use of a competitive model for the 
organisation of healthcare services which may operate within either a designated public sector context as 
much as in a private ‘non-profit’ or private ‘for-profit’ context. In the latter case I do not assume either a 
‘competitive’ or ‘non-competitive’ framework since, given the multitude of public and private sector 
provision and financing that is intrinsic to all healthcare systems this may generically be referred to as a 
market.  
2 In this thesis I am using the OECD as a proxy for a group of countries with a broadly similar economic 
status, that is developed countries, and to distinguish my broader comparative statements from developing 
countries. While this study takes account of an extended time period including the post-WWII era but with 
greater focus on the last quarter of the 20th century, I acknowledge that the member states comprising the 
OECD have changed over time, with newer members added over the past few decades. As such I do not 
assume this to be a diachronically static category for describing developed countries. 
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for-profit firms into markets in other national locations, and this is a feature which seems to have 
intensified since the mid-1990s (Hall, 2001).  
Moreover, since this period, such cross-border market penetration appears to be a key feature 
often encouraged within the fold of the public policy agendas for market-oriented healthcare reform 
in a number of countries (Mackintosh & Koivusalo eds, 2005). This can be seen as much within the 
national public policy sphere as within the international policy domain, propagated and perpetuated 
via international organisations including the World Bank and IMF, whereby the adoption of market-
oriented reforms to public sector welfare institutions and the proliferation of private sector 
involvement in these is highly valorised and promoted (Koivusalo, 2001; Lister, 2005). The 
activities of multilateral institutions such as the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the European Unions’s (EU) Directive for the liberalisation of its internal market only 
serve to enhance the pressure on national healthcare systems to become absorbed into an 
international commercial agenda for healthcare (Pollock & Price, 2000; Rowland et al, 2004). The 
intensification of the internationalisation trend that I am talking about, against the background of 
the commercialisation of healthcare services constitutes the central component of the research 
agenda underlying my thesis. 
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s a dominant analytical framework for explaining the 
relationship between internationalising commercial agents and national structural changes has been 
that of ‘globalisation’. It has become a ubiquitous conceptual tool to refer to the multiplicity of 
structural changes and the causal relationships between them that I have been describing (Lee, 
Fustukian, & Buse, 2002; Lee, K. ed, 2003; Mackintosh & Koivusalo eds, 2005). Its explanatory 
value is implicit within the fact that it offers a means of describing new levels of complexity in 
social relations over the past few decades. Typically this rests on the understanding that there is an 
intensification of links between institutions and agents across national territorial spaces that were 
unprecedented prior to a specific chronological period, usually taken to be around the 1990s. It 
brings supposed order to this increasingly complex level of interaction, which is bringing different 
national locations into a common framework of change. In this reading, the expansion of 
commercial enterprises is essentially part of a natural convergence of different national healthcare 
systems towards a more highly market-oriented structure.  
What I am arguing, however, in this thesis is that ‘globalisation’ offers an inadequate 
conceptual framework to explain the emergence of an international healthcare services market. It 
does not provide a basis to explain the commercial transformation of healthcare services against the 
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background of market-oriented reforms that have become a widespread trend across the OECD 
member states. Instead, I argue that the commercialisation of healthcare services and the causal role 
of internationalising companies in this scenario is something that needs to be interrogated from 
within the specific national context where healthcare service firms are based. This requires an 
understanding of the historical context in which commercialisation has developed in different 
national locations.  
In my research I have sought to interrogate historically the interplay between multinational 
healthcare companies and states in the pursuit of market-oriented reforms for healthcare. On one 
level my thesis is a critical reading of the idea of globalisation as a concept with substantive 
explanatory value to analyse the causal role of multinational service firms in a commercial 
transformation in national healthcare service sectors. This forms the crux of my discussion, in 
Chapter 2, of several different strands of literature aiming towards a synthesis approach of 
understanding the changes qualitative changes that form the basis of my research agenda. 
On another level, my thesis is a historical analysis of the development and expansion of 
commercial (for-profit) healthcare service provision and financing in the healthcare systems of 
‘developed’ countries. By historical, I mean tracking the evolution over and extended time period of 
the emergence of market-oriented healthcare reforms in a comparative context across several 
different national locations. The purpose of this is to establish the degree to which there is an actual 
convergence towards a specific market-oriented framework that creates the space for commercial 
transformation of healthcare services which I do in Chapter 3, through an exploration of trends in 
the OECD group of countries leading towards market oriented healthcare reforms. This exercise 
provides both a useful insight into the broader trend of market-oriented healthcare reforms, but also 
helps to situate my research of specific national cases of the US and UK hospital and health 
insurance sectors which I develop in the 5th and 6th chapters respectively.  
A key component of the ‘globalisation’ thesis is to do with the intensification of international 
linkages between different national territorial locations and the emergence of new cross-national 
structures. The emergence of an international healthcare market thus requires an assessment of the 
degree to which the expansion of commercial organisations has become a substantively new 
development. As such, I have sought to develop a framework for empirical research into the scale of 
internationalisation, which is necessary prior to extrapolating a general ‘global’ trend about these 
substantive changes in healthcare services. Mapping the scale and scope of internationalisation of 
the world’s largest companies within key segments of the international healthcare services market 
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in Chapter 4, I have sought to contribute to field of research a framework for generating a fuller 
picture of what is actually internationalising about healthcare service corporations.   
In the next section I briefly elaborate on the context of my research and develop the core 
research questions driving this thesis. Next I briefly discuss my methodology and some key 
limitations of my research, and I conclude this introductory chapter with an outline of the chapters 
in the thesis. 
1.1. The research agenda: market-oriented healthcare reform and the 
development of an international healthcare services market 
1.1.1. Historical context  
The post-war involvement of governments in healthcare has arguably been the most 
important driving force in creating the vast and complex institutional landscape that characterises 
contemporary healthcare systems, combining a massive and complex network of medical service 
providers, financing organisations, convalescent and rehabilitative care services, mental health, 
public health systems, medical technologies manufacturers and suppliers, and numerous related 
non-health-specific industries that count on the healthcare sector as a major source of business and 
revenue. For several decades after the Second World War (WWII), most OECD countries made 
reforms by moving towards universalising access to healthcare through the expansion of public 
sector financing and, in many cases, of public sector provision with a view to limiting or 
eliminating financial barriers for access to healthcare for households. The chief logic of these 
efforts were focused on ‘de-commodifying’ healthcare as a sphere of social relations (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Roemer, 1976). While this development had been quite uneven across the OECD 
membership - in terms of the timing of universalisation,3 the extent to which public sector 
intervention had been instituted,4 and in the form of state intervention 5 - this formative period has 
seen healthcare systems become increasingly a major component of national economic production.6  
                                                   
3 While a large number of OECD countries introduced universalisation of coverage in the first couple of 
decades after WWII, many did not introduce legislation to this end until the 1970s and 1980s. 
4 Many countries retained extensive private sector provision albeit regulated by public agencies, though in 
most cases public sector spending accounts for the largest portion of overall healthcare spending. 
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In a dominant interpretation, the massive expansion of healthcare systems and the scale of 
resources they absorbed by the 1970s have posed a significant challenge to the fiscal sustainability 
of the public contribution to healthcare (Cutler, 2002). This challenge is understood by many as 
following from endogenous limits reached by post-war healthcare systems in developed countries, 
including the pressures generated by ageing demographics, the increasing costs associated with 
adoption of new medical technologies, and an epidemiological shift from acute conditions and 
infectious disease to chronic conditions and non-communicable disease (Wilkinson, 1996; Blank & 
Burau, 2004). In addition, the growing expectations of patients and citizens of what healthcare 
systems can and should provide are often cited as an important political factor for reforming 
healthcare systems to become more responsive to patient needs and wants. The endogenous 
challenge has been accompanied by an exogenous challenge widely associated with changing 
conditions in the international political economy. With the world oil shocks in the early-1970s, most 
countries faced a protracted period of uncertainty with rising  inflation and economic stagnation, a 
situation which prompted most governments in developed countries to seek ways to control public 
expenditure in general (Schieber & Poullier, 1990; Armstrong, Glynn & Harrison, 1991). In the face 
of a growing fiscal crisis, the Keynesian policy approach which had largely sustained the post-
WWII growth in public spending in developed economies was rapidly losing favour and most 
OECD countries entered a period from the late 1970s marked by attempts to contain public 
spending in general and associated with the ascent of a neoliberal ideological framework for 
economic and social policy from the 1980s (Altenstetter & Haywood, 1991; Harvey, 2005). 
In the early 21st century the fiscal challenge remains a central issue of healthcare policy: how 
to pay for healthcare without undermining the equity, quality and efficiency goals of healthcare 
policy (Cutler, 2002). The past two to three decades have seen a number of policy responses which 
have sought one way or another to balance this particular ‘trade-off’. However, not all of these have 
been based on economic solutions even while many of these policies have been instituted 
accompanied by justifications of cost-containment, improvement of efficiency and responsiveness 
of providers to patient needs (and wants), and an increase in the value for the money spent on 
                                                                                                                                                           
5 There are a lot of features in common between healthcare systems, but the way in which financing and 
provision have been organised do vary considerably between countries largely due to the historical-political 
development of healthcare systems (key distinctions for instance being between ‘Bismark’, ‘Beveridge’, 
‘Hybrid’ or ‘Semashko’ models: cf. Lister, 2005, p. 127). 
6 To illustrate this point, total expenditure on healthcare has risen from less than 3% of GDP in most 
developed countries in the earlier part of the 20th century to around 8%-9% in most Western European 
countries and a staggering 15%-16% in the US in the early 21st century (OECD, 2006b). 
6 
 
healthcare. Changes in medical practices, administrative arrangements, and a greater emphasis on 
primary care and public health (if only rhetorically) have been important in shifting the discourse on 
healthcare in the past twenty years. But the fundamental distributional problem that underlies this 
‘trade-off’ has meant that the economic aspect in healthcare reform has continued to be central to 
policy analysis and debate (Mossialos & Dixon, 2002). In a bid to address the fiscal problem of 
healthcare most governments of OECD countries sought increasingly to regulate and contain 
spending growth during the 1980s through a wide spectrum of policies including rationalisation of 
hospital capacity and various macroeconomic controls. The attention that such control measures 
brought on the inefficiencies inherent in healthcare services was, however, accompanied by the 
realisation that cost-controls in themselves potentially threaten the other variables in the trade-off 
(i.e. equity and quality).  
Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, market-oriented solutions became 
increasingly popular. Many governments of OECD countries relied on such solutions as a means of 
containing the continuing growth on healthcare spending, whilst enabling greater responsiveness to 
patient demand but also increasing the efficiency of providers in the use of their resources and 
raising productivity (Cutler, 2002). Whether focused on containing costs or on fundamentally 
changing the institutional structure of healthcare services, such market-oriented reforms have 
impacted upon the dynamic of the mixed economy of healthcare which, although variably 
manifested and implemented between countries, marks a common transition towards a more 
commercial context for healthcare services provision and financing across OECD countries.  
However, the research undertaken for this thesis has indicated that the commercialisation 
process is not only uneven between countries but also within each country, and the same can be said 
for the internationalisation of commercial healthcare services. While there is much recognition that 
this is a significantly developing trend it remains under-researched, while a lack of clarity about the 
extent to which these developments are progressing persists both within academia and in public 
policy. 
The international agenda for the liberalisation of services raises several important questions 
about the commercialisation trend. For cross-border trade in healthcare services to be gauged, it is 
important to have an understanding of the extent to which commercial enterprises have expanded 
internationally. I explore this in Chapter 4 and examine the different modes of internationalisation 
of healthcare services, keeping in mind the scope for their commercial development. However, prior 
to the analysis of internationalisation, it is important to understand the development of 
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commercialisation in a national setting and I have started my empirical investigation with an 
international assessment of commercialisation across the OECD countries which I do in Chapter 3. 
Within this context the key research questions for my thesis are summarised in the rest of this 
section. 
1.1.2. The commercialisation of healthcare services 
Of the two main components of my thesis, the issue of commercialisation in healthcare is the 
most extensively documented and analysed in existing literature. However this is still largely 
confined to national-level (as opposed to international comparative) and sector-level studies. 
Market-oriented reforms do not necessarily spell a ‘for-profit’ orientation of healthcare services 
even though the expansion of commercial enterprise in healthcare services is still a notable trend 
that has been pinpointed in various national-based studies. My first aim has therefore been to 
determine to what extent commercialisation has been a substantive trend so far on an international 
scale and to explore the conditions that have generated a commercial transformation of healthcare 
services. In the third chapter of this thesis I approach these issues with an overview of market-
oriented reforms that set the basis for the commercialisation of services.  
Commercialisation of healthcare services, where it has taken place, has mostly been a 
national and fairly localised phenomenon: commercial healthcare providers have typically expanded 
their market share within national boundaries and more usually in urban metropolitan areas where 
for-profit healthcare is more viable. However, though cross-border commercial expansion has 
developed less than at national level expansion, since the early to mid-1990s, it has become a more 
notable feature of the healthcare services market. Moreover, while international market penetration 
by commercial providers is overshadowed in scale by national-level developments there is already 
evidence showing the capacity of such cross-border commercial penetration to have a 
transformative effect on national healthcare service markets. 
In the context of the current international agenda for the liberalisation of trade in services and 
the erosion of the public sector status of healthcare financing and provision, there is the growing 
possibility of an intensifying commercial transformation of healthcare services facilitated by public 
policies. An international overview, however, is still limited to looking for commonalities and 
differences. Having analysed the extent of the commercialisation trend there are still questions 
about the mechanisms of commercialisation, tentatively identified in the international overview.  
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Equally important is to investigate how and to what extent commercialisation has impacted 
on the different segments of the healthcare services sector particularly those segments that have 
experienced substantive changes in the post-WWII period following increased governmental 
intervention. It is also important to understand the way in which they have been transforming in the 
more recent period of market-oriented healthcare policy.  With my historical analysis of the US and 
UK cases, I demonstrate that commercialisation has no evident outcome. That is to say it has 
historically been a negotiated development dependent as much on the agency of provider and 
financing organisations as on the role of state policy making. Because of the historical context of 
commercialisation trend for healthcare services, and in view of a more recently emerging 
international agenda for the liberalisation for trade in services, an association between globalisation 
and commercialisation is often made both in academia and in public policy to explain these 
changes. This is why an overarching concern of my thesis is with the extent to which the notion of 
‘globalisation’ provides an adequate conceptual basis for understanding this ‘commercialisation’ 
trend and the degree to which it is being precipitated by the internationalisation of healthcare 
service firms.  
1.1.3. Internationalisation and a global transformation of healthcare services 
The key focus in examining the internationalisation of healthcare services is the extent of the 
international market penetration by commercial firms. There is considerable variation in the degree 
of overseas market penetration across different segments of the international healthcare market. The 
more traditional supply chain (i.e. pharmacy wholesale) and retail firms have displayed 
considerably greater levels of market penetration than more narrowly defined medical service 
suppliers. Hospital firms, even where they have established major leading commercial 
conglomerates in their home market, have had a variable experience in penetrating and remaining in 
overseas markets.  It is therefore crucial to explore what role international forces play in driving 
these developments. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4 it seems that internationalisation is quite uneven and moreover 
healthcare remains somewhat insulated.  A crucial implication of the overseas market penetration of 
commercial healthcare corporations is to raise questions about the capacity of national healthcare 
systems to remain insulated from the exigencies of ‘globalisation’ which has been a dominant 
conceptual vehicle for explaining structural changes such as I am describing within national 
political economies for at least the past two decades (Mishra, 1999; Scholte, 2000; Gilpin, 2001). 
This in turn raises questions about the potential for the development of an international market in 
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healthcare services dominated by multinationals as has been the case in several other economic 
sectors historically; a hallmark of what is generally understood as ‘globalisation’ (Lee et al, 2002; 
Mackintosh & Koivusalo eds, 2005). 
 
1.2. Methodology and limitations 
I developed the research for my thesis through use of an interdisciplinary approach since the 
questions I address in the analysis of internationalisation and commercialisation of healthcare have, 
in my view, seen relatively little cross-over across the different social science disciplines I have 
drawn on for my investigation. I have found invaluable and insightful analysis in economics 
literature, business and management literature, sociology, International Political Economy (IPE), 
and in policy analysis. While I address this thesis largely towards health policy studies, which is 
itself a rather interdisciplinary field of inquiry, I draw significant insights from the socio-historical 
methods of critical IPE and the analytical milieu of business studies.7 
The research itself entails a longitudinal study of qualitative data of both secondary and 
primary sources broadly covering the period 1975-2005. I have also made extensive use of 
quantitative data to illustrate key economic trends that are relevant to the changes in the particular 
healthcare services sectors analysed. The year 1975 marks a period just prior to the ascent of the 
Thatcher-led Conservative government and the sea-change in British politics and welfare state 
which ensued, leading to an embryonic expansion of private for-profit healthcare services in the UK 
following the entry of foreign-owned healthcare service firms in UK’s private healthcare market. 
The year 2005 marks the end of the second term of the New Labour government which was 
responsible for generating a strategy of incorporating private providers into the UK National Health 
Service (NHS). I do not strictly limit myself throughout to this period, since reference to pre-1975 
developments is necessary to elaborate some of my arguments based on historical analysis. 
                                                   
7 Critical IPE encompasess a wide set of approaches, from Marxism through Critical Realism, Institutionalism 
and Post-structuralist (i.e. Foucauldian) methods of analysis. The reason I make this distinction of ‘critical’ 
IPE is a reference to a common strand of thought amongst critical scholars of IPE which is to reject a neat 
distinction between the political and economic spheres as has been the dominant mode of interpretation in 
economics and in international political economy since the emergence of the Chicago School (a key analysis 
of this issue can be found in Wood, 1981). The chief approach I identify with is that of marxist political 
economy, though at the same time I choose not to force this point since although I derive considerable 
guidance from marxist method of analysis and conception of political economy I would hesitate to claim that 
my thesis is strictly speaking marxist. 
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Moreover, my focus on the US also takes note of key developments in the 1960s that have had 
direct impact on the commercial transformation of healthcare services in that country and indirectly 
internationally with the cross-border market penetration of US healthcare corporations. Also, with 
regard to my chapters on the internationalisation of healthcare services (Chapter 4), and my chapter 
on the UK (Chapter 6), some data extends to 2007 to incorporate important developments that have 
emerged during the course of my research and which have enabled me to put in further perspective 
the issues I engage with in my thesis. 
1.2.1. Data collection 
Research for this thesis has relied on a variety of sources, most of which were collected using 
the library search facility at Sussex University Library, British Library of Development Studies, the 
Library of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSTHM), the British Library and 
the King’s Fund library.  
A great deal of the research has relied on peer reviewed academic journals published mainly 
between 1975 and 2007, although I have included material where relevant from earlier years 
towards developing a longer term historical view. Initially I made key word searches through the 
WorldCat academic search engine and, at later stages once these became available through the 
Sussex University Library of more specialised search engines of Medline and PubMed. While these 
search tools have proved invaluable, I have supplemented it through Google Search tools (Scholar, 
News, and Book) employing a variety of search terms. This has also proved an invaluable means of 
identifying and employing data sources and new research in the subject area that could not be 
ascertained via the more traditional library searches and compilation of sources from other readings. 
Often enough this brought me back to the Medline and PubMed search tools.  
Qualitative data has been collected from a variety of sources that are publicly available 
including: national governmental sources such as the UK Department of Health (DH), National 
Health Service (NHS) organisations (mainly for England, but for other UK countries where 
relevant), and Parliamentary papers and debates. I have also made use of International 
governmental organisation policy documents, reports, working papers and press releases such as 
the World Bank’ annual World Development Reports (WDR); various OECD publications; the 
European Union online resource EUropa.eu; the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) World 
Health Report (WHR) and Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) publications, and 
documents relating to the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) GATS. Qualitative data has also been 
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drawn from private sector data sources such as Laing and Buisson’s annual Healthcare Market 
Review (1999 - 2008). The Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) database (available 
online on request) was also used initially to map key multinational companies involved in the 
healthcare services sector. While this resource has been used to supplement the data collected by 
myself, its variable content and quality means that it has remained a secondary source of data. 
A further key source of qualitative data has included private organisation press releases and 
newsletter publications such as business press releases and healthcare service newsletters and 
updates, which have been useful to gauge the positions of private for-profit firms and business 
associations in the international healthcare services market. Furthermore, political party policy 
statements and manifestos have supplemented government documents in assessing changes in 
political discourse. Reports, papers and research from think tanks, epistemic communities, lobby 
groups and advocacy associations have also been drawn on to varying degrees for ascertaining 
information about healthcare sector reform, but also for identifying key debates in the 
commercialising healthcare reform agenda. Finally, general and business media reports: from the 
British and US press have been used extensively to cross reference historical contextualisation and 
supplementary information about political change and news in the healthcare services market. 
These sources were a first port of call in the initial phases of the research in order to familiarise 
myself with the current state of the healthcare sector in the UK. At a later stage in the research, 
press reports became more a means to maintain continuity with current changes in the health sector. 
Quantitative data has been drawn from a mix of public and private sources. It is notable that 
such data with regard to the private sector has been considerably variable making for quite a 
frustrating search for data.8 A key source of international comparative data has been the OECD 
Health Data sourcebook.9 This has been supplemented by the World Bank’s World Development 
Report and the WHO’s World Health Report to a lesser degree, but useful for gauging cross country 
and national data for health expenditure and welfare expenditure. Important national data sources 
have included the UK’s Office of Health Economics (OHE) Compendium of Health Statistics 
(various years), and the Centres for Medicaid and Medicare (CMS) database of national health 
                                                   
8 Data for public sector spending and overall expenditure is available from these sources, otherwise data for 
private healthcare sector is virtually non existent, except for data for consumption. It is also revealing to see 
that most national data is very patchy until the late 1970s and early 1980s. The most comprehensive datasets 
start from 1990s. 
9 Initially this was through print copy and later through the CD-Rom version once this became available 
during the course of my research. 
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expenditure available for download on their respective website. It is notable that UK long time-
series data have been more accessible through private publications including the aforementioned 
OHE Compendium, and also the previously mentioned Laing and Buisson’s Healthcare Market 
Review. In addition, Fortune Magazine’s Global 500 list of top international companies (by 
revenue), was used for the chapter analysing the growth of an international market in health services 
(Chapter 4). This was used to build a database of key companies involved in the healthcare services 
sector, with quantitative data drawn from the same company publications used for qualitative data 
collection. The aforementioned PSIRU database was also used partially to supplement some of this 
quantitative data I collected myself for my research of multinational companies. 
Data collection on private sector is quite limited, and where it does exist, it is most frequently 
commercial in confidence. Little empirical research has been conducted on private sector healthcare 
services provision; what data does exist is largely in private sector databases, for which the 
monetary cost of access has been too high to justify use in this current research project.10 
Furthermore, the data is not widely available - even in most libraries. However, some of these 
sources are available for consultation on location in the British Library and London’s King’s Fund 
Library. These are composite data sources, compiling data from a variety of other official and 
publicly inaccessible sources and some data from their own research presented in a single resource. 
I have used what limited data I could acquire from publicly accessible resources. 
1.2.2. Limitations of the study 
While I have devoted much effort to be thorough in my research and coherent in my 
articulation of my analysis, I acknowledge that there are inevitable limitations to what is possible in 
a single study. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, I have covered a great deal of 
literature from different fields of social scientific research. Although this has enriched considerably 
my analysis, it has also meant that I have had to be fairly brief in my engagement with different 
debates within the various academic fields of inquiry. Whilst the eclectic approach to the secondary 
literature is intended to draw on the strengths of each method of analysis, I am aware of causes for 
critique in each of the bodies of literature that I have not been able to fully develop.  
                                                   
10 See also an article by Radical Statistics Group (2000) and also report by Association of British Health 
Industries (2002) which discuss the limitations of empirical data. The former on the accessibility to private 
research data, the latter for the limited amount of empirical data available even to private enterprises. 
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A key limitation I acknowledge is in the use of raw data. Whilst early in the study I  
considered employing survey and interview techniques as one of a number of sources of data for 
eventual triangulation of data sources, the longitudinal changes that I have analysed and the type of 
questions of interest to the study have meant that interviews would have had limited usefulness. 
Interviews may be useful in a smaller, more focused study. This has not meant a complete absence 
of personal input from policy actors. Moreover my analysis of the US case has meant relatively 
constrained access to data from US sources. Access to databases of US industry representative 
associations or of market analysis compendia such as the UK’s Laing and Buisson sources have 
proved even more costly to access, partly due to distance. As such, I have endeavoured where 
possible to piece together publicly available primary data and data supplied in various secondary 
sources regarding US healthcare corporations. 
A further important point for which I must insert a caveat is that international and country-
level studies carry with them the danger of over-extending the conclusions drawn to the entire 
national constituencies analysed. Just as the UK is composed of four different countries, each with 
particular variations in the way in which they manage the NHS and its relation to the private sector, 
this also applies to the US which is a federation of 50 states each with different degrees of 
commercialisation of healthcare services. Due to space restrictions and an interest to capture general 
international trends, the sub-national level of analysis is something that regrettably suffers absence 
in this thesis. 
Finally, due to language restrictions, I have chosen to focus exclusively on English language 
literature which has also been a key reason for my choice to focus on the British and American 
cases. On the other hand, my focus on these countries is not entirely based on language restrictions. 
My justification for studying these two countries lies in the historical relationship between their 
healthcare sectors, which in one sense are both outliers vis-à-vis the healthcare systems in the rest 
of the world; one is dominated by market structure, whilst the other is paid for through general 
taxation and the public sector.  
 
1.3. An overview of the chapters 
The structure of the present thesis is organised as follows:  
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In Chapter 2, I provide a framework for the analysis of the thesis and dealing with the 
treatment of key ideas about accounting for substantive change over time in national healthcare 
systems and how this links to changes in healthcare services markets. I did not initially set out to 
develop a synthesis approach, which can be seen in the overview of three strands of literature n this 
chapter centred around health policy studies, International Relations/International Political 
Economy and International Business Studies. While this began as a simple literature review, I 
eventually developed it as a survey of these key literature strands because this allows for a more 
extensive and systematic discussion of how the different key concepts regarding healthcare reform, 
commercialisation and internationalisation of healthcare services markets complement each other.  
In Chapter 3, the state of the international healthcare services market is analysed and key 
areas are identified where internationalisation of for-profit healthcare providers has taken place. The 
objective of this chapter grew out of a need to gain a comparative overview of the advancement of 
market-oriented healthcare reforms across different national locations in order to be able to situate 
the subsequent US and UK national case studies within a broader set of trends. 
In a similar way to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 developed out of a need to gain a general overview 
of what the international healthcare services market looks like within the broader international 
economy. Data collection in this respect proved much more difficult than initially anticipated, and 
out of this frustration, my research utilising Fortune Magazine’s annual ranking of Global 500 
companies provided an alternative route to gaining perspective on this. Though it has its limitations 
as a data source - something I discuss at greater length in the chapter itself – it has been a useful 
means to establish systematically how internationalisation is quite uneven across different segments 
of the health services market. 
The national case studies in the following two chapters bring into perspective the role of 
internationalising commercial organisations within the context of changes in specific national 
locations. An initial desire to gain a broad overview of commercialisation in each of these markets 
led me to focus on the hospital and health insurance sectors, because I found these to be well 
documented in initial stages of my research and found intriguing the linkages between these two 
market segments in their parallel evolution as ‘producer’ and ‘financer’ institutions respectively.  
Chapter 5 looks at changes in the US healthcare sector by focusing on commercial 
transformation in the US healthcare services market and the implications for the international 
market in healthcare services. My selection of the US as a core case study has rested on its status as 
one of the most highly market-oriented healthcare systems in the world. An extensive literature base 
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on the US on account of it having undergone the earliest commercial transformation compared to 
other countries means on the one hand there is a wealth of secondary literature, which is reflected in 
the overwhelming amount of literature in academic searches for commercialisation relates to this 
country. An account of specific companies and how has been harder to piece together from diffuse 
sources of market analysis and references to these within the academic literature. 
In Chapter 6, I take a substantive look at the evolution of the private sector in the UK, 
considering how this has developed in relation to public health policy. Similar to the US, my choice 
of the UK as a case study rested on it being one of the earliest countries to develop an extensive 
public healthcare system. As such, the UK provides an insightful test case for the onset of 
privatisation and how this is impacted upon by penetration by foreign-owned companies. 
In the concluding chapter (7), I reflect on my analysis of the commercialisation and 
internationalisation in the healthcare services sector with reference to the specific national cases 
analysed.  
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2. Chapter 2: Internationalisation, commercialisation and the 
‘new’ mixed economy of healthcare 
In this chapter I develop more explicitly my analytical framework in relation to the questions 
opened in the introductory chapter. I engage more directly with various key debates and analyses in 
the literature that I have researched to illuminate the issues relating the internationalisation and 
commercialisation of healthcare services within the context of market-oriented reforms. As I have 
suggested in the introductory chapter, my research indicates a limited amount of output directly on 
this subject. While over the past three decades much research was carried out on the direct impact 
of national-level market-oriented reforms on healthcare services, primarily in the health policy field, 
comparatively little engagement seems to have been made with the interplay between 
internationalisation of healthcare services firms and the commercialisation of healthcare services in 
specific national locations. Moreover, in fields of inquiry where considerable amount of research 
has been dedicated to understanding globalization and the internationalisation of business - such as 
International Relations, IPE and International Business Studies - nearly no engagement with the 
healthcare services sector has been undertaken.  
As such, my objective in this chapter is to set out how the following issues have been 
engaged with so far in these academic research fields. The overarching issue I have been looking to 
engage with has been how ‘globalization’ is understood to impact upon healthcare systems 
particularly within the context of the reform of social welfare provisions in a market-oriented 
direction. Furthermore, I have explored how commercialisation in healthcare is conceptualised and 
explained across the various strands of literature. Within the context of these two issues, I focus 
attention on the emergence of a ‘new’ mixed economy of healthcare, which has entailed not just the 
privatization of public healthcare services but new forms of incorporation of private sector 
provision and financing into governmental agendas for the delivery of healthcare services. 
Moreover, I seek to set the grounds for the ensuing empirical chapters in which I develop my 
questioning of whether globalization puts a different perspective on commercialisation. 
In the first section I review policy analysis literature, considering the place of policy analysis 
in this study.  
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The second section discusses more theoretical and historical contextual factors drawing largely 
from IPE literature. Here I devote attention to welfare state restructuring, the reconstitution of 
healthcare services from de-commodified to commodified, and the international dimension for 
healthcare services. In the third section I discuss the analysis of the healthcare market in order to 
map the international healthcare services market and to provide a framework for analysing the 
internationalisation strategies of firms. Here I draw more from international business and 
management literature. I conclude the chapter with a summary of main arguments to guide the rest 
of the thesis. 
2.1. The Policy Process and Healthcare Reform 
 
The issue of healthcare sector reform is not a new one. Since late 19th century and early 20th 
century turning points in the history of state intervention in the financing and/or provision of 
healthcare, we can see a regular re-negotiation of the framework in which healthcare is conceived 
and acted upon. The emergence of a market-oriented healthcare reform agenda and the related 
commercialisation of healthcare services is something that seems to have been intensifying in recent 
years, but nonetheless is something that is frequently identified with a historical juncture since the 
1970s. The great majority of health policy analysis researching current developments seems 
however to dehistoricise the development of commercialisation over time, with a considerable 
emphasis on the analysis of policy content. In this first section of the chapter I essentially make my 
case, through a review of key literature as to why historical method is an essential component to 
understanding long-term changes, whilst considering the limitations of a focus on policy content. 
2.1.1. Beyond content: analysing health policy change  
Walt and Gilson make a valid critique of the study of health policy and the implications for 
the conceptualisation and implementation of reform, when they draw our attention to the fact that:  
‘[…] much health policy wrongly focuses attention on the content of reform, and 
neglects the actors involved in policy reform (at the international, national and 
subnational levels), the processes contingent on developing and implementing change 
and the context within which policy is developed’ (authors italics: Walt & Gilson, 
1994, p.354).  
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This blinkered focus on policy content, consequently ‘diverts attention from understanding 
the processes which explain why desired policy outcomes fail to emerge’ (p.354). Their urgent call 
for ‘new paradigms of thinking…to be applied to the health sector, to understand the factors 
influencing the effectiveness of policy change’ (p.354), represents a broader discontent with 
understanding the complexity of factors in policy change in healthcare and other areas of public 
policy. This has only recently begun to be addressed by various authors (e.g. Salter, 1998; Lee & 
Goodman, 2001; Langley, Denis & Lamothe, 2003; Lister, 2005). Though none of these authors 
have necessarily developed an entirely ‘new paradigm’, a broader perspective in analysis has been 
developing. A key contribution has been made primarily by political scientists whose awareness of 
structural factors and how these shape health policy, and public policy more generally, helps to 
illuminate the politics of welfare reform in contemporary ‘developed’ states as well as highlighting 
cross-national commonalities in healthcare reform agendas. Though not all are as concerned with 
the implications of research practices and the direct links to policy influence, it signals an opening 
of the health policy research agenda in academia for analysis beyond content. 
This broader perspective has not yet reached far outside academic circles; major institutional 
actors with a significant influence in policy making at both international and national levels 
continue to lack sufficient reflection on the contextual and process aspects in the practice of 
learning from past policy. An example is the USA where, for decades, little appears to have been 
learned from past mistakes in national (federal) healthcare reform, whilst at the same time there is 
impetus to export these same mistakes (Walker, 1999; Krugman, 2007), as policy makers in other 
countries look for quick-fix solutions to the inadequacies of their own healthcare systems. At the 
same time, there is little evidence of substantial transformation in the premises of policy advice 
stemming from influential organisations such as the World Bank (IBRD, 1993), which has had 
considerable impact on the form of development programmes for the ‘South’, successfully 
overturning the dominant paradigm for economic development towards the neoliberal model of 
economic liberalisation and public sector privatisation (Cammack, 2002 & 2004).  
An important point about Walt and Gilson’s intervention is that their commentary is focused 
on the paucity of policy analysis and policy transfer for health reform in relation to developing 
countries. They cite important historical reasons for this paucity, noting the impact of international 
donor agencies and international governmental organisations policy prescriptions on national public 
policy changes and failure to restructure developing countries according to flawed criteria for 
development. They note how ‘economic adjustment programmes affected the health sector through 
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cuts in budgets, promotion of the private sector, and the introduction of user charges for health 
services’, but ‘the tendency of those advocating policy reforms was to perceive them as technical’, 
so that ‘international experts negotiated reform programmes with national policy-makers’ (Walt & 
Gilson, 1994, p.355).  
This latter point has been no less relevant to developed countries where, in spite of deeply 
entrenched public systems of welfare that have not been so easily displaced as in many developing 
countries in the past few decades.11 Overall, there has been greater investment in strengthening 
‘evidence-based’ policy making and evaluation research (Langley, Denis & Lamothe, 2003, p.196) 
- in official state-sponsored research institutions, such as NICE in the UK, as well as in academic 
research agendas - at the expense of understanding processes.12 The focus is primarily on 
quantitative data collection and analysis intended to lead to evaluation and adjustment of what are 
effectively rendered technical decisions (Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 355). Again, this is not for a lack 
of research on policy process, context or actors. But insofar as this research is employed for policy 
making itself, there are significant gaps. At one level this may be attributed to a ‘cultural gap’ 
between policy-makers and academic policy research (Caplan, 1979). It can also be attributed to the 
difficulties of the immediate applicability of contextual and process research into policy-
formulation as policy is also often inherently tied to short-term political agendas, for as Reich 
(1994) argues, ‘policy reform is a profoundly political process, affecting the origins, formulation 
and implementation of policy’ (cited in Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 354).  
Some of the reasons are clearly world historical. An ideological shift from ‘consensus’ to 
conflict has had an important impact on the trajectory of healthcare reform policies, not only in their 
content but also in the way in which the normative basis for healthcare provision outcomes should 
be achieved (Walt & Gilson, 1994, pp.355-257). In the immediate post-WWII period, the 
construction of contemporary healthcare systems in western ‘developed’ economies was part of a 
broader set of economic changes and a ‘consensus’ politics which prioritised the development of 
                                                   
11 For this we can cite the importance of popular and political resistance to privatisation and market-oriented 
restructuring of welfare systems; although, as I also argue, this resistance has been met by other approaches to 
introducing market structures. Whilst the technical dimension to policy change discourse is still present in 
‘developed’ countries a key basis for overcoming resistance has been to focus on consumer choice as a 
criterion for public service ‘improvement’ (Henderson & Petersen, 2002). 
12 A key reason for this lies in the paucity of empirical evidence for the purposes of quantitative evaluation of 
healthcare systems. Indeed, most data on healthcare systems only began to become available from the late-
1960s and mid-1970s, and even then there is only very patchy longitudinal data to draw on. The logic of 
organisations such as the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is specifically to 
counter this lack of data. 
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publicly owned industry and public welfare services; with a dominant role of the state in regulating 
markets even where these were not owned by the state. In developing countries, during the 1950s 
and 1960s, ‘state directed development was justified through economic analysis that identified 
market mechanisms as being inadequate in developing countries legitimizing governments’ role in 
intervening to correct market imperfections through public sector investment’ (Chowdhury & 
Kirkpatrick, 1994, p.1; cited in Walt & Gilson, p.355). Similarly, in Western European economies 
the dominance of the Keynesian model of macro-economic planning and the objectives of full-
employment in public policy thinking, helped to perpetuate for some time a broad ‘consensus’ on 
the notion of the failure of the market to adequately meet social and economic objectives (Gough, 
1979; Offe, 1984; O’Connor, 2000). A prime example of this has been ‘Butskelite’ paradigm of a 
mixed economy in Britain from the 1950s - a political-ideological climate in which the recently 
founded NHS and public education programmes flourished - until the ascent of the New Right in 
the UK under Thatcher in 1979 (Ranade & Haywood, 1991, p.93; Singleton, 1995, p.22; Kerr, 
1999).13  
The mixed economy thus became a mainstay of post-WWII economic growth as well as the 
de-commodifying role of the welfare state (Holden, 2003b). In the UK, the nationalisation of 
industries extended in many respects to areas such as healthcare, whilst in Germany and France a 
corporatist model for universalising healthcare access was pursued via state regulated social 
insurance systems linked to employment rather than taxation-derived funding (Freeman, 2000). 
Private sector medical and health care thus developed in quite different ways within a group of 
countries all of which, to one extent or another, emphasised nationalised industry and public 
welfare. By contrast, in the US, the institution of Medicaid and Medicare had the adverse result of 
contributing to the commercial development of healthcare (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1990; 
Relman, 1997). But although the mixed economy model was rendered unproblematic in the context 
of the post-WWII decades of economic recovery and growth, governments began to subvert the 
existing political-ideological ‘consensus’ in the early 1980s and by the 1990s began looking to the 
private for-profit sector for solutions to the problems of healthcare systems.  
                                                   
13 We should note, however, that this conception of a political-ideological ‘consensus’ in defining public 
policy in 1950s and 60s western Europe has also come under criticism and revision (Kerr, 1999), particularly 
in terms of the perceived continuities and discontinuities before and after 1979 in British politics (Marsh et al, 
1999). 
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The approach to health policy proposed by Walt and Gilson is effectively a method of 
examining structure and agency in policy formulation and implementation. Underlying this point is 
that the structure-agency is a problem that social scientists cannot escape (Giddens, 1984), and also 
constitutes one of the most contested features of social scientific inquiry (Weik, 2006). By arguing 
for analysis beyond policy content, their model ‘offers a much broader framework for thinking 
about health policy’ wherein policy is not simply about prescription or description, and nor is it 
developed in a social vacuum, but is ‘the outcome of complex social, political and economic 
interactions’ (Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 359). Thus, whilst content is about the policy output, and 
context constitutes the broader structural framework or conditions within which actors (individuals, 
collectives, or networks) must operate, then process refers to the means by which the agenda is 
constructed and determines the output and ultimately the outcomes.  
2.1.2. Policy analysis: an overview  
Policy analysis has no singular origin but draws on concepts from a number of disciplines 
ranging from economics, political science, sociology, public administration, and history, emerging 
in the late 1960s in the United States. With such a heterogeneity of different theories and definitions 
(Heclo, 1972) it is worthwhile setting apart how I intend to use policy analysis from the historical 
development of the technique as a method of social scientific investigation. 
Understanding process 
Where process is the focus in policy analysis, policy-makers tend to be viewed as rational 
and acting within a well-defined framework of choices between policy alternatives towards the 
procurement of ‘complex yet compatible goals’ (Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 358). Conducting policy 
analysis in this view has a primarily instrumental objective comprising, in Dror’s definition, a set of 
‘approaches, methods, methodologies and techniques for improving discrete policy decisions’ 
(1993, p.4: cited in Walt & Gilson, 1994, p.). Thus, the rational choice foundation is a strong 
epistemological feature in the analytic techniques of many key proponents of policy analysis.14 The 
task is one of providing policy-makers and/or other relevant actors with choices between 
alternatives towards meeting their goals, built on analysis and evaluation of public policy options. 
                                                   
14 This is particularly the case in US traditions of policy analysis literature where rational choice, 
pluralist and functionalist schools of thought have been most prevalent. 
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 As such, we see a tendency to break down the policy process into stages of activity that can 
be analysed each in their own right and which collectively are taken to constitute process. For 
example, Laswell’s (1956) conceptualization of the main stages of policy process consist of (i) 
agenda-setting, (ii) decision-making, (iii) adoption, and (iv) evaluation (Sabatier, 1999; Buse, Mays 
and Walt, 2005). Concerned with improving the process of policy making itself, Lindblom (1959) 
proposes analysis of what happens in organizations and how particular decisions lead to particular 
outcomes. In contrast to Laswell, he asserts that the ‘stages’ are not necessarily followed in 
sequence, nor are they all necessarily visited upon. Rather, policy actors essentially ‘muddle 
through’ most of the time in an incremental process of policy construction.  
Agenda formation 
Agenda-setting constitutes a crucial stage at which actors can influence policy outcomes. The 
prevailing socio-political situation can either lead to issues reaching the policy agenda just as the 
policy process mechanisms can dictate which issues are excluded (Sabatier, 1999; Sutton, 1999). 
Following Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams model, for an issue to get on the governmental 
agenda,15 three streams must converge to create a ‘window of opportunity’: (i) how it is perceived 
and defined by policy actors and how it is brought to light (the problem ); (ii) how relevant and 
plausible the proposed solutions are to the policymakers and stakeholders alike (its solutions); and 
how it fits into the current state of affairs and how influential the interest groups and coalitions 
are/can be in ensuring its dominance (the political situation). If appropriately adhered to these 
‘windows’ of opportunity ensure that issues receive a policy response (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 
1998), which also requires the right actor or as Kingdon calls it a ‘policy entrepreneur’ (1991; 
1995), competing with others for the attention of decision-makers. The ideal policy entrepreneur is 
the capable advocate who can foresee the solution and the required political climate in which to 
present his issue whilst simultaneously balancing an intricate web of policy networks. 
The importance of different actors throughout the different stages of the policy making cycle 
is thus a key point for analysis (Sabatier, 1999; Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Lindblom, 1979; Stone, 
1999). However, the way in which actors attempt to influence the policy agenda depends largely on 
the premises of policy analysis - i.e. whether it focuses on policy as conditioned by norms and 
                                                   
15 There is also an important distinction between the ‘governmental’ and the ‘decision’ agenda (Kingdon, 
1995, p.4). The agenda itself defined as ‘the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and 
people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any 
given time’ (p.3).  
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values, ideas and interests or institutions – something reflected in a variety of authors discussing 
policy networks (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). Due to the nature of the policy system consisting of 
conflict and bargaining, coalition formation amongst groups to advance certain interests and protect 
others is an integral part of the process (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Actors can be divided into 
different groups for analysis: issue networks (Heclo, 1978; Berry, 1989), epistemic communities 
(Haas, 1992); policy communities (Stone, 1999), and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993).16 
Lindblom acknowledges and is interested in a process of bargaining taken as inherent 
between different interest groups in the process of policymaking.17 This is particularly useful 
approach when considering the array of actors involved in the policy process, locating their relative 
interests, and identifying how they relate to each other. For our research, private for-profit firms are 
a key ‘interest group’ in the healthcare reform agenda. However, as I discuss later in this chapter, 
for-profit firms – variably referred to as ‘business’ or ‘capital’ - by no means constitute a uniform 
group, whether taken within the healthcare sector or more generally as business actors seeking 
market share and profit-maximisation. Moreover, it is not only within the business sphere that we 
find advocates of market-oriented welfare reform. Rather this reflects a wider ideological and 
contextual environment in which a broader array of actors (with no obvious or direct stake in 
market share), seek to influence governmental agenda formation. Thus, in these different coalitions 
of agency, actors are responsible for placing themselves in a position of power and subsequently 
competing to maintain it through use of external actors (the foremost example of the media) and 
contextual opportunities, and they do this by framing of certain issues, thereby either expanding or 
curtailing policy debates.  
Leichter (1979) categorises the systemic contextual factors as situational – idiosyncratic 
‘focusing events’ that are either one-off occurrences or lengthy diffused issues; structural – the 
moderately unchanging elements including economic typology, demographics, political structure, 
etc; cultural – the cultural make-up of society and the extent of its influence and diffusion; and 
international or exogenous – the influence of international organisations or movements and level of 
inter-dependence between states (Leichter, 1979; Buse, Mays and Walt, 2005, p11). The 
                                                   
16 This is simplified in Walt & Gilson (1994) by dividing actors into individuals, organisations and groups.  
17 Lindblom’s analysis is often described as having a pluralist outlook, given his emphasis on various actors 
within the policy field, and their interests ultimately (in a democracy; as defined by Lindblom/Dahl) will 
make their way through to the agenda of policy making and implementation. 
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implication is that each factor holds a different balance of the political, economic and social triptych 
at national and international levels and can interchangeably be used to frame a discourse on 
particular issue, whether this is on a political party electoral campaign (Lakoff, 2005), development 
policy (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996), or the impact of globalisation on national decision-making 
(Hay, 2001; Watson & Hay, 2003).18  
Regardless of how analysts view power, the literature discussed above highlights a power 
driven inter-dependence between all aspects of the policy making system that combine, implicitly or 
explicitly, to enable or suppress specific agendas within policy-making. To quote Lindblom (1979), 
‘fragmentation of policy making and consequent political interaction among many participants are 
not only methods for curbing power but are methods, in many circumstances, of raising the level of 
information and rationality brought to bear on decisions’ (p.524). However, as Lukes (1974) argues, 
power is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be understood as a purely behavioural relation, 
but one in which ideological context has an important role in the exertion of power in distorting 
agents’ perceptions of their real interests and in the contestation over framing agendas (Couzens 
Hoy, 1986, pp.125-126). But an over-emphasis on structural limits to agency can also be damaging 
to an understanding of the role of agents. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious of both a pluralist 
approach, which looks only at interest group activity and policy-making, as well as any approach 
which considers power solely in terms of ideological or structural control. An understanding of the 
broader contextual basis for policy decision making at the state level must also be sought outside of 
the policy process. 
Continuity, Discontinuity or Path Dependency 
Though we may understand the policy process within a national political context, policy 
analysis does not in itself explain the reasons for a particular policy direction being chosen. In 
rejecting the pluralist and functionalist models, I am acknowledging that the choices available to 
policy makers are not necessarily a priori choices, nor is a particular direction for policy inevitable. 
For instance, when in 1988 Margaret Thatcher announced on a BBC broadcast of the Panorama 
                                                   
18 Although policy analysis will be more effective with a consideration of process, actors and context, it does 
not mean that content need be ignored or undermined. Indeed, much can be gained from the techniques of 
discourse analysis (Hay, 1998). However, whilst I incorporate observations of discourse from other authors, 
this is not the primary mode of analysis in this thesis. Rather it is used at times to illuminate the thinking of 
various actors, and the way official statements by policy actors demonstrate how they frame the agenda 
conceptually. 
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programme that there would be a “fundamental review of the NHS”, the particular direction 
announced was anticipated by neither party insiders, nor opposition party actors, nor indeed most 
actors outside of the party political system (Leys, 2001). Overall, this announcement did not mark a 
fundamental disjuncture from Thatcherite economic doctrine for restructuring the national economy 
and for welfare services reform. However, it still constitutes a significant turning point for the then 
government’s policy on the NHS. At least from the late 1970s but especially under New Labour, 
healthcare reform policy has in many ways appeared disjointed and incoherent, with many short 
term goals being set at the expense successful long-term reform. Echoed over a decade later, was 
the announcement of the 2000 NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) in which New 
Labour laid out its programme for fundamental reform of the NHS. Again, this appeared to deviate 
from earlier electoral promises implying a retreat from market solutions (Greener, 2004; Jenkins, 
2005). 
This scenario has prompted some to question the substantive nature of reform - and thereby 
change - for the NHS, echoing questions regarding the broader public policy agenda for public 
sector reform (Hay, 1999; LeGrand & Vizard, 1998). If there is no fundamental discontinuity, then 
is there essentially a path dependency underlying the policy agenda for healthcare reform? This 
question becomes more pertinent when we consider diachronic continuities. For instance, whilst the 
NHS has undergone a variety of transformations to its administrative structure since its foundation, 
the foundational premises of its operation have remained largely unaltered. Indeed, access remains 
in most areas essentially free at the point of use and continues to be regulated by indirect rationing 
mechanisms of queuing (waiting lists), whilst the co-existence of private and public sector delivery 
(and provision) of services has remained essentially unchallenged throughout its existence.19 Still, 
this does not detract from the fact that the policies since the 1980s in the UK which can be 
                                                   
19 This has not precluded actual challenges in Parliament, such as when Labour Secretary of State for 
Social Services Barbara Castle headed a challenge to the public private mix in calling for the banning of pay-
beds in NHS hospitals in the late 1970s. The irony of the outcome was that this challenge was undermined by 
her own party colleagues and the then prime minister (Harold Wilson) in coalition with Conservative 
counterparts. Moreover, when Thatcher as prime minister sought to reverse any possibility of banning pay-
beds with the intent of safeguarding the mixed-economy in healthcare and indirectly encouraging private 
sector healthcare alternatives, the consequence was to stunt the domestic private sector healthcare services 
market (Griffith, Illife & Rayner, 1987).  
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understood to favour and encourage market structures - whether in ‘quasi’ form or in ‘genuine’ 
competitive market by opening up to for-profit competitors for service contracts – do reflect a 
fundamental shift in the way in which government of public sector provision is undertaken. 
I would argue that one should not assume that specific discontinuities in certain areas amount 
to substantive change. For instance, whilst the internal market outlined in the Working For Patients 
Bill (1989) was touted as a great innovation for addressing the fundamental problems of the NHS, 
empirical research indicates that the market structures proposed were not substantially 
implemented, so that the essential relationships that were to be changed remained barely altered 
(West, 1998). Related here, is the question of the level at which change takes place. Indeed, reform 
at micro-level, such as quality standards in clinical surgery practices, may be relatively 
straightforward to enforce, whilst more macro-level cultural-organisational changes which affect 
multiple tiers of medical or health practice are much harder to implement.  
2.2. International Political Economy and Healthcare Reform 
A limitation in utilizing policy analytic techniques is its confinement to actor relationships 
and the process of policy making, so that contextual factors remain under-emphasised or even 
absent from the analytical framework. Contextual factors tend to be taken as given aspects within 
which effectively timeless categories of actors or actor groups must negotiate their way through the 
policy process. Here a political economy approach is particularly useful for developing an 
explanatory framework for the historical and social context within which processes related to 
formulation and implementation of welfare state restructuring take place. The prioritisation of the 
‘international’ in International Political Economy 20 is no mere extension of the ‘national’ to another 
level. It is an interdisciplinary field containing various approaches concerned with international 
trade and finance, as well as state policies and how these affect the former. More mainstream works 
since the 1970s focused on the relationship between state and market in international regimes 
(Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1976, 1994). However a more critical strand of research has developed 
since the mid-1980s from the work of Susan Strange (1994, 1998) and Robert W. Cox (1983, 1987) 
taking a broader view of the relationship between state and market.  
                                                   
20 Similarly we could talk of an extension of the ‘global’ in Global Political Economy (Palan, 2000; Gilpin, 
2001). 
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With regard to the application of political economy in healthcare, some of the most explicit 
examples of political economy approach have been from Marxian authors (Doyal & Pennel, 1994; 
Navarro, 1976, 1978; McKinley ed., 1984). There are also examples where the more ‘classical’ 
rationalist economic methodology is employed to analyse the policy challenges in healthcare 
financing and provision (Keynes, Coleman & Dimsdale, 1988). Overall we find that the political 
economy approach is characterised by a multitude of authors - derived from areas as diverse as 
epidemiology, political science, sociology, history, health planning and medicine - highlighting 
once again, the inter-disciplinary nature of this approach (Baer, 1982). Moreover, whilst the 
political economy of health is a subject that has been ‘dropped and rediscovered several times since 
the mid-19th century’,21 a revival of the approach in the late 1970s and early 1980s,  
‘struck a responsive chord among certain medical social scientists was related to a 
growing dissatisfaction with functionalism and the failure of many studies to place an 
analysis of health problems and the organization of medical care in a larger societal 
context’ (ibid, p. 2). 
The currency of such an approach is in a concern with ‘the impact that the capitalist mode of 
production has on the production, distribution, and consumption of health services and how these 
processes reflect the class relations of the larger societies within which medical institutions are 
embedded’ (Baer, 1982, p.2). Moreover, the intimate link between the economic and political 
spheres means than they cannot be disentangled from each other without, at least, losing a sense of 
the bigger picture and, crucially, gravely misidentifying the context within which policy is made 
(Wood, 1981, 2002). In this sense, the ‘international’ or ‘global’ is already imbued within the 
Marxian political economy approach.  
Despite these interventions by a number of authors employing the political economy 
approach, there continues to be a substantive gap in the literature investigating the link between 
changes in the welfare state, changes in healthcare systems, and the internationalisation of welfare 
and healthcare service provision (Moran, 2000, p. 136). What follows in this section of the chapter 
involves as much an unpicking of the relationship between international and national levels of 
analysis as it does between the healthcare, the state and capitalism.  
                                                   
21 A reference to the work of Friedrich Engels in his The Condition of the Working Class in England in 
1844, (Baer, 1982, p.2) 
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2.2.1. Welfare State Restructuring 
One thing that is striking is the resilience of institutions such as the NHS in a political and 
ideological environment that seems otherwise quite hostile (or at least intolerant) of social 
provision. It is clear from historical analysis that the NHS was substantively not the socialist ideal 
presented in political rhetoric (Doyal, 1994; Fielding et al, 1995; Porter, 1999), nor is it the socialist 
nightmare presented by its detractors. Yet, the social contract that brought it into being in the 
context of post-WWII West European welfare states remains an essential part of ongoing political 
landscape. But whilst the strength of popular support for public social provision in most countries 
makes wholesale dismantling the welfare state highly unlikely, at the same time, it is this very 
social contract which has been under increasing pressure for revision in the past thirty years (Cox, 
R.H., 1998) so that restructuring and modernisation have become the predominant language for 
change in ‘mature’ welfare states (Pierson, P. 1996, 1998). 
Retreat of the state from social provision 
One of the key points of debate during the 1990s was over whether and how the state was 
retreating from social provision. In this view ‘social policy is subordinated to the needs of labour 
flexibility and/or the constraints of international competition’ (Loader & Burrows, 1994, p. 2), so 
that effectively there was a shift from ‘welfare state’ to ‘workfare state’ or ‘competition state’ 
(Jessop, 1994; Cerny, 1997; Mishra, 1999). Even prior to the ascent of ‘globalisation’ as a dominant 
explanatory variable, the subject of welfare state restructuring had occupied numerous pages and 
research agendas; though the ‘globalisation’ era (at least intellectually) has done nothing but 
accentuate a sense that (radical) transformation has been taking place (Strange, 1998; Shaw, 1997). 
Critical analysis of these decades illustrates that far from retreat, states have often increased their 
financial input into welfare and public services (Pierson, P. 1998; Navarro, Schmitt & Astudillo, 
2004). Moreover, public support for the retention of social provision is still high, in spite of serious 
concerns and misgivings with the actual state of public welfare services (Donelan et al, 1999; 
Koivusalo, 2003, p. 98). This creates a puzzle regarding what is really changing.  
The political discourse of the New Right latched on to the problem of constantly growing 
expenditure on public services, and argued for its curtailment by a number of strategies, including 
privatisation, and marketisation of public services, arguing that the absence of competitive drive in 
public sector only leads to inefficient use of resources, spiralling costs, and services that are 
unresponsive to the needs and wants of their users as consumers (Altenstetter & Heywood eds, 
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1991). Thus, whilst there has been an increase in social spending, the form in which social 
provision takes place has been changing. Certain areas have been privatized whilst those which 
remain in the public sphere have been subject to a much more monitored and market-oriented 
thinking. Yet, in the long-run there have been mixed results following the application of such 
measures generating the desired outcomes across countries with widely differing models for 
healthcare (Cabiades & Guillen, 2001; Andersen, Smedby & Vagero, 2001; Lieverdink, 2001; 
Light, 2001; Fougere, 2001). 
By the 1980s almost all OECD healthcare systems 22 could be said to have achieved some 
semblance of universal coverage for basic healthcare services, to which the principle of equity in 
access to care constitutes the core normative foundation (Cutler, D. 2002). Yet by this time it also 
became apparent that universalisation of coverage could not be implemented without ultimately 
presenting challenges regarding rising expenditure on healthcare and the efficiency of resource 
allocation, as few constraints on medical care demand or supply were in conflict with rising 
demands for healthcare services. 
‘Countries were willing to accept spending above efficient levels to meet distributional 
goals. But spending was also growing more rapidly than countries could easily afford. 
While tax revenues were increasing at the rate of payroll or consumption growth, 
roughly the rate of GDP growth, medical-care spending was increasing twice as 
rapidly. In the average OECD country, medical care rose from 3.8 percent of GDP in 
1960 to 7.2 percent in 1980.’ (Cutler, D. 2002, p. 887) 
The rising costs confronted by governments in OECD countries, particularly, are chiefly associated 
with the adoption of new medical technologies. A significant portion of national expenditure on 
healthcare has been absorbed by pharmaceutical products (both prescription and over-the-counter), 
and the use of high-tech innovations in the clinical setting account for the greater part of this 
technological cost rise (Moran, 1999). Though the costs of medical and support workforce, as well 
as of the expansion of clinical facilities have also been important, the technological aspect 
overshadows their impact.  
Another challenge is associated with the growing expectations of patients in terms of having 
access to services and making use of healthcare resources. The impact of changing demographics is 
                                                   
22 The US is a notable outlier here with around 40% of its population remaining uninsured for healthcare. 
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further seen as a challenge to the fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems as ageing populations 
put pressure on the fiscal pool of resources. This fate is shared by all funding systems one way or 
another, whether compulsory social security (France, Belgium, Japan, or Germany), taxation based 
funding (UK’s NHS), single-payer (USA Medicare and Medicaid), or private insurance (USA, and 
many other countries where public and private funding co-exist) (Donaldson et al, 2005, pp. 55-72; 
Poullier et al, 2002; Abel-Smith & Mossialos, 1994). 
Economists tend to express these pressures in terms of a cost, efficiency and equity mismatch 
(Cutler, D. 2002; LeGrand, 1990). But while policy makers and health administrators seek to 
control costs, this will not necessarily correspond with the attainment of productive efficiency. The 
objective of population equity in access and quality of treatment cannot be easily reconciled with 
the organisational objectives of cost control and productive efficiency. But there is also, in essence, 
a tension between the technical objectives of policy analysis and organisational management, and 
the normative values for social provision and citizenship. One author, commenting on the politics of 
Community care policy reform in early 1990s Britain, has expressed this in terms of a political-
ideological mismatch between the principles of the welfare state and the resources available (Salter, 
1994). Importantly, these are not autonomous developments but intimately bound up with the 
development of welfare states as a de-commodifying intervention by capitalist states as well as the 
broader political, economic and social changes surrounding healthcare systems. 
Thus, debates surrounding the reform of healthcare have become focused on the issues of 
financing / taxation, regulation, and provision, and it is these three dimensions which frame the 
basis for transformation of welfare states (LeGrand, Propper & Robinson, 1992). Nonetheless, these 
dimensions tend to obscure the fundamental absence of substantive debate over the normative basis 
for legislative or constitutional clarification on what the state is due to its citizens. For Salter 
(1994): 
‘The restricted agenda on the appropriate relationship between social rights and state 
responsibilities has left policy makers and their legions of advisers unable to analyse, 
understand or answer the problems inherent in the apparently inexorable and 
uncontrollable expansion of the welfare state’ (p.120). 
We can see that this tension is derived from the fundamental contradictions of the welfare state 
itself as a de-commodifying mediatory agent. In a bid to see through substantive restructuring of 
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social provision, reforming states have also experimented with the reformulation of this 
decommodifying role. 
De-commodification / Re-commodification: back to the market 
De-commodification as a concept goes back to Polanyi (1957) who, building on an existing 
body of political economy literature and somewhat critical of the marginalist tradition, noted how 
capitalism treats labour as a commodity produced for exchange.23 For Polanyi, the commodification 
of labour is an unstable ‘fiction’ that in turn requires non-commodified support systems to preserve 
and enhance the capitalist system whenever labour is forced to exit the labour ‘market’ (Polanyi, 
1957; Offe, 1984; Holden 2003b, pp. 303). The concept has been extended and brought to greater 
popularity since the 1990s by Esping-Andersen, who understands de-commodification as ‘when a 
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market’ (1990, pp. 21-22). It is a view entrenched in T.H. Marshall’s conception of 
social rights and citizenship in modern capitalist states, wherein social rights given the same status 
as property rights ‘will entail a decommodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market’ 
(Marshall, 1950). Others have extended the concept in terms of empowerment expressed through 
citizenship against the forces of the market, whereby decommodified social policies afford greater 
autonomy and choice to citizens in their lives; choices over marriage, having children, seeking 
higher education, and to engage in political activity which in principle are unconstrained by market 
relations (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 1394, cited in Holden (2003b), p. 304).  
De-commodification entails an active intervention from the state to create ‘non-market’ 
spheres. This can be seen in employment policies that assist in times of unemployment and finding 
new jobs, in the compulsory social insurance payments, in the provision of free school education, or 
the direct state financing of healthcare. Public services came to be associated with de-
commodification, particularly in the development of post-WWII welfare state institutions. The 
Keynesian policies of full-employment and state intervention in the economy, which dominated the 
post-war era until the 1980s, derived much of their logic from the recognition of the fact that 
                                                   
23 Marx’s conceptualisation of commodification has been hugely influential: ‘The transformation of labour 
(as living, purposive activity) into capital is, in itself, the result of the exchange between capital and labour, in 
so far as it gives the capitalist the title of ownership to the product of labour (and command over the same). 
[…]Labour itself is productive only if absorbed into capital, where capital forms the basis of production, and 
where the capitalist is therefore in command of production. The productivity of labour becomes the 
productive force of capital just as the general exchange value of commodities fixes itself in money.’ (author’s 
italics: Marx, 1973, p. 308) 
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markets are not self-regulating mechanisms. In economic terminology the basis for de-
commodification is expressed in terms of the problem of ‘market failure’; that is the inadequacy of 
market-organised services to meet collective needs and the inherent (Pareto) inefficiency of the 
market in providing social goods due to a tendency towards concentration (monopoly or oligopoly) 
and informational asymmetries between producer (physician, hospital providers, or health insurance 
firms) and consumer (Wonderling, Gruen & Black, 2005, pp.138-145; LeGrand, 1990).  
Nonetheless, de-commodification is only ever partial because it continues to remain within 
the system of capitalist accumulation and is thereby defined by it: it is neither a return to the ‘pre-
commodified’ state of affairs nor a full retreat from the commodified relationship. Rather, it is a 
constant mediation by the state of the contradictory relations between capital and labour. 
Consequently the state resorts to a strategy of, what Offe (1984) calls, administrative re-
commodification under which legal and economic subjects can function as commodities. It is a three 
pronged strategy including the saleability of labour, the saleability of capital, and ultimately the 
exposure of certain sectors previously insulated to market processes.  
Thus from the 1980s, market practices have been infused into social policies and public 
services, whilst the private sector has on the one hand been brought into more direct competition 
with public sector, and on the other the boundaries between public and private have continued to be 
smudged in certain areas. For Leys (2001) this transformation is a threat to non-market spheres of 
life, requiring active policies of commodification of something that previously was not, by the 
following means: (i) a reconstitution of goods and services as tradeable (we can note the ascent of 
health economics as a policy framework and the triumph of the technical agenda), (ii) people are 
induced to want to buy them (through the privatisation, quasi-markets, and the consumerisation of 
public service usage), (iii) a change in workforce ethic (labour flexibilization and New 
Managerialism), and (iv) ultimately where the risk is underwritten by state (examples such as the 
Private Finance Initiative where the state effectively has been expected to underwrite what 
otherwise were privately financed construction projects).  
What we are witnessing then is not a complete reversal of the de-commodifying role of 
welfare state practices, but a partial re-commodification. Indeed, as I have suggested, policies which 
focus on competitiveness - presented within a modernisation discourse - to meet the challenges of 
increased international integration tend to see welfare services being reconfigured in order to serve 
effectively the needs of the market. Thus, New Labour for example has not attempted to reverse 
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social rights in any simple way but rather has sought to redefine them by arguing that they must be 
attached to obligations or ‘responsibilities’ in its workfare programme (Holden, 2003b, p.310).24  
Welfare state and the internationalisation of public services providers 
Under partial re-commodification welfare restructuring and public service modernisation 
agendas possess an essentially experimental character as programmes for welfare reform. It is in 
this framework of trying to introduce competition in public healthcare systems that the presence of 
international for-profit firms has primarily been fostered. But the form of internationalisation also 
has a very specific character in each country since, as has already been emphasised, healthcare 
reform is also bound up with the historical specificities of national healthcare systems.  
The UK private sector market in healthcare remains small in relation to the public NHS 
system, despite deliberate public policies to expand the private sector role since the 1980s. Moves 
under the Thatcher governments to restructure the power relations within the public healthcare 
system, alongside broader policies of privatisation of post-WWII nationalized industries and 
utilities, marked the first wave of de-regulation and liberalization of the healthcare sector in the UK 
(Rayner, 1986;). However, this only extended to certain areas of the healthcare services and, 
moreover, did not comprise a unified and coherent privatization programme for healthcare services 
as was the case in other economic spheres and in much of the social services sector. By the 1990s, 
the emphasis was less on privatization and more on introducing market forms to the public sector, 
with PFI projects for the construction of new facilities, business oriented accounting and managerial 
practices extended from reforms that were instituted in the 1980s, and the infamous quasi-market 
relationships within the organisational structure of the NHS. 
Western European social-democratic countries also experienced market-oriented reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, the extent and form of market-oriented changes were fairly different 
in that the structure of these healthcare systems was more corporatist than the centralised tax-based 
system of the UK. Private provision was already the modus operandi of healthcare services in 
Germany25 and the Netherlands for example. But heavy state regulation maintained limits on the 
business orientation in healthcare, whilst compulsory employment-related insurance schemes cover 
                                                   
24 A strategy in which the provision of state income has become a means of commodifying rather than 
decommodifying labour, by seeking to eliminate surplus labour power via active engagement in job-seeking 
or (re-) training. 
25 Inevitably after unification the former German Democratic Republic’s healthcare system became 
restructured according to the new unified Federal Republic of Germany. 
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the bulk of the costs of care. This has not prevented, however, the growth of domestic private 
sectors - whether in co-existence with the public sector or outside it – and also the expansion of 
activities for a small number of such firms into foreign markets (Roemer, 1987; Hall, 2001). 
As Holden argues ‘…the nature of the welfare state, in both home and host countries, plays a 
pivotal role in determining firms’ internationalisation strategies in the social care sector’, since due 
to the extensive role of states in welfare provision ‘…states are likely to have the greatest impact on 
the strategic decisions of welfare-related firms…’ (2003a, p. 292). Noting LeGrand et al’s (1992) 
observations regarding three possible forms of state intervention to secure social welfare - direct 
provision, taxes and subsidies, and regulation - Holden proceeds to relocate the focus from the 
analytical restrictions of ‘regime-based’ conceptualisations of the welfare state such as Esping-
Andersen’s to a more flexible notion of ‘Welfare State Formation’ (WSF) (Holden, 2003a, p. 292). 
This view allows for greater consideration for change in the political and economic dimensions of 
social policy, particularly when we wish to account for the relationship between social policy and 
private sector organisations. Moreover, it provides a firmer basis for analysing the relations in view 
of internationalising strategies of care sector firms, which are not directly comparable to other (i.e. 
manufacturing) sectors where internationalisation has received greater attention academically, but 
also where the patterns and objectives may be quite different. He goes on to argue that ‘…it is the 
particular mix of direct state provision, taxes and subsidies, and regulation in the welfare state 
formation that provides the opportunities for, or barriers to, the international expansion of private 
providers of health services’ (my italics: Holden, 2003a, p.288). 
The key is not the existing WSF but change in the WSF, the opportunities this opens up for 
private providers and its influence on the internationalizing strategies of such firms. For where in 
the UK, ‘the publicly funded NHS is expanding the scope of private provision through a substantial 
increase in taxation and subsidy’ (ibid, p.293), historically the state has not supported domestic care 
firms, so that the entrance of foreign owned organisations into the market have posed a considerable 
competitive pressure in key areas of the private care market. By contrast, ‘countries like the USA 
which have long tradition of private insurance are likely to have markets dominated by domestically 
based private providers, rather than by foreign-owned firms’ (ibid, p.293). Moreover, US firms 
abroad ‘will have a competitive advantage on the world market due to accumulated experience’ 
(ibid, p.293). The WSF concept is also valuable for comparative assessments in that it is this 
combination of factors that firms will regard in developing strategies for entering foreign markets. 
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2.2.2. The State, ‘Globalization’ and Policy Change 
As transformations in the role of the state vis-à-vis social provision have been taking place, 
the explanatory importance of ‘globalisation’ has increased with a search for causal factors for these 
transformations. It has also been the subject of considerable debate over its actual explanatory 
value; a debate that has taken place predominantly in IR and IPE have addressed the theorisation of 
international integration/globalization, particularly given its domination of conceptual space 
throughout the 1990s, whereby the two main approaches were in contestation. For many scholars, 
‘globalisation’ has been understood as the intensification of temporal and spatial integration of 
international political, economic, social, cultural and informational relations and processes (Dicken, 
1998; Scholte, 2000). This view suggests a self-effacing tendency in the state, and the possibility of 
its ultimate demise or at least decline as a significant socio-political institution or actor (Levitt, 
1983; Ohmae, 1990, 1995). A contesting and sceptical view has been that ‘globalisation’ entails 
little more than ‘internationalisation’ by another name, whereby states continued to remain the 
predominant actors in the international system, but also that the resilience of national sovereignty 
countered the assertions of ‘globalists’ (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Strange, 1998; Weiss, 1997).  
Its meaning has often been adapted to the intellectual agenda of each author, and despite each 
‘discipline’ claiming some unique take on the questions that arise with regard to ‘globalisation’, 
little deep engagement has taken place within the field of healthcare policy. Where authors do speak 
of globalisation there has remained an implicit and at times explicit acceptance of the ‘globalist’ 
thesis. Even so, as the debate has matured in more recent years, there has been re-engagement with 
its meaning in framing political discourse and action and constraining national decision making 
(Hay, 2001; Greener, 2004a), and the beginnings of a research agenda to take stock of what 
concrete impact it has on people’s lives and the social determinants of health (Hong, 2000; Lee ed, 
2003; Navarro, Schmitt & Astudillo, 2005; Labonte & Schrecker, 2007a,b,c).  
At least the common denominator amongst all analysis utilizing the concept (globalisation) is 
that it constitutes an agar-like medium with which the interpretation of complex social and 
institutional change can be a priori reduced conceptually to a singular point of reference for the 
empirical examination of the subject of analytical focus. Thus it can just as powerfully be employed 
to talk about a number of subjects as Walt (2000) has systematically pinpointed, ranging from: (i) 
economic transformation: i.e. financial volatility, marginalisation, labour insecurity; (ii) new trade 
regimes: ‘winners and losers’; (iii) the growing poverty gap: i.e. rising health inequalities; (iv) 
electronic (technological) revolution: the ‘knows’ and ‘not-knows’; (v) new forms of governance: 
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such as the proliferation of non-state actors. Yet, in its contested and at times fluid nature as a 
medium of interpretation, little clarity over the impact of ‘globalisation’ can be derived from simply 
attaching it as a concept to the analytical objectives of understanding more specific changes in, for 
instance, the policy making process and policy change. Yet, in the plurality of different contexts to 
which ‘globalization’ may refer, it also looses considerable explanatory power with regard to a 
specific set of changes such as healthcare reform. The dangers of appropriating this terminology for 
too many different contexts is discussed briefly next. 
Policy change and ‘globalisation’/ ‘internationalisation’ 
Moran and Wood (1996) discuss how internationalisation in healthcare remains more 
potential than actual. One point on which they stumble, however, is in the premise of 
‘internationalisation’ being synonymous with ‘globalisation’ (p.128). My point is not to assume 
globalisation as internationalisation ‘writ large’ (Mishra, 1999), since this negates the point of 
employing globalisation as a concept of ‘higher’ or different explanatory value than the former 
(MacLean, 2000; Weiss, 1997). Rather it is to argue that the significance of ‘globalisation’ pertains 
more to a potent discursive framework than to its actual explanatory capacity as a concept.26  
Moran and Wood nonetheless have examined the potential for evaluating empirically the 
actuality of globalisation as a structural phenomenon. Their working definition, therefore, does not 
deviate from a mainstream conception: 
‘internationalization is a process through which the authority and autonomy of the 
nation state is challenged or supplanted by structures, processes or policy 
developments which cut across national boundaries.’ (my italicisation: Moran & 
Wood, 1996, p.125) 
The problem with ‘globalisation’, as critics have noted, is that whilst it is portrayed as a 
universalising concept it falls well short of adequately capturing the continued variations in national 
and local experiences. Healthcare continues even now to be one area where the state remains central 
to its funding and provision (ibid, p.126), and healthcare systems remain highly distinctive in their 
national institutional structures (Poullier, 1989, p.6).  
                                                   
26 There is an element here of what we mentioned regarding ideology; though ‘globalisation’ or even 
‘globalism’ cannot be considered an ideology but the product of an ideological framework. 
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The logic in talking of ‘internationalisation’ therefore, as opposed to ‘globalisation’, is in 
remaining conscious of the uneven development of the different processes that comprise it both 
within and between different national locations. Thus,  
‘internationalization cannot be conceived as a single wave washing over national 
health care systems. It is perfectly possible that there is occurring, for example, 
internationalization in the markets for health care products, and in the regulation of 
those markets, without any corresponding internationalization at any significant level 
in the markets for the labour of health care professionals.’ (Moran & Wood, 1996, 
p.127) 
After all, many of the processes described are not particularly new. Migration of labour has a much 
longer historical trajectory than the past couple of decades in view of market-oriented reforms. The 
cross-national exchange of medical knowledge and information also has a prior history. 
International trade in healthcare goods has been taking place long before ‘Big Pharma’ became 
nearly synonymous with the ‘global pharmaceutical industry’ (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). An 
international sensibility about the cross-border spread of disease, and the need for cross-border co-
ordination to tackle such issues has preceded the era of ‘globalisation’ historically (Fidler, 2002). 
For an assessment of substantive change in healthcare, therefore, Moran and Wood propose four 
distinct ways in which it might take place (Moran & Wood, 1996, pp.126-7) and which can be 
employed as indicators of change: (i) the structure of policy making; (ii) changes in the 
implementation or application of health policy; (iii) internationalisation of product markets in 
health; and (iv) a ‘contextual’ or, as Lee et al (2002) describe it, a ‘cognitive’ dimension. 
Several authors have made an important contribution to studying globalisation and healthcare 
(Lee, Fustukian & Buse, 2002; Lee, 2003; Lee, 2004), drawing on the work of sociologists, political 
scientists and particularly scholars of International Relations, who dominate the theorisation of the 
international and globalisation. However, Lee’s appropriation of the dichotomous model of analysis 
of ‘temporal’ and ‘territorial’ dimensions, in emphasising the change in scale and pace of the ‘flow 
of goods, capital and people across political and economic boundaries’ (Daulaire, 1999, p.22, cited 
in Walt, 2000, p.1) tends to reproduce the weakness of conceptualising ‘globalization’ present in 
earlier scholarship. This is not to reject such findings, but to acknowledge a deep contradiction in an 
approach which remains essentially descriptive whilst claiming to offer explanatory value 
(Rosenberg, 2007). The chief proponents of Globalization Theory (including Giddens, 1999; Held 
et al, 1998, 1999; Scholte, 1999) rather than being critical at a deep level of neoliberal 
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hegemony/globalisation or capitalist social relations, as they purport to be, actually contribute to 
reproducing the dominant discourse of globalization and ‘individual liberty’ which is the basis of 
neoliberal ideology.27 As such globalization will continue to be current as long as it is perceived as a 
satisfactory descriptive concept (for this is its chief attribute) and it is a complex of socially located 
processes and is also derived from social relations (Joseph, 2006). 
The implications are not just on a theoretical level, but resound in the conceptualisation of 
policy, as globalisation is rendered unproblematic conceptually itself. This has consequences in the 
framing policy making and inevitably in its implementation. On one level it provides policy makers 
in health care (and in other areas of public policy) with a means of legitimizing particular choices 
(Moran & Wood, p.140; Watson & Hay, 2003). From this viewpoint, the restructuring and 
modernisation agendas I have been referring to are legitimized in a way that evacuates removes 
agency from policy makers (Watson, 1999; Hay, 2001; Watson & Hay, 2003; Farnsworth, 2004). It 
renders them at the mercy of external forces that cannot be controlled by national decision-makers. 
On another level, however, there are concrete processes taking place which, as I have discussed 
earlier, are changing the character of healthcare systems.  
How national is healthcare reform? 
If the framework for healthcare policy-making is influenced by the processes of 
internationalisation then what changes are taking place? And how can we measure and evaluate the 
change? A starting point may be the creation of contemporary healthcare systems. The post-WWII 
healthcare systems of OECD countries are now considerably different to the ‘cottage-industries’ 
that characterised medical practice and the small-scale and employment-related insurance systems 
which developed until the mid-20th century. It is clear that state intervention (whether local or 
national/federal) has been a key part of their development, particularly in terms of the dimensions of 
regulation, taxation/public expenditure, and direct provision of services and/or infrastructure 
development, and must be seen in terms of a complex historical process of social and economic 
transformation.  
                                                   
27 One further key critique related to this is that in seeking to theorise modernity, globalization theory has in 
effect ‘latched itself on’ to prior weak and shallow explanatory frameworks of ‘post-fordism’, ‘post-
industrialism’, ‘post-modernity’, etc. without successfully either theorising the totality of change and its social 
basis, or providing an emancipatory politics vis-à-vis neoliberalism. 
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The ‘nationalisation’ of hospitals and medical practice in the UK with the foundation of the 
NHS, may mark the first instance of the institution of ‘universal’ access to healthcare services under 
a single unitary framework. However, the terms of universalisation were also limited by essential 
compromises within the system, which permitted private practice parallel to public service, as well 
as a small contingent of private organisations to continue to exist outside the overarching NHS 
structure (Rayner, 1986). This situation was not replicated in the rest of Western Europe, which by 
the 1950s was also firmly within the sphere of US dominance via Marshall Aid for post-war 
economic reconstruction (Armstrong, Glynn & Harrison, 1991; Van Der Pijl, 1984). The systems 
which developed were based on prior corporatist structures of health and medical insurance, which 
although eventually were legislated to become ‘universal’, were built on considerably different 
premises of financing and infrastructure development to the UK. Here I re-emphasise the national 
variation in healthcare systems and the problem this poses for comparative assessments of 
internationalising change. 
Localised differences also remain, not only between sovereign territories but within them. In 
federal government systems, for example, the federal structure may act as a unifying legislative 
force, but also states or municipalities will differ in their legislation (this is most apparent in the US) 
(Blackman, 1995). Even in countries without federal structure, there is evidence of geographical 
inequalities in the kind of healthcare services available, the metropolitan centres often being host to 
some of the most highly regarded institutions which have greater resources at their disposal 
(Mohan, 1995). On the other hand in the same national geographical constituency, we may find that 
facilities are again unequally distributed between more affluent sectors and those that are more 
deprived (Hart, 1971; Wilkinson, 1996). In the UK we find further differences in view of the state 
structure variance between the different countries that make up the United Kingdom. Existing 
differences between Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and England have become even more 
significant because of the devolutionary politics in the last decade (Woods, 2004).28  
Some focus has also been made on the impact of Regional and International Multilateral 
Trade Agreements (MTAs) and Treaties. The European Union (EU) is the most significant in the 
European region due to the degree of political as well as economic integration that it represents and 
                                                   
28 This point is more significant given the rejection by Scottish and Welsh Assemblies to not pursue 
the integration and closer cooperation between NHS and private for-profit sector. 
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fosters. Nonetheless, its direct influence on healthcare systems is still fairly limited. However, it 
does have impact in some key areas: the free movement of professionals between member states 
(Single European Act, 1986); the regulation of pharmaceutical products (European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency, following the SEA); public health and health protection, including consumer 
rights (Treaty of the EU, 1992; Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, Article 152); and labour relations 
(Working Time Directive, 1993) (Lethbridge, 2002; Laing & Buisson, 2003). But whilst healthcare 
issues cut across most all areas and institutions of the EU (including the European Parliament and 
various directives), its reiteration of the subsidiarity principle especially in relation to health care in 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992), has meant that little coordination takes place at the EU level. But this 
still does not preclude that it is a vital point for interest groups (such as corporate advocacy groups) 
to seek application of influence.  
There have been concerns, however, over the implications of its in-built liberalisation agenda 
for services sector (European Commission, 2004; Rowland, Price & Pollock, 2004). Elsewhere, 
Multilateral Trade Agreements of the WTO and FTAA negotiations are also causing a stir over 
what influence they may have in liberalising national healthcare services markets by forcing states 
to accept international competition and capital investment in private sector health. Though in the 
case of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade In Services (WTO 1994),29 is a process that 
remains far from completion and implementation – and moreover there has been considerable 
resistance to the inclusion of healthcare services within its remit – the potential impact it poses for 
the opening of domestic healthcare services markets is still symbolic of a broader drive for 
healthcare commercialisation (Price, Pollock & Shaoul, 1999). The bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations FTAA has been more successful in developing trade avenues for US firms to Latin 
American countries; although again, there is no explicit provision for healthcare services. Rather it 
is an indirect pressure in terms of gaining overall trade concessions between US and other countries. 
The point about regional Trade Agreements is that they potentially treat healthcare services as any 
other service sector. In doing so, they contribute to an economic reductionism in the treatment of 
healthcare, reneglecting the social role of such services.  
However, it is crucial to understand that such ‘trade-creep’ (Koivusalo, 2001) - ways in 
which trade policies influence, intentionally or unintentionally, various non-trade policy issues, 
                                                   
29 According to the GATS: “A service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority means any service 
which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.” 
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taking place through legal, legal-administrative or non-legal routes - depends a great deal on the 
way in which social provision is organised and legally/normatively supported in any participating 
state. Moreover, as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) have demonstrated extensively, Trade 
Agreements are but one forum where business actors pursue a liberalisation agenda via state 
representatives and advocacy groups.  
 
2.3. International Healthcare Services Market and Healthcare Reform 
If internationalisation of trade is an emergent issue for most countries, the capacity of the key 
actors in international trade need to be understood. Business, as has become increasingly evident 
since the early 1980s, exerts both structural power and agency in a variety of ways which have an 
impact on social policy formation and by extension social provision (Farnsworth, 2004; Marsh & 
Locksley, 1983). Hence it is important to examine in what ways government policies relate to 
business preferences and what kind of preferences these are. If one is to analyze the 
commercialisation of healthcare services, one must be clear about who has an interest in such an 
outcome. Farnsworth (2004) emphasises the need to bring the role of business and business 
influence into the analysis of social policy formation and, further, to overcome taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the role and interests of business in shaping social policy. In view of the ‘pro-
business’ stance of governments and the increasing involvement of business in issues of social 
policy and welfare state services provision, there arises the question of whether there is a business 
agenda for healthcare. A ‘business agenda for healthcare’ does not simply refer to the way in which 
the interests of ‘business’ or ‘capital’ are developed in healthcare sector, but also the business 
oriented framework within which social policy - in this case healthcare policy - is developed and 
implemented.  
2.3.1. Analysing business interests in social policy 
Pluralist analyses (Dahl, 1971; Lindblom, 1977; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993) tend to view 
‘business’ as an interest group amongst a broad set of groups contending for influence, rather than 
assigning it special privilege. Moreover, the majority of studies in the heyday of policy and interest 
group analysis tended to focus on industrial or manufacturing industry power. No less important is 
the point that, in Anglo-Saxon at least, academic research we find a higher proportion of works 
concentrated in US policy making and business-state or business-social policy nexus. The 
application of US studies to European cases inevitably requires a cautionary approach, although this 
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is not to say that there has been a complete dearth of European or UK analyses, just that due to the 
US origins of policy analysis it has inevitably also shaped the research agenda in countries outside. 
Out of the US dominated pluralist tradition in studying the structure of power in capitalist 
democracies also grew elite theory, business actors have been shown to have particular purchase on 
government policy-making due to their social and economic power. Some authors have attempted to 
combine Marxist methodology and elite theory to demonstrate the deep links between the state and 
capitalist ruling class (Mills, 1956; Miliband, 1969). This reflects not only a concern with the nature 
of the contemporary capitalist state but also with unpicking the ideological content of business-
government relationships. However, ‘business’ and ‘capital’ have often been used interchangeably 
in political science and social policy literature, particularly given the Marxist preference for 
‘capital’. Yet, as one commentator suggests, with the concept of capital we are not only interested 
in the study of interest group activity,  
‘but also with the capacity of capital as a whole, and of its various sectors or fractions, 
to constrain the autonomy of Government, and with the question of how far the 
ideological framework within which decision makers’ work serves capital’s interests’ 
(Editorial, 1983, p.2). 
Thus, as Farnsworth (2004) reminds us, it is no monolithic category but constitutes a variety of 
different positions and interests, and which are neither necessarily coherent nor in agreement. Upon 
deeper analysis, it becomes apparent that there are a great number of different and sometimes 
competing interests involved, as capital is much more fragmented than purely structuralist analysis 
may suggest, but also ‘capital’ and ‘business’ – though often taken as synonymous – do not express 
the same thing. While ‘business’ is a privileged interest, its power and influence vary over time and 
between policy areas (Hacker & Pierson, 2002; Vogel, 1989); its dominance is neither constant nor 
unassailable.  
In this analysis, capital and business are understood as having a special privilege, but I wish 
to distinguish ‘business’ from ‘capital’ in emphasising the agency aspect of the analysis in reference 
to corporate and private for-profit enterprises involved in the social policy domain rather than 
capital and it’s more totalising connotations. I treat ‘business’ primarily as signifying ‘private for-
profit firms’ and secondarily as the business associations and lobbying networks that organized to 
advance their specific and collective agendas. A key distinction is to be made between industrial 
and financial business (Sargent, 1983; Marsh, 1983b; Farnsworth, 2004), particularly in view of the 
43 
 
rise of financial capital above industrial manufacturing as a key site of influence on government 
decision-making and economic policy, and the displacement of traditional manufacturing industries 
with services as a major source of economic activity and growth since the 1980s (Gray, 1990; 
Castells, 2000).30 This point reflects the treatment of the healthcare sector in international business 
literature and an emphasis on the effects of increased integration of the international economy on 
the strategies of national governments and particularly of firms (Porter, 1986; Dunning, 1997). As 
firms (particularly in manufacturing industries) have altered their market strategies - i.e. just-in-time 
and lean production methods, flexible wage-labour contracts, outsourcing of production, or 
relocating production to countries with cheaper labour and minimal labour protection legislation - 
so too states have had to change their policy approach to enticing FDI and supporting economic 
growth (Amin & Palan, 2001). This is a key justification for the increasing opening of welfare 
services to private markets (Pfaler et al), and an indication for some analysts of the post-Fordist turn 
in the international economy. If healthcare gets any attention, it is most often subordinated by 
default to this conception of the international service economy; acknowledging simultaneously the 
high value-adding activities of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies producers within the 
manufacturing sector. With regard to the medical component of healthcare services it is after all a 
high skill, knowledge-driven industry. 
With the sensitisation of researchers to the importance of globalization - whether an actual set 
of substantive changes or in the cognitive dimension - there is also a sense of the way it has 
changed the power dynamic between business and nation states. As I have been suggesting, IPE 
literature, noting the claims of international business and management has also contributed to a re-
conceptualisation. Stopford and Strange’s (1991) model of agenda formation is particularly 
influential (El Kahal, 1994, pp.78-9; Brown, 1999; Lawton et al, 2000). They posit firm-firm, state-
firm and state-state interrelationships as defining a new ‘triangular diplomacy’ of a more integrated 
and competitive world economy, in which firms and states are in bargaining positions for defining 
the terms of investment and governance authority. More classical Marxist theorists have developed 
further the class analytic methods, discussing a Transnational Capitalist Class (Sklair, 2001; Van 
Der Pijl, 1998; Robinson & Harris, 2000), combining a broad group (even itself containing multiple 
and variable interests) of managers, owners and corporate heads which transcend national 
territories. This is effectively a trans-nationalisation of elite theory, though taking a much more 
                                                   
30 Indeed, the current list of Fortune 500 companies shows more service companies and fewer manufacturers 
than in previous decades (Fortune 500) 
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nuanced approach to the relationship between state and business actors than previous elite theory, 
and being explicitly Marxist (or Gramscian) in content.31 This is further framed by the rise of 
financial capital and offshore financial centres, as capital becomes more remote from the controls of 
the state whilst at the same time the state becomes a chief arbiter of capital’s liberalisation (Cerny, 
1996; Palan, 1998a,b). Furthermore this constitutes the predominant realisation of anything that 
may be called ‘globalisation’ (Boyer, 2000, p.274; Blecker, 2005). 
Some social policy authors have begun to research the interest of business actors in the value 
of social provision to business needs or agendas (Hacker & Pierson, 2002; Farnsworth, 2004, 
2006c). For Martin, ‘business managers’ strategies for economic competition have shaped their 
reception to public policies that simultaneously enhance workers’ skills and add to the costs of 
labor’; so that it is important to see the difference ‘between a business community accommodating 
growth in government services and one resisting expansion of the public sphere’ (Martin, 2003, 
p.1). This analysis also rebalances, somewhat, the focus on ‘business’ as employers onto the other 
key variable, that of labour (Marsh, 1983). The West European corporatist structure of labour 
relations and the US structure vary considerably, so that post-Fordism also is not expressed quite in 
the same way in different national locations (Palan, 2006). Yet, this still leaves the importance of 
examining actual firm strategies, how these are shaped by business preferences and state policies, 
but also how they shape state policies. 
2.3.2. Strategies of Firms  
Firms exert both structural power and agency. Structural power takes place in a number of 
ways (Farnsworth, 2004, pp.13-16) including, first and foremost, the ability of business actors to 
make free investment decisions within the capitalist market system. This ‘institutionalised right of 
capital withdrawal’ (Hirshman, 1970) derives from the fact that both government and labour are 
dependent on the collective investments of business, so that ‘the pursuit of personal or ‘national’ 
interest must take account of the impact that such pursuits have on future investment decisions’ 
(Farnsworth, 2004, p. 13). Thus, governments are acutely conscious of the importance of (i) 
maintaining a pro-business investment environment - one which does not overburden with 
administrative costs, provides favourable tax regime, and an attractive labour market - (Pfaller & 
Gough, 1991, p.34-6), and (ii) co-opting labour into business-oriented educational requirements 
                                                   
31 See Cox, R.W. (1983) or Gill, S. (1993) for the Gramscian turn in International Relations and International 
Political Economy Research.  
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(Bottery, 2001; Stedward, 2003; Finn, 2001; Bedgood, 1999). Second, as Offe and Ronge (1982) 
argue, the state is structurally dependent on the capitalist sector for its revenue, so that 
fundamentally governments in capitalist states are averse to undermining capital accumulation. 
Thus the state has an ‘institutional self-interest’, which is ‘conditioned by the fact that the state is 
denied the power to control the flow of those resources which are indispensable for the use of state 
power’ (Offe & Ronge, 1982, p.145). Third, the power capital exerts with regard to labour given the 
relative dependence of labour for its livelihood on private firms. Though it is not exclusive, 
especially given the size of the public sector as an employer in most countries, the asymmetrical 
power over labour is secured by the continuation of profitability and accumulation as coterminous 
with ultimate interests of labour to remain in employment. Finally, ideological control is a corollary 
of the first three dimensions of its structural power, wherein the hegemonic power to legitimise 
business as national interests, means that business may be normalised as being central to most social 
and economic activities. This may be just as powerful in spite of resistance or challenge from 
organised labour, which ultimately is bargaining with business for a better deal for labour (Gill, 
1995). 
Firms also actively exert agency power, of which the following are most prevalent. Direct 
involvement in government machine is one of the older methods of influence. A useful paradigm to 
describe this is the notion of the ‘revolving door’ between government and business whereby civil 
servant and government official may work on boards of directorship in private for-profit firms, just 
as businessmen or managers of private firms may be brought into government positions either as 
active political agents or in an advisory capacity. A further, though less direct, example is that of 
party political donations and the development of partisan relations which has long been recognised 
as a method of business actors for influencing government (Lindblom, 1977; Podhorzer, 1995; 
Polsky, 2005). A further means of influence is via informational strategies which include the 
following: (i) lobbying - this includes hiring firms or individuals that specialise in lobbying 
government actors, or the direct approach of government officials by representatives of peak 
business associations; (ii) press releases; and (iii) think tanks – this is done either through 
sponsorship of research institutes or participation by business actors in the organisations 
themselves, which in turn have an impact on the framing of policy. A further way for business to 
exert agency is in participation in social commitments (a corollary of which is the doctrine of 
‘corporate social responsibility’); this is not just about the provision of social goods or services 
under contract with government. This has in more recent years been framed by notions of ‘corporate 
social responsibility’. 
46 
 
Yet, identifying the structural power and agency of business still leaves questions about what 
determines firms’ preferences in choosing particular strategies for influencing public policy, and in 
forming particular decisions about what fits with their corporate strategy overall. Martin (2003) 
finds that, first, ‘the further an issue is from the company’s core profit-making activity, the greater 
the degrees of freedom in the construction of the firm’s interests’, which suggests that ‘in areas such 
as social policy firms have even greater range of possible preference positions’ (ibid, pp.24-25). 
Thus, for example, while a firm in the consumer electronics sector may have an acute interest in 
changing environmental regulations and how these affect their costs of production and profit 
returns, the same company may have little direct interest in questions of healthcare reform. Second, 
‘processes of employer engagement with the political sphere seem to vary across regions’, so that 
national specificities in firm coalition and association as well as relations to government vary 
between national (and even more localised) settings (ibid, p.25). This is an issue that has as much to 
do with the historical location of firms within the welfare state social contract between state and 
citizenry, and firm with state. Thus, the corporate association culture can be seen to differ between 
corporatist regimes that dominate in Germany, US liberal politics, and UK liberalism (Alcock & 
Craig, 2000; Palan, 2006). Third, as public policy is not the primary activity which firms are 
engaged in, ‘business managers tend to be reactive, following the lead of others in deciding to get 
involved with policy issues’ (my italics:, Martin, 2003, p.26). This does not mean that business 
actors wait around until a policy proposition is made, but pro-active engagement in social policy is 
unlikely unless it is to attain goals which pertain to firm profitability. 
2.3.3. A Business Agenda for Healthcare Reform 
There is an interesting variance in the debates which dominate the political agenda in 
different countries regarding healthcare reform; after all it is in reform agendas that we are able to 
see the objectives for change by various actors. In the US we can see contesting groups of firms in 
terms of their position vis-à-vis healthcare reform: employers not associated with healthcare but 
which do provide health insurance in their employment package have an interest in reducing the 
costs of care, whilst many insurance firms and HMOs have an interest in subverting any substantive 
change from the current arrangements for healthcare financing. In the UK, where healthcare has 
been predominantly funded by general taxation and insurance firms have a relatively weak stake in 
the sector, we find the greatest amount of pressure coming from domestic firms that had previously 
had virtual monopoly market share within the domestic private sector as their position is being 
threatened by international competition from new foreign entrants.  
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As far as liberalisation of services is concerned, there is little indication of business advocacy 
specifically for liberalisation of healthcare services markets from the level of multilateral trade 
agreements and international governance institutions. It is important to note that this is something 
that remains considerably under-researched. However, with the negotiations over the GATS, there 
was no comparable coalition of business actors pushing for healthcare liberalisation as had been the 
case with the TRIPS agreement. For TRIPS a coalition of services firms, under PhRMA, was set up 
to gain amongst other things, a shifting of the site of international regulatory authority from the 
WIPO to the WTO which was seen as a more favourable forum to pursue more stringent IP 
regulations that would favour their existing market position (Purdue, 1995; Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000). Moreover, despite the advocacy by the European Services Forum for service liberalisation in 
the EU, there has been considerable resistance to EU intervening directly in member state 
healthcare services markets. However, no matter what the current status of international trade 
regimes in so far as these may affect the healthcare services sector, there is still a need to 
understand the causes for firm entry into foreign markets and consequent internationalisation of 
their business strategy. 
2.3.4. Blurring the boundaries: The mixed economy of healthcare provision 
Key works on the subject cite the lack of empirical data, and at the very least imply the 
paucity of research on the linkages between healthcare reform and commercialisation. A number of 
works have focused on the public-private mix in health, though containing widely differing 
approaches to the subject. Maynard’s edited volume, The Public-Private Mix for Health (1982; 
2005),32 gives a general overview of the variation of the public-private mix across a set of similar 
healthcare systems of the OECD. It highlights the significance of that mix for conceptualising and 
making healthcare policy, as well as the importance of generating more substantial body of 
empirically led research in the area. Keen, Light and Mays’ report on the Public-Private Relations 
in Healthcare (2001) consists of one of the most comprehensive overviews recently published 
focusing on the UK healthcare sector. Despite the brevity with which it covers each area of 
healthcare provision, the report provides a much more practical basis for empirical investigation, as 
well as an overview of theoretical frameworks which assist in conceptualising the public-private 
mix.  
                                                   
32 First published in 1982 and recently revised and substantially rewritten in 2005, it contains a cross-country 
perspective despite its rather flawed comparative analytical credentials as each chapter focuses on different 
aspects making sound comparative impracticable (McLachlan & Maynard (eds), 1982; Maynard (ed), 2005). 
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The diversity of relationships and practices that cut across public and private boundaries 
highlights the difficulty of assessing the structure of healthcare systems in terms of a neat 
distinction between public and private spheres (Salter, 1995; Ham, 1996; Keen & Mays, 1998). 
Indeed, there is often a blurring of boundaries between the public and private sectors. This has been 
an endemic factor in the UK’s political economy of healthcare, effectively written into the 
foundation of the NHS (Salter, 1995 & 1998). This includes medical consultant’s part-time 
employment between NHS and private sector, pay-beds in NHS hospitals, and GPs legal status as 
private entrepreneurs. Other aspects developed since the early 1980s include the outsourcing of 
ancillary services. Since the 1990s, the most visible examples of the blurring process have included 
the expansion of ‘contracting out’ of ancillary cleaning and catering services; the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) and more recently the Local Investment Finance Trusts (LIFT) for the building of 
hospitals and primary care facilities respectively; the commissioning of an ongoing institution-wide 
IT project; and since 2002 the commissioning of independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs) by 
the NHS to provide specialised services such as cataracts operations and hip-replacements (Unison, 
2005). 
Nonetheless, outside cross-national comparative research, analysis of the internationalisation 
processes in contemporary healthcare systems is an important omission in these publications. A 
small number of authors covering the expansion of private healthcare in the UK (Griffith, Illife & 
Rayner, 1987; Higgins, 1988) have made invaluable contributions to a historical overview of the 
impact of US domestic policy in the corporate exportation of healthcare services firms into the UK. 
These works draw upon, and echo already growing literature from the USA, that is illuminating on, 
but also critical of, the corporate transformation of American medicine and healthcare. This 
literature goes as far back as 1971 (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich), and has since expanded throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s into the current post-Clinton reform era (Relman, 1980 & 1997; Salmon, 1984 
& 1995; Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1990; Navarro, 1995; Geyman, 2004). Whilst, these are 
generally limited by the absence of theorisation in their analyses, they do provide a basis for 
examining some of the changes that have taken place since the mid-1980s. We can also see the 
difference between the state of the private sector and its relationship to the public from the late 
1960s when the private sector in the UK still remained fairly marginal and distinctly an appendage 
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of the NHS compromise (Mencher, 1967),33 and later in the 1990s by which time the importance of 
private sector growth had already demonstrated a policy challenge for the public system (Salter, 
1995). 
Despite scant research on the topic since that time, various critiques have contributed to 
empirical research on issues ranging from PFI schemes in primary and secondary care (Gaffney & 
Pollock, 1999; Goddard, Pollock & Player, 2001) in the UK, and the importation of ideas behind the 
managed care from the US (Churchill, 1999) in the UK (Robinson & Steiner, 1998) and in other 
countries (i.e. Germany: Altenstetter, 2002). However, their specialised focus means that an 
examination of the international dimension of the healthcare services market is still fairly limited 
and, furthermore, it is most often assumed that there is a natural business agenda for the 
privatisation and commercialisation of healthcare. Whilst it does follow that firms are by definition 
profit-seeking organisations whose first priority is attaining and maintaining profitability, not all 
firms operating abroad have made huge profits and some have even had to concede to failure and 
withdrawal from a new market. 
2.3.5. Internationalisation of Firms and Healthcare Services 
Most literature on internationalisation and foreign market entry strategies focuses on 
manufacturing which follows from their significance in terms of the historical development of 
international trade and of national economies, and most firms are manufacturing based (Arvidsson, 
1997, p.71). Much of the research has also tended to be on multinational companies (MNCs), which 
by definition are firms with an international strategic outlook, though some work has been done on 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in more recent years, which reflects more appropriately the 
scale of healthcare service firms. The predominant methods for internationalisation usually 
identified include: export, licensing, subcontracting and franchising, joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions, and direct investment (Buckley & Casson, 2000; El Kahal, 1994).34 Dunning’s (1988) 
                                                   
33 The compromise entailed the retention of private practice alongside public service provision. Whilst the UK 
government sought to ‘nationalise’, or essentially ‘municipalise’, the majority of hospitals and bring medical 
practitioners into public wage scheme, in a concession to practitioners GPs remained legally as private 
entrepreneurs whilst hospital consultants and medics also retained certain rights to practice part time in the 
private sector, whilst fulfilling public service duties in the NHS (Webster, 1998) [more in Chapter 4]. 
34 In the 1960s export and FDI were the predominant methods that were concerning researchers, form the 
1970s the internalisation strategies of licensing, franchising and subcontracting gained more attention, whilst 
the resurgence of mergers and acquisitions as a strategy in the 1980s was followed by a further turn to FDI in 
the 1990s, particularly with regard to ‘transitional’ or ‘emerging’ economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
and Southern and East Asia (Buckley & Casson, 2000, pp. 61-62). 
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‘eclectic’ theory of international production35 places emphasis on ownership, location and 
internalisation advantages (OLI) as the foundation for most business internationalisation 
considerations. As we have suggested already, research specifically on services firm 
internationalisation has overwhelmingly focused on ICT, telecommunications, and financial 
services industries. Services firms cannot make the same kind of production efficiency savings as 
manufacturing firms in internationalising production. Some of the key considerations that emerge 
from the literature have to do with the prior existence of corporate networks in the target market, 
which includes early starters as well as firms operating in markets outside of the key market studied 
(in this case healthcare) but are still potential customers of the key market studied (Arvidsson, 1997, 
p. 80). 
Despite growing research on services, however, this still leaves a considerable gap in the 
literature specifically examining the internationalisation of firms operating in the healthcare 
services sector of either category (i) or (ii) as identified in section 5.3 above. This is in part due to 
the relative novelty of discussing international trade in healthcare services (Chanda, 1998; Drache 
& Sullivan, 1999, p.1). However, some authors have identified at least some strategies, whereby 
hospital firms, having entered foreign markets by an initial purchase of an existing private clinic or 
hospital, following an initial phase of market evaluation and entry have expanded rapidly through 
aggressive acquisitions of small (often single-unit) independent not-for-profit or for-profit providers 
(Mohan, 1991; Holden, 2002b). Holden (ibid, 2002b), drawing on management literature, discusses 
the ‘market seeking’ behaviour of healthcare firms in expanding their activities outside the home 
market. This analysis reflects findings in the ancillary services (Mohan, 1991), in private hospital 
(Mohan, 1991; Keen, Light & Mays, 2001) and in long-term care industries (Holden 2002b; 
Lethbridge 2005). It is a way of describing a strategy by which companies spend time at first 
scouting out potential new markets with initially a small presence of a single unit, followed by an 
(often aggressive) acquisitions strategy - as well as new buildings in the case of hospitals and long 
term care providers - once the market is understood and opportunities for expansion are secured due 
to government policy environment and/or regulatory conditions. 
From early on, US firms were reaching limits to domestic markets because of federal 
regulation, and sought to expand into markets abroad. One of the ironies is that they found 
                                                   
35 It is eclectic because it recognises the need to look beyond FDI theory for a framework of understanding the 
rationale and considerations behind internationalisation strategies (Dunning, 1988, p.1). 
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opportunities in the UK healthcare sector, where the virtual monopoly of the healthcare services 
sector was held by the state. This has partly been explained by reference to the favourable political 
climate of the early 1980s in which the Conservative government was seeking strategies for 
restructuring the economy and the monopoly power of the medical profession. The converse holds 
for the US domestic market, which is dominated by domestic firms, expanding their activities 
between US states. 
2.4. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have sought to develop a synthesis approach towards a critical reading of 
‘globalization’ as an explanatory concept to understand the commercialisation of healthcare 
services. My review of largely secondary academic literature indicates the following key points. 
Health policy analysis as a field of inquiry is considerably limited so far in having developed an 
understanding of the impact of globalization on healthcare services. While a large number of 
publications have been made over the past decade in this area from a health policy perspective, a 
key issue that is considerably under-researched is the interplay between internationalising 
commercial healthcare firms and the changing structure of national healthcare service sectors.  
To develop a framework for analysing this particular issue historically, I have sought 
recourse in a reading of authors employing a critical political economy approach, which itself 
demonstrates a strong historical perspective of analysis. However, despite important interventions 
by a number of authors employing the political economy approach, there continues to be a 
substantive gap in the literature investigating the link between changes in the welfare state, changes 
in healthcare systems, and the internationalisation of welfare and healthcare services (Moran, 2000, 
p. 136).  Moreover, while business studies research is relatively more developed in the analysis of 
business strategy (i.e. for internationalisation), there is still considerable lack of engagement with 
firms in the healthcare service sector, while the relationship between firms and welfare state reform 
is generally rather limited to its impact on businesses themselves in terms of the development of 
opportunities or barriers to commercial activity. 
Meanwhile a number of substantive points can be made from the literature reviewed in 
considering the internationalisation and commercialisation of healthcare services which offers some 
guidance to developing the empirical section of the thesis. It is indicated that both 
internationalisation and commercialisation appear to have largely stemmed from state policies and 
practices. Moreover, the penetration of foreign-owned firms into the national healthcare economy 
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has had a significant impact on re-shaping the dynamic within the private sector (both for-profit and 
voluntary) as well as public healthcare service structures. Furthermore, the processes of 
internationalisation and commercialisation in healthcare services appear to be highly contingent on 
each other.  
The findings of this chapter raise a further set of questions that I focus on in the following 
two chapters. First, what kind of reforms have been implemented which may appreciably give space 
for the commercialisation of healthcare services? Second, to what extent have healthcare service 
firms actually internationalised? In the ensuing chapters I develop an overview of state policies in 
OECD countries, followed by an investigation of the extent to which healthcare services have been 
internationalising. In turn, I re-visit the long-term emergence of the commercialisation trend and its 
relation to the internationalisation of healthcare service firms through a substantive examination of 
these developments in the US and the UK. 
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3. Chapter 3: Dynamic of the healthcare services market in OECD 
countries: the US and UK in international perspective 
 
In this chapter I analyse national-level conditions for the emergence of an international 
healthcare services market. As suggested in the preceding two chapters, in the context of a market-
oriented turn in public policy for healthcare over the past few decades, the emergence since the 
1990s of an international agenda for liberalization of trade in services has brought into sharp relief 
the possibility for healthcare services to become absorbed into such an agenda for market 
liberalization. Nonetheless, many changes in the dynamic of the mixed economy of healthcare 
services have so far taken place without the direct compulsion of international trade liberalization 
regimes. Given that healthcare services are historically embedded in territorial national-level policy 
decision-making settings and local-level (sub-national) delivery structures, this raises a question 
about the degree to which healthcare systems have been moving towards a situation that may be 
conducive to competition in an international market for healthcare services.  
A key problem for cross-country analysis, however, is that healthcare systems are historically 
embedded in the social, economic and political specificities of their respective national settings 
(Porter, 1999; Blank & Burau, 2004). Nonetheless, while both the UK and US are quite unique in a 
number of respects compared with other ‘state-based’ and ‘market-based’ healthcare systems 
respectively, locating them in terms of more general trends in the OECD countries is helpful to 
laying the ground for assessing the (potential) emergence of an international healthcare services 
market. As such, for my analysis in this chapter I take a broad international comparative approach 
to highlight key trends of market-oriented healthcare services reform across the OECD countries.  
What I am looking for is the extent to which public policy in ‘developed’ countries has been 
following a similar path towards market-oriented restructuring of healthcare services with attendant 
consequences for the dynamics of the mixed economy of healthcare. This in turn should reveal 
pointers towards key mechanisms for commercialisation in the healthcare services sectors of 
‘developed’ countries. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter may help to illuminate, to some 
degree, a more general overarching theme of the thesis regarding the relationship between 
globalization and commercialisation of healthcare services by considering the extent to which a 
convergence has been taking place in terms of market-oriented reform across the OECD countries. 
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The chapter begins with a general overview of the shift in the dynamic in the healthcare 
services market across OECD countries in the years, pinpointing the emergence of a commercial 
form of healthcare service provision and financing in the post-WWII era. The following section 
(3.2) consists of a more in depth overview of market-oriented reforms across OECD countries, 
while the final section (3.3) reflects on the degree to which space for the private sector and 
particularly commercial provision and health insurance has been opened up over the past few 
decades. 
3.1. Healthcare reform and the dynamic healthcare services market in OECD 
countries 
The shift in the public-private healthcare mix has varied considerably between OECD 
countries depending on the prior scale of public sector contribution, and the particular structure of 
the public-private mix to begin with. The most important tendency, evident to some degree in all 
OECD countries during the 1990s, has been the pursuit of a more ‘pro-competitive’ market-oriented 
structure of healthcare services, in which providers have been encouraged to act in a more 
competitive way for healthcare service consumers and in more public-integrated systems for public 
organizations to compete with private sector service financing and provision. The greater space 
opened up for the private sector has, in some countries, also opened up opportunities for 
commercial (‘for-profit’) health insurance and provision, though this tendency is still comparatively 
limited. 
3.1.1. Long-term changes in the ‘mixed economy’ of healthcare 
The expansion of public sector involvement in healthcare services in the post-WWII years 
largely sought to limit the financial barriers for access to healthcare (Roemer, 1976; Cutler, 2002). 
The political commitment of governments in a post-war world to improvement of health status 
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through social provisions was a major aspect of this.36 On a pragmatic level, the inadequacies of 
private markets and voluntary insurance for large sections of the population provided a strong 
stimulus in the early post-war period in gaining equitable access to healthcare for universalisation of 
coverage through public programmes in many developed countries, including New Zealand, the 
UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Some countries however, moved to universalise coverage 
comparatively late, in periods when post-war economic recovery was no longer a driving force (i.e. 
Canada, Japan, and Italy in the 1970s). Still other countries, such as Greece, Australia and South 
Korea, expanded coverage to a universal or near-universal level through public programmes or 
compulsory social or private insurance as late as the 1980s.37  Some of the former Soviet-bloc 
countries that had developed state-based healthcare during the post-war period, began to reform 
towards a social insurance system in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, though 
still retained universal coverage (i.e. Hungary and Poland) (Table 3.1). 
In a number of OECD countries, provision of healthcare services was also brought under 
direct public ownership and/or control; though mainly limited to hospitals, with primary care 
practitioners often brought into a public contract system. Most of these followed the UK’s model of 
nationalisation of hospitals and the creation of a National Health Service (NHS) regulated by 
government or public agencies and paid for through a system of public taxation and, to varying 
degrees, combined with compulsory social health insurance administered through public or quasi-
public agencies (i.e. Sweden, Norway, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Portugal and Greece) (Freeman, 
2000; Mossialos et al, 2002). However, in many cases, ownership of healthcare service providers 
remained split between the public and private sector, the latter usually dominating market share by 
                                                   
36 Although post-WWII social programmes were strongly linked to the process of post-war economic 
recovery, the plans to expand social protection had, in many cases, preceded the experience of the Second 
World War. For instance, New Zealand had legislated for universal healthcare coverage in 1938, even if its 
National Health Service programme was only implemented in the 1950s. The UK had also been developing 
plans for an NHS since the early 1940s, before to the full impact of WWII was felt by British society. 
Meanwhile, not all countries that developed highly solidaristic public healthcare systems experienced the 
same kind of consequences to their economy or to their society as a consequence of the Second World War. 
Nonetheless, within the context of post-war Keynesian economic thinking that had begun to pervade much of 
the developed world, the notion of public financing and provision of services was much more ideologically 
supported. 
37 In some cases universal coverage followed only after the dissolution of dictatorships, and the ascent of 
socialist or social-democratic governments such as in Spain, Portugal and Greece. In others, ‘universalisation’ 
in the 1980s was more about completion of programmes already offering fairly extensive coverage. Besides 
these historical differences in timing of universalisation, the kind of financing systems put in place have 
varied between countries, a great number of which, in Europe, established ‘Beveridge-type’ systems in which 
public taxation constitutes the primary source of financing, while a smaller number established ‘Bismark-
type’ systems based around social health insurance. 
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number of hospitals, beds and in terms of the proportion of medical practitioners working in the 
private sector (i.e. Germany, France, Netherlands, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea and Japan). In the 
US a residual public hospital sector is limited to hospitals for army veterans and small number of 
municipal hospitals left over from before the Second World War (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006); 
although acute bed numbers in legally defined ‘for-profit’ hospitals still only amounted to around 
11% of total US acute bed capacity in 1995, the rest being split between non-profit (65%) and 
public institutions (24%) (Cutler, 2000, p.1). 
In most cases - including those systems where the private sector became residual after the 
1940s (most notably the UK and the Scandinavian countries) - the current private healthcare sector 
has been rooted in non-profit charity and mutual organisations, largely for historical reasons, 
preceding public ownership where this became instituted (Griffith et al, 1987; Starr, 1982; Porter, 
1999). However the distinction between non-profit and for-profit healthcare has also been important 
insofar as for-profit private healthcare services are still widely regarded as antithetical to equitable 
objectives of medical practice, while ‘non-profit’ status is also typically distinguished from the 
profit-motive in healthcare.38  
In practice, the non-profit status of healthcare services varies considerably between countries, 
and this depends a great deal on the position of these services within the overall mixed economy of 
care. The mutual health insurance companies in France or Germany which make up the bulk of their 
health financing source (mandatory social health insurance) are non-profit private entities (Freeman, 
2000). But their ‘public mission’ is much clearer than, for instance, the UK’s non-profit BUPA (the 
major market leader in the UK private health insurance market since the 1950s) which occupies a 
voluntary complementary market space as a form of financing to that of the dominant public NHS. 
While both these ‘non-profit’ types rely on profit margins from subscriptions which essentially are 
re-invested in their organisations rather than paying share-holders (as is the case for ‘for-profit’ 
insurers), the nature of their market is quite different, as is their competitive position within that 
                                                   
38 This is important when we consider that the private sector is a major source of healthcare provision in the 
world, including OECD and developing countries (Uplekar, 2000). 
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market.39 Incidentally, both France and Germany have voluntary private health insurers in addition 
to their social insurance providers, occupying a similar complementary and supplementary market 
space to that of British private medical insurance (PMI). 
The ‘market failure’ inherent in healthcare financing and delivery - particularly when it 
comes to costly acute and long-term care - means few are able to afford the high cost of technology-
intensive treatment and long-term cost-burden of chronic conditions without severe economic 
consequences for households (Arrow, 1963). This is one reason that led to restrictions being 
imposed in a number of OECD countries on the expansion of the private sector, and particularly of 
for-profit healthcare organizations in some OECD countries. Such measures have included banning 
private doctors working in the public sector or using public sector facilities (Lister, 2005). By 
contrast, doctors contracted to the public sector are typically allowed to operate in the private sector 
simultaneously (mainly hospital-based consultants), and in some cases have been encouraged to 
expand their private practice as in the UK in 1979 after the repeal of the NHS pay-beds ban that had 
been instituted in 1976 (Griffith et al, 1987). In this case, private beds in NHS hospitals (where 
consultants could treat private patients) were part of the historic compromise between the 
government and medical professionals which led to the establishment of the British NHS in 1948. 
Interestingly, the retention of NHS pay-beds had been an important feature that slowed the growth 
of the non-NHS private sector in the late-1980s (Laing, 1992) despite a significant boom in private 
health insurance subscriptions between 1979 and 1981 (Rayner, 1987; Laurance, 1983). 
Even in the US, which stands out for having developed one of the largest for-profit healthcare 
services sectors, the distinction between ‘non-profit’ and ‘for-profit’ healthcare has been very 
important in the development of health policy and in healthcare worker perception of the nature of 
these organisations. For instance, the medical profession was for a long time highly (and 
successfully) resistant to the development of for-profit healthcare provision from the 1920s 
regarding the making of profit (‘commercialism’) from medical services rendered as antithetical to 
the ethics of medical practice (Starr, 1982). Interestingly, the establishment of federal programmes 
                                                   
39 Many of the social health insurance providers in France and Germany have faced severe debts for many 
years, with this being a key area targeted for healthcare reform in these countries. By contrast, the voluntary 
market in which BUPA operates, while having a much smaller risk pool, is more intimately aligned to an 
equally small number of private hospitals. Although private health insurers in the UK have also faced periods 
of low profitability - as an outcome of reduced subscription rates in the late 1980s and mid-1990s -  they have 
not faced the kind of ‘debt spending’ (debt resultant from spending at higher rates than rates of income) of 
mandatory private health insurance in other countries. 
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for healthcare financing (Medicare and Medicaid) acted unintentionally to provide an important 
impetus to the growth of ‘for-profit’ healthcare services by generating a significant source of 
income for newly emergent commercial providers and health insurers. Moreover, federal policies 
for controlling the growing cost of these programmes in subsequent years - the 1973 Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act and the Medicare Prospective Payment System - created 
greater openings for commercial hospital providers and insurers as the federal government openly 
pursued a more market-oriented (‘pro-competitive’) approach to organizing the healthcare system 
(Marmor, 1998).  
On the other hand, despite a high level of dissatisfaction reported with the US healthcare 
system in consumer surveys (Donelan et al, 1999) it is not clear whether consumers are so much 
concerned about the for-profit versus non-profit nature of providers than whether or not they have 
access to needed health services and the health insurance coverage to pay for these. For instance, 
with the majority of Americans who are covered for their health costs by some form of health 
insurance plan, consumer choice over which provider to use is typically circumscribed by managed 
care organizations (MCOs) which have come to dominate the market for health insurance 
(Robinson, 1999). Indeed, for most American healthcare consumers, the biggest challenge comes 
from high levels of cost-sharing (at least for those who have access to health insurance), while a 
substantial portion of the population remains without health insurance due to its high economic cost 
and the absence of a mandatory universal contribution system (DeNavas-Walt et al, 2007). 
Nevertheless even those systems most extensively financed by the government did not 
exclude private sector financing and provision altogether. Rather, the nationalisation of medical 
facilities and public financing largely displaced the private sector, still characterised as a “cottage 
industry” until the 1960s at the earliest. In the last couple of decades however, the dominance of the 
public sector role in healthcare financing has been changing in most OECD countries, as has the 
limitation over the private sector role in provision. Indeed, in many countries the private sector has 
itself changed substantively since the post-war decades of public sector expansion. In some 
countries it can justifiably be described as “big business”, particularly the US, where private for-
profit healthcare providers entered the market at a rapid rate establishing a strong presence by the 
1980s (Gray, 1986; Starr, 1982). In Germany, for-profit providers also made substantial market 
gains during the 1990s being one of the few OECD countries still experiencing over-capacity in the 
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hospital sector following a broader trend of hospital rationalization in most OECD countries during 
the 1980s (Busse & Riesberg, 2000 & 2004).40  
3.2. Rising expenditure and the fiscal problem 
Structural transformation of the mixed economy of healthcare has stemmed foremost from 
efforts to scale back the public sector role in healthcare in face of the growing cost of healthcare 
expenditure. In all OECD countries total healthcare expenditure increased substantially (on average) 
from 3.8% of the GDP in 1960, to 7% in 1980, and 9.1% in 2004, with the US displaying a 
respectively sharp increase from 8.8% in 1980, to 15.3% in 2004 (Figure 3.1 & Table 3.2). 
Moreover, the public share of financing came to compose a major part of healthcare expenditure 
and, with a few exceptions, it has come to account for at least two thirds of total expenditure on 
healthcare in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Table 3.3).  
In 1960, the OECD average for the public share of total healthcare expenditure stood at 
61.4%, rising considerably to 73.3% by 1970. This high level has remained fairly constant in 
subsequent years and in 2004 the bulk of spending on healthcare in most OECD countries continued 
to come from public sources, with just under 73% of health spending on average (Table 3.3). Even 
in those countries with a historically smaller portion of public coverage (i.e. US, Mexico and 
Turkey), it is still a significant amount from a single source in per-capita terms. In the case of the 
US, despite public coverage being below 50% of TEH, compared to over 85% in the UK, current 
per capita public spending on healthcare has actually been of a comparable level to countries of 
similar levels of economic development, such as Sweden or Switzerland in 1990, and even 
exceeding the UK’s per capita public spending on healthcare since the 1980s (Tables 3.3 & 3.4).41 
By the late 1970s however, healthcare spending had been already growing at a rate that began 
to put into question the sustainability of public expenditure. Notably the period 1965-1970 saw the 
highest rates of growth for health expenditure in the post-war period in almost all OECD countries 
(Table 3.5). With the world oil shocks in the mid-1970s, most countries faced a protracted period of 
                                                   
40 Nonetheless, where healthcare services have become big business, in most countries this still needs to be 
put into the context of the healthcare sector. These are large firms often dominating local or regional markets 
and in a few cases national markets, but few if any can be compared directly with the national and 
international scale and scope of the major pharmaceutical giants or most other major corporate sectors. 
41 In spite of this comparable share of per capita spending from public sources, these resources are much less 
evenly distributed than in other countries since they are limited to specific population groups. Moreover, per 
capita spending in itself is a dubious indicator insofar as it cannot account for inequalities within national 
populations, assuming by definition equal spending levels per head of population.  
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inflation and economic stagnation, a situation which prompted governments to seek ways to control 
public expenditure in general (Schieber & Poullier, 1990). In the face of a growing ‘fiscal crisis’, 
public policies prioritising government expenditure on public services and public works that had 
predominated in the post-war years were losing favour along with the administrative planning 
approach to public policy characteristic of the Keynesian ‘consensus’ that pervaded most developed 
countries in the post-war decades. The healthcare sector has been no exception to this changing 
political context, and the ascent of several neoliberal oriented governments in the 1980s only further 
cemented the retreat from an interventionist state as they clamoured to cut back public spending as a 
whole (Altenstetter & Haywood, 1991).  
Though health spending rates were a key target area in healthcare reforms during the 1980s 
and 1990s across the OECD countries, increased spending in itself has not been the biggest 
problem. Rather, the realisation that marginal increases in spending did not translate into 
substantive marginal gains in health status helped to feed scepticism about the value extracted from 
this growing level of investment (Light, 1993; Docteur & Oxley, 2003). Emergent critiques of 
medicine and its therapeutic achievements since the 1960s helped to anchor the broader concern 
with fiscal sustainability of public funding in observable population health outcomes (Porter, 1999). 
Reduced mortality rates in developed countries were shown to have been an outcome more of 
public health measures and initiatives outside of medical intervention and generally improving 
standards of living (i.e. sanitation, education, or housing). For Wilkinson (1996) it is essentially ‘the 
nature of social and economic life rather than medical services which determines the health of 
populations’ while ‘the role of medicine is to pick up the pieces’ (p.67). Medical scientific advances 
had still been important in reducing communicable disease and reducing early life-stage mortality, 
while conditions of affluence and greater life expectancy (non-communicable and chronic diseases) 
were taking over as the main burden on health (Wilkinson, 1996, pp.29-49).  
3.2.1. Cost-control and macroeconomic reforms 
The growing demand for healthcare, stimulated by the publicly subsidised expansion of 
medical services and the generous coverage afforded through public systems of financing, seemed 
to be predicated on an unprecedented expansion of medical-technological intervention that could 
neither be repressed (Starr, 1982; Klein, 2001), such being the value of scientific progress, nor fully 
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afforded without a more concerted cost-benefit decision-making taking place.42 An introductory 
comment in a 1990 joint OECD-Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) publication 
highlights this thinking: 
‘Despite slightly slower growth in health care outlays in more recent years relative to 
that experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, concern persists among [OECD] Member 
countries because of continuing economic constraints coupled with competing 
pressures in the use of resources’ (OECD, 1990, p.5). 
By the late-1980s the protracted period of post-war expansion of public sector involvement in 
healthcare seemed to be coming to an end as many OECD governments sought ways to control the 
rate of expenditure growth, becoming a driving factor in health policy discussions in industrialised 
countries over the past three decades (Abel-Smith, 1992; Mossialos et al, 2002). Initial efforts 
focused more on macroeconomic restrictions to contain healthcare spending which have included 
budgetary spending caps, wage and price controls, resource allocation mechanisms, as well as 
measures to increase the cost of care to individuals through co-payments or cost-sharing policies 
(Abel-Smith, 1992, Docteur & Oxley, 2003; Mossialos & Dixon, 2002; Blank & Burau, 2004) as 
presented for selected countries in (Table 3.6).  
For much of the late 1970s through to the late 1980s the hospital sector was the key sector 
targeted with such macroeconomic reforms, as in most OECD countries it peaked in the 1970s and 
1980s as the largest spending category. By 1985, hospital spending ranged between 33.8% of TEH 
in South Korea and 49.2% in Denmark, as compared with 23.9% and 15.2% in the same countries 
for ‘ambulatory’ care services such as primary care (Table 3.7).43  
                                                   
42 Certainly from the perspective of welfare economics which has been a key intellectual influence on 
healthcare policy since the 1970s: ‘a cost cannot be held too high or too low in relation either to itself or to 
costs elsewhere. This is true at a microeconomic level. For instance, the capital and recurrent costs of a new 
imaging procedure in diagnosis or treatment are worth incurring only if the expected benefit is deemed high 
enough. […] It is also true at the macroeconomic level: The overall expenditure (public and private) on health 
care is worthwhile only for what it enables the system to accomplish, bearing in mind that benefits at the 
margin from extra health spending have as their real costs the non-health benefits that could have been had, 
but were not, because less is being spent on other sources of human welfare. (These are opportunity costs)’ 
(Culyer, 1990, p. 29). 
43 NB: These figures are effectively cumulative categories that for hospital care include general, specialist, 
local and psychiatric hospital services, while ‘ambulatory care’ includes figures for primary care, dental 
and some aspects of opthalmic services in the OECD composite data (2006b). National statistical 
classifications may differ while also the practice of physicians and medical specialists differs between 
countries in terms of access to secondary specialist treatment, whereby such access is limited in some 
countries by a GP ‘gatekeeper’ system. The figures are still indicative of the share of hospital expenditure 
within total healthcare expenditure. 
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With cost-containment measures increasingly targeted at the hospital sector in several OECD 
countries, a drop in the share of spending going to hospital inpatient care between the early 1980s 
and late 1990s is clearly visible. For example, cumulative figures for ‘hospital services’ show how 
spending in this area peaked at 51.6% of TEH in 1980 in Australia, dropping significantly to 42.8% 
in 1995 and 37% of TEH in 2000; though there has been a slight resurgence in this share in more 
recent years. Similarly in the US it peaked in the early 1980s (43.9% in 1980) dropping to between 
28% and 29% in the late-1990s and early 2000s, though in some cases undersupply in the 1980s has 
led to an increase in this share in the 1990s (as in Portugal: from 28.7% in 1980 to 33.9% in 1995) 
in a period characterised by greater investment in the hospital sector (Table 3.8). 
The urgency of targeting the hospital sector has been no less important in terms of the scale 
of public sector spending for which this has been a major spending category. While international 
data for public expenditure on hospitals is rather sparse prior to the 2000s (Table 3.9), public 
spending on inpatient care as a proportion of total public spending on health provides a crude 
indicator for cost burden of hospital-based services for the public sector historically. It clearly 
exceeded 50% of total public expenditure on health for most countries between 1960 and 1995. 
Following cost-control measures targeted at the hospital sector, there is a perceptible decline in the 
proportion of public spending on this sector through the last third of the 20th century, especially for 
inpatient services, with few exceptions (Switzerland and Austria) increasing the share of total public 
contribution to inpatient care (Table 3.10). The hospital sector has been a key target area for cost-
control in the US for which public coverage of in-patient care has not exceeded 27% of the 
population even in the early 2000s when the public sector programmes have been expanded to 
include greater numbers of the population (Table 3.11) (Docteur & Oxley, 2003).  
Reductions in hospital spending were partly being achieved at this time by limiting capital 
investment in hospitals: in the US, the federal Hill-Burton grant programme for hospital 
construction and renovation begun in 1946 was halted by 1975 (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006), while in 
the UK, public capital investment for hospitals was not instituted until the 1960s with the 1962 
Hospital Plan - a level of public spending not seen again until the late 1990s under the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) programme (Mohan, 2002a).44 A key strategy for limiting hospital 
                                                   
44 Though the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) construction programme was, in principle, developed to attract 
private sector investment in hospital construction, in practice, the cost to public expenditure on hospital 
construction and refurbishment has been much higher than planned in view of the failure of many of the 
projects to stay within budget (Pollock, Price & Player, 2005). 
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spending, however, was manifest in a trend of hospital rationalisation during the 1980s in many 
OECD countries, with government mandated hospital closures and bed-number reduction in the UK 
(Mohan, 2002a), and a more costly operating environment in the US (after the introduction of the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System) pushing many hospital operators to reduce bed numbers 
whilst also witnessing a period of market concentration through mergers (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006). 
This is reflected in a notable drop in the number of inpatient beds in the US from around 7 beds per 
thousand heads of population in 1975 to just over 4 in 1995 and 3.3 in 2004.  Only more recent data 
for this measure are available for the UK which shows a drop from just under 5 beds per thousand 
heads of population in 1995 to just over 4 in 2004 (Table 3.12). 
Wage controls have been prevalent in public-integrated systems especially in hospital and 
ambulatory sectors which compose the main areas of provision under public control and/or 
ownership. Although wages have been re-negotiated regularly in healthcare systems since their 
creation (for instance, the UK’s NHS undertook wage re-negotiations for nurses, consultants and 
GPs even prior to 1980s), this became a key instrument of NHS cost control in the 1980s (Webster, 
1998b). In Denmark, Ireland and the UK, hospital salaried personnel have been subject to pay cuts 
or wage freezes, while in Finland, Sweden, and Spain, such wage controls have also extended to 
ambulatory sectors (primary care and dentistry) (Freeman, 2000; Docteur & Oxley, 2003). 
Moreover, where specific aspects of public service provision have been outsourced, such as 
ancillary services, this has effectively amounted to an indirect restructuring of the remuneration for 
formerly public sector employees as they shifted from public sector salaries to private sector 
contract labour.45 Particularly in public-integrated systems, wage controls have been part of broader 
public sector pay controls implemented since the 1980s (Altenstetter & Haywood, 1991).  
Price controls have been used relatively early on, particularly as governments in public-
integrated systems can set prices administratively or, more generally, have oversight on prices 
agreed between healthcare purchasers and providers (Docteur & Oxley, 2003, p.25). Such controls 
have been employed in all sub-sectors of healthcare provision. Some set fees for healthcare services 
directly after negotiations with health-care providers broke down (including Australia, Belgium, 
France, Japan, Luxembourg and Canada). In Japan, price fixing by the government has been an 
important policy instrument for primary and secondary care. In other countries, after fixing budget 
                                                   
45 Notably in the UK in the 1980s under the Compulsory Competitive Tendering process for Local Authorities 
which were also responsible for many aspects of healthcare service provision. 
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ceilings, prices have been automatically adjusted as a function of the volume of care, such as in 
Germany (ambulatory care), Austria (hospital care), Hungary (outpatient care) and in Belgium. 
Price schedules have also been used in some cases to reduce marginal return to doctors for 
additional supply of services beyond defined ceilings (Canada (Quebec), Hungary, Germany), 
indicating a combination of price and volume controls to reduce overall expenditure (Docteur & 
Oxley, 2003, p.25; Freeman, 2000, p.54).  
Budgetary caps have been another widespread strategy for cost control. While earlier ‘cash 
limits’ tended to be directed at the hospital sector, they have been often complemented by global 
and supplementary spending caps on ambulatory care and pharmaceuticals. Global budgets have 
reflected the difficulty in controlling overall spending by focusing on only one care component 
(Docteur & Oxley, 2003, p.27). These were most popular in the UK (as early as 1976) and Denmark 
(in the 1980s), while this approach was built into more recently formed National Health Service 
systems such as Portugal (1980s) or Italy (1970s). For systems such as these, organized along 
‘Beveridgian’ lines, whereby annual budgets have been covered directly by public financing, global 
budgets were a simple means of cost-containment. In insurance based systems like Germany, 
France and the US, the implementation of such spending limits focused on the problem of 
reimbursement by insurers, in view of the ‘moral hazard’ produced by indemnity insurance. Budget 
caps have also been introduced within broader reform packages. For instance, in 1977, West 
Germany introduced its Health Insurance Cost Containment Act which limited the level of 
contributions to sickness funds to the level of salaries and sought to prevent any spending growth in 
real terms by intending to limit the scale of charges imposed by health care providers (Busse & 
Riesberg, 2000).46 In the US, substantive spending controls were introduced in 1982 with the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System, which transformed the prior re-imbursement structure of 
Medicare without substantive limits to one based on specific Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs), a 
model that has since been emulated in part by other countries (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006). 
3.2.2. Microeconomic incentives for cost control: user fees and cost-sharing 
In systems where coverage was free at the point of access for scheduled goods and services, 
the introduction of user fees has marked a more noticeable transition towards partial re-
                                                   
46 The latter did not get fully implemented until 1992 after reunification with East Germany. 
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commodification by requiring patients to assume a greater portion of health expenses than after the 
introduction of universal coverage (Table 3.13).  
Although in a more immediate sense this is effectively a method for externalising costs to a 
third-party payer for reimbursement (health insurance) or resource allocation (governments), earlier 
‘cost-sharing’ schemes were introduced with the idea of increasing the personal responsibility and 
cost-consciousness of patients. Many cost-sharing initiatives still being implemented have a similar 
primary objective, though since the late-1990s cost-sharing has been more explicitly tied to 
efficiency objectives of healthcare reform. Nonetheless, as with the other macroeconomic strategies 
mentioned, the implementation of cost-sharing policies has varied between countries in the timing 
of their adoption and in the scope of implementation. For instance, the UK government started to 
introduce patient contributions for spectacles and prescription drugs as early as the 1950s (Griffith 
et al, 1987). These contributions gradually increased over the next few decades, although caps on 
the level of cost-sharing were also implemented with a flat rate for prescription drugs. While this is 
only part of the full cost, its regressive nature tends to discriminate against poorer households so 
that measures have tended to be introduced to offset this negative impact on lower income groups – 
at least in more socialised systems such as Sweden, France and the UK (Docteur & Oxley, 2003, 
p.29).  
Meanwhile from the early 1990s the withdrawal of public coverage for dental and ophthalmic 
services has meant that a larger proportion of the costs of these services are effectively left for 
patients to cover, which has been one of the key areas taken up in private health insurance (PHI) 
schemes in the UK during the 1990s (Keen, Light & Mays, 2001; Foubister et al, 2006). Cost 
sharing for prescription pharmaceuticals has been the biggest category where cost-sharing has been 
implemented, partly explained in the economic literature as being due to the higher degree of 
elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals (and generally consumables) than for services (OECD 
1990). Crucially, pharmaceuticals have been a major area of spending for the public sector in most 
countries - a significant area of total spending on health itself for most OECD countries - especially 
those with high levels of public coverage for healthcare overall. For instance, between 1970 and 
1980 public expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other non-durable medical goods was at around 
67% of total expenditure on pharmaceuticals in the UK, and above 70% in Sweden and Germany 
(Table 3.14). In the US, by contrast, private out-of-pocket payments and private health insurance 
have been a more significant source of coverage for pharmaceutical consumption; though 
interestingly, public coverage of drugs spending in the US rose significantly from 8.7% in 1980, to 
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over 19% after the year 2000 (Table 3.14). The latter development is in part related to extension of 
the Medicare programme in the late 1990s and early 2000s specifically for coverage of 
pharmaceutical costs (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006). 
Cost-sharing in itself has not necessarily been a recent innovation linked to market-oriented 
healthcare reforms. In a number of countries user fees or co-payments for prescription healthcare 
goods were already in place at the point of introduction of universal coverage, highlighting that 
universal coverage has not necessarily gone hand-in-hand with comprehensive coverage. Moreover, 
co-payments as a means of influencing consumer behaviour have historically been more associated 
with systems reliant on health insurance as the main mode of financing. For instance, co-payments 
such as those introduced in the 1970s in the US were an effort to introduce demand-side incentives 
for cost control in relation to the fee-for-service reimbursement by private health insurance firms.  
Cost-sharing, is thus chiefly manifest in terms of ‘deductibles’ in health insurance schemes 
introduced in the 1970s with the passing of the HMO Act and expanded during the 1980s and 1990s 
as HMOs became more widespread.47 A ‘deductible’ refers to coverage that begins only after a 
contractually set ceiling has been passed in the cost of drugs or the use of healthcare services for the 
subscriber of health insurance (Enthoven, 1993; Hoffman, 2006). On the other hand, a significant 
portion of out-of-pocket payments in the US is due to lack of insurance coverage (over 15% 
uninsured by 2005; cf. DeNavas-Walt et al, 2007). This highlights how the nationally specific 
context of cost-sharing is important to bear in mind, since it has not been employed in the same way 
in every country or to the same degree. This can have considerably different outcomes between 
national context regarding access to treatment and the net cost-burden and related de-
commodification of healthcare when located in the overall financing structure.  
Cost-sharing has to some extent contributed to the growth of private healthcare spending, 48 
and a relative rise in out-of-pocket (OOP) payments both as a component of private spending and in 
terms of overall expenditure (Table 3.15 & 3.16).  
                                                   
47 The expansion of managed care organisations (the predominant form being HMOs or health maintenance 
organizations) in the US during the 1990s led many traditional indemnity insurance firms to also adopt cost-
sharing through deductibles in a market that was becoming increasingly difficult to compete in. 
48 Besides direct patient expenditure, two forms of private funding have had historical significance: charity 
donation and health insurance. Spontaneous charity donation is a significant source of funding mostly in niche 
areas (usually channelled through issue-specific NGOs) or in institution-specific money raising campaigns. 
But this has been dwarfed by health insurance since the inter-war decades. 
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The impact of cost-sharing is not fully evident in OOP payments data, particularly as some of 
the cost is redirected to private health insurance in countries where public coverage is strong, or has 
been off-set in some cases by establishing ceilings for certain population groups (OECD, 2004a). 
While cost-sharing measures have to some degree reduced the public share of total healthcare 
spending, the impact of co-payments on reducing overall household demand and consumption of 
care seems on balance to be fairly limited (Docteur & Oxley, 2003, p.29). Though intended to 
reduce “unnecessary” consultations and/or treatment, because it is extremely difficult to predict 
“necessary” and “unnecessary” intervention, crucial early diagnosis can be suppressed as an 
outcome of attendant disincentives to use healthcare services, so that treatment may be more costly 
when addressed at a later date while problems may arise from patients not taking drugs when they 
need them (Docteur & Oxley, 2003). This in turn raises important questions about the impact of 
cost-sharing on more vulnerable population groups - especially the poor, chronically sick and 
elderly - who consume the bulk of health-care services. A number of countries have responded to 
this problem by placing ceilings on annual spending on healthcare by individuals and households 
(i.e. Sweden), and allowing complementary insurance to cover the cost-sharing burden (i.e. France) 
(OECD, 2004a). Net budget savings, however, may be reduced where multiple exemptions and 
ceilings of this sort are implemented due to the administrative costs incurred as a result. 
3.3. Restructuring and market incentives for providers and third party payers 
Cost-containment became a central feature of healthcare reform during the 1980s and, in 
terms of the balance sheet, has in some cases been successful in temporarily stemming annual cost 
growth rates. However, such policies frequently created problems with access to care (i.e. 
exacerbating access inequalities), increasing waiting times, reductions in quality and in some cases, 
amounted to constrictions on investment in the healthcare infrastructure at the cost of longer-term 
service performance (Docteur & Oxley, 2003). While the overall healthcare spending growth rate 
slowed down by the late-1980s for most countries, it continued to increase in most cases at a higher 
rate than economic growth (Culyer, 1990, pp.30-33). By the 1990s, attention in most health 
ministries had shifted from mere cost-control to ‘performance’ improvements, provider efficiency 
being the centre of focus. Cost-containment became more explicitly tied to efficiency goals in many 
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OECD countries (Docteur & Oxley, 2003).49 The most significant development internationally 
during the 1990s, in terms of developing competition in healthcare services, was the widespread use 
of micro-economic incentive mechanisms at the level of providers and third-party payers (as 
purchasing agents), and a shift towards greater autonomy for providers, markedly in systems 
characterised by public ownership.  
The idea of a market-competitive system in healthcare stems largely from the US, where the 
principles of ‘managed competition’ were first developed in the 1970s to create HMOs (or 
‘managed care organizations’, MCOs) a form of health insurance organization to bargain with 
providers for lower prices (Enthoven, 1993). Though encouraged with federal legislation in 1973 
(with the HMO Act) to become the mainstay of health insurance to compete with the established 
fee-for-service retrospective reimbursement of the predominant indemnity insurers, MCOs did not 
attract significant demand until the 1990s (Robinson, 1999). By the end of the 1990s, MCOs had 
overtaken indemnity insurers as the predominant form of health insurance provision. While 
contributing to the reduction in overall hospital expenditure in the 1990s, their dominance has not 
ensured the kind of price competition anticipated by their proponents, and the cost-inflationary 
tendency within US healthcare continues to be a core issue for US public policy on healthcare 
(Robinson, 1999).  
Managed competition was crudely replicated in a different context in a number of European 
countries, most notably the UK (Light, 2001a), where the Conservative government introduced a 
purchaser-provider split in the public NHS (implemented in 1991 after passing the Community Care 
Act) to induce greater efficiency from providers, while also making health authorities as quasi-
autonomous entities to manage annually limited budgets.50 Though the purchaser-provider split was 
repealed in 1998 following the election of New Labour a year prior, the notion of micro-economic 
incentives for providers to contain costs and increase efficiency has remained a central feature of 
the NHS with the greater autonomy given to regional NHS Trusts as purchasing agents to set annual 
budgets for hospitals and to penalise them when they over-spend, while Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
do the same for GPs (Lister, 2005). The most significant innovation for providers under New 
Labour in this respect was the greater autonomy given to a number of hospitals (made Foundation 
                                                   
49 Indeed, one outcome of this has been a marked emphasis on the need for greater amounts of data and 
collection of empirical indicators to monitor evidence-based outcomes (Nunes, 2003; Timmermans & Kolker, 
2004). 
50 The form of budgetary caps was changed from global to ‘capitated’ budgets, whereby patient number 
throughput was made a chief measure of budgetary allocation for health authorities.  
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Trusts since 2002) approximating a non-profit mutual organizational structure and allowing hospital 
management greater decision-making power and responsibility over raising capital though still with 
strong limitations on revenue that can be acquired through non-NHS (i.e. private sector and 
international) patients (Lister, 2005; Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2005). 
A purchaser-provider split was also introduced in Sweden in the late 1980s so that a decade 
later three quarters of county councils had established separate purchasing bodies to manage county 
budgets for hospital and primary care. While market structures have become more pervasive in 
Swedish public healthcare, the private sector is relatively limited with only a few private hospitals 
and few PHI carriers (based on voluntary supplementary coverage). In 2002, legislation to allow 
state insurance funds (a prospective payment system which for the public sector is combined with 
tax based contributions) to pay part of the cost for private hospitalization costs has since been 
reversed, in an attempt to limit the extension of privatization of the public sector (Glenngard et al, 
2005). Meanwhile in 2001, legislation was passed to prevent privatization of public hospitals, as 
had occurred in a few cases in the late-1990s, bought by the largest private provider in Sweden 
(Capio) while in 2004, legislation has prevented simultaneous treatment of public and private 
patients by private hospitals (Lister, 2005, pp.161-2). New Zealand also implemented legislation for 
a purchaser-provider split in 1993 and in the process also introduced greater autonomy for hospital 
authorities as newly Crown Health Enterprises. In the process the conservative National Party in 
power at the time sought to stimulate greater competition between public and private providers and 
encourage private health insurance; though it should be mentioned that the purchaser-provider split 
was repealed in 1999 after a new government replaced it with more cooperative, if still quite 
decentralized structure, bringing more control over budgets back to the Ministry of Health (Lister, 
2005, p.247). 
In some countries a purchaser-provider split characterised the de facto relationship between 
insurers and providers from inception of the healthcare system, notably in those countries where 
mandatory social insurance has been the predominant form of financing and providers are mostly in 
the private sector. In Germany, France and the Netherlands the most significant changes involved 
the increase of user fees and diversification of the financing base. The Netherlands had already one 
of the most mixed systems of health financing, with a substantial contribution from out-of-pocket 
spending (co-payments accounted for 8% of funding in 1998). More important is the large private 
health sector which benefits from statutory mandatory subscription between 30 regional sickness 
funds and 50 private insurance plans which pay for healthcare services on a fee-for-service basis 
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(Schippers, 2002). However, while there is a fairly large selection of PHI firms, the functional 
division between PHI and sickness funds means there is not much direct competition between these 
different forms of health insurance as it operates currently. Rather than a purchaser-provider split, 
the Netherlands sought to introduce managed competition for insurance in 1987 (with the ‘Dekker’ 
reforms) into an otherwise highly regulated hybrid system, seeking to break the cost-inflationary 
effects of the private sector (Van de Ven & Schut, 2000).  
Already containing a purchaser-provider split, the French healthcare system lacks adequate 
price competition as the private sector has become entrenched in a system of insurance 
reimbursement that allows high charging level but also minimizes market competition. Imai, 
Jacobzone and Lenain argue that ‘the financial distortions in the system have resulted in a 
segmentation of supply by type of care but without any price competition’ (2000, p.24). Indeed, as 
Lister (2005) notes,  
‘the private sector may appear to charge a lower rate than the public sector for some 
hospital care, but its selective provision and its incentive to drive up demand for care 
means that it can still exert a constant upward pressure both on prices and on costs, 
intensifying competition for scarce qualified staff’. (p.176) 
Consequently, private practice has been an important factor in the rising expenditure, and this 
extends beyond hospitals, as two-thirds of French doctors are in private practice and paid on a fee-
for-service basis (Durand-Zaleski et al, 1997, p.944), a scenario that to some extent is quite similar 
in Germany.  
Having essentially worked on the basis of a purchaser-provider split since its inception the 
German system of social health insurance, does not seem to benefit greatly from competition-
induced cost-control and efficiency since both providers and insurance carriers maintain a strong 
position within the healthcare economy. Part of this stems from the freedom for patients to choose 
healthcare providers directly. In the absence of a ‘gatekeeper’ system of referral, there remain 
incentives from providers to increase fees (Busse & Riesberg, 2000). Moreover, insurance is not 
limited to the sickness funds. Private health insurance has become a more prominent feature of the 
German health economy. With over 14 million subscribers in the early 2000s, 52 PHI carriers 
compose one of the largest voluntary health insurance markets in Europe (Busse, et al, 2002, 
p.48).51 The combination of a weak primary care system, strong hospital providers and health 
                                                   
51 These PHI carriers are organised in the Association of Private Health Insurance Companies. 
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insurance has meant the purchaser-provider split has fallen short of the substantial cost savings 
through competitive incentives. Instead a fragmented network of powerful interests between 
providers, insurers and health product companies has repeatedly created a major barrier to 
government attempts to break the cost-inflationary effects of the German health economy (Busse & 
Riesberg, 2000, p.16). 
3.4. Market-oriented reform: a climate for a commercialising healthcare 
services mix 
Having taken this broad comparative look at market-oriented reform across the OECD 
countries, it is useful to reflect briefly on what these trends mean for the changing dynamic of the 
healthcare services market internationally. The hospital and health insurance sectors are still the key 
segments of interest, although it is important to stress that structural change in other market 
segments can impact upon the former two as well.  
Convergence 
As can be seen in the overview so far, there is wide variation in the experience of market-
oriented healthcare reform in OECD countries. Spending limits through wage, price or budget 
controls have, in most cases, grown out of incremental changes over extended periods of time and 
within different components of broader reform programmes for public sector restructuring. In some 
cases they have been explicitly introduced as part of specific healthcare reform programmes. For 
instance, as efficiency became more explicitly a focus of healthcare sector reforms, spending 
controls and remuneration negotiations increasingly have been tied to output-based indicators, such 
as patient throughput targets, and ‘value-for money’ definitions, something that has seen a major 
trend in the UK (Lister, 2005).52  
Changing mixed economy of care 
Although I have noted a few cases in which wage, price, and budget controls have impacted 
on the public-private mix, it is more accurate to say that these policy areas provide a contextual 
                                                   
52 However, these definitions themselves are only more recently testable insofar as evaluation relies on 
extensive data for which collection has only more recently been implemented in most countries. Questions 
have also been raised in many cases regarding the use of targets to achieve efficiency goals and that these 
goals may be undermined by providers finding alternative ways of classifying work performed in order to 
circumvent spending caps for specific categories for instance. 
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background within broader reform programmes, than having an immediate impact on the public-
private mix. For instance wage controls may act as a stimulus for healthcare workers to leave the 
public sector, seeking employment in the private sector or in other countries (Docteur & Oxley, 
2003), while outsourcing can function as an indirect method of wage control for the public sector. 
Budgetary caps and price controls may also be a stimulus to divest certain activities from public 
sector provision, although this can take place in more indirect ways. For instance the closure of 
small community hospitals and concentration of beds in larger regional or general hospitals in order 
to reduce budgetary outlays has had the indirect outcome of privatising provision by leaving gaps in 
the market for private sector providers (Lister, 2005). However, budgetary constraints in the case of 
hospitals have tended to work in tandem, rather than singly, with policies to rationalise overall 
hospital capacity, being an outcome of local authority or sickness fund budgetary constraints on 
providers.  
While the marketisation of healthcare provision has been an important trend it still has a 
somewhat experimental character. Though a purchaser-provider split has been essentially present in 
a number of OECD countries since inception (US, France, Germany, the Netherlands), attempts to 
introduce such a structure into the healthcare system in the UK, Sweden, and New Zealand for 
instance have had mixed outcomes, with the latter two turning away from more overt ‘pro-
competitive’ approaches in the early 2000s. In the UK, by contrast, the overt purchaser-provider 
split has been reversed within the NHS, though elements of a competitive structure have been 
retained, particularly as in the early 2000s the New Labour government sought to open up greater 
space for private providers to offer elective surgery on NHS contracts. 
Related to marketisation, the privatisation of consumption has been a key trend during the 
1990s. A rise in out-of-pocket payments has stemmed from a trend to increase the level of the cost-
burden on households through cost-sharing for private health insurance and through reduction of 
coverage by public financing and social health insurance. In some cases, efforts to increase the role 
of private health insurance in the healthcare mix has been a key element of the privatisation of 
consumption, most notably in the Netherlands and in New Zealand, though while in the former case 
PHI has been balanced with social health insurance for defined population groups, in the latter case 
low demand for PHI has meant a reversal of this policy approach and return to greater public sector 
coverage (Lister, 2005).  
In the US, PHI has been the de facto form of coverage for most of the population insured for 
healthcare costs, and while the federal government introduced public reimbursement for defined 
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population groups in the mid-1960s, it has since pursued a greater role for private health insurance 
to top-up public financing (Medicare-Plus) for those who can afford it (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006). 
The expansion of PHI in the UK has been more tentative, though in the 1990s and early 2000s it is 
also linked to the increase in the share of costs for services with reduced public coverage for dental 
care and ophthalmic services that have been largely divested from public coverage. 
Private sector expansion and commercialisation 
The expansion of the private sector is thus in many cases predicated to a large extent on the 
space either left unoccupied by the public sector or where the private sector is already a firmly 
established part of the healthcare mix. The most obvious case is the US where private provision is 
for the most part the de facto form of healthcare service provision and financing. Space opened up 
following attempts to create a more competitive healthcare system with a greater selection of health 
insurance schemes and/or withdrawal from the provision of hospital and ambulatory services 
(particularly dental care, ophthalmic services, but also to some extent of primary care) has been the 
most important tendency during the 1990s. This has been most evident in systems where public 
financing and provision were made key components of the healthcare mix in the post-war decades. 
Moreover, in most countries the private sector remains dominated by ‘non-profit’ organizations, so 
that in only a few countries have for-profit healthcare providers made much headway in the past 
two decades (most notably the US). In a number of countries, for-profit and investor-owned 
providers are banned or face limitations to operate in markets served by the public sector.  
The growth of private sector provision and financing has been a key tendency between 1990s 
and the early 2000s, but it is still a tentative trend that does not have an inevitable outcome. It is 
difficult to imagine a complete reversal from the incremental privatisation that has been taking 
place, particularly as governments are still keen to diversify the choice available to patients and the 
limits of public financing and provision in meeting changing demand patterns. However, as the 
private sector is subject to the trappings of market failure, due to its cost-inflationary tendency as a 
result of high administrative costs associated with it and the difficulty of ensuring equitable access 
to healthcare, OECD countries that still have a strong public sector presence are more cautiously 
creating space for private sector expansion.  
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have made a broad overview of market oriented healthcare reforms with a 
mind to establishing the degree to which this is a substantive trend across developed countries, for 
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which I have used health economic data from OECD countries. While there is a definite shift 
towards market-oriented restructuring in healthcare systems ranging from the more socialised and 
‘state-based’ systems such as the UK and Nordic countries, to the more ‘pro-competitive’ market-
based systems of the US and South Korea, as well as systems with more mixed state and private 
sector structures of provision and financing, the notion of convergence towards a similar type of 
structure is rather tenuous to extrapolate from the data I have shown. Nonetheless, there is a 
noticeably common move towards increasing the personal burden of cost for healthcare services, a 
key indicator of commodification in the sense of requiring patients to contribute a greater 
percentage of direct out-of-pocket costs to care: from covering pharmaceutical costs, to the costs of 
primary care, dental and ophthalmic services (‘ambulatory care’ in the cumulative OECD data 
category), and even the cost of hospitalisation to some degree. 
My research here, however, has not been dedicated sufficiently to this question to make a 
strong empirical statement on the substantive degree of commodification. Considering that some 
countries have also included certain measures to off-set increases in personal outlays for healthcare 
for lower-income groups this indicates at most a partial re-commodification, though it is not in itself 
indicative of commercialisation qua expansion of ‘for-profit’ service provision and financing. Even 
so, there are some clear indications of the space being opened up for the private sector, whether 
non-profit or for-profit, which in a ‘pro-competitive’ climate in public policy could well create 
greater niches for the commercial (‘for-profit’) sector. One particular area of potential growth of the 
commercial sector seems to be in PHI where coverage withdrawal could open up space more easily 
for the private sector than in the relatively harder to penetrate and more highly regulated hospital 
sector. 
While globalization may not quite be extrapolated from the picture painted in this chapter in 
terms of a convergence towards a bottom line for healthcare provision and financing, the increased 
space gradually being created for private healthcare services could well provide a basis for the 
development of an international healthcare services market. The form of such a market remains to 
be examined, which I do in the following chapter. Meanwhile, with regard to identifying 
mechanisms for commercialisation, the current overview has not shown very much in detail. One 
thing that does seem clear is the importance of looking at the nationally specific context for 
commercialisation. This is a reason for my examination in greater depth of the development of 
commercialisation in the hospital and health insurance sectors in subsequent chapters 5 and 6 
looking at the US and UK respectively. 
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Table 3.1: Historical trajectory of universalisation of healthcare financing in selected OECD 
countries 
1938 New Zealand* Establishment of universal coverage  
1948 UK NHS implemented instituting majority tax-based financing for universal comprehensive coverage 
1950s Mexico* Foundation of social security system 
1961 Japan* All local governments implement National Health Insurance (mandated in 1958) 
1965 USA 
Medicare and Medicaid passed providing universal coverage for over 
65s and delimited coverage for disabled and medically indigent (later 
added specific diagnostic groups) 
1971 Canada Last Province enacts Medicare (established in 1966) 
1970s Portugal Nationalisation of hospitals, and clinics (1974-1977) and formation of NHS 
1975 Hungary* National Health Service established 
1978 France 
Universal coverage achieved (National insurance fund for salaried 
workers: agricultural and self-employed covered by other funds in 
1967) 
1978 Italy National health service created 
1981 Germany 90% coverage achieved (remains the same level today) 
1983 Greece National Health System established 
1984 Australia* Universal tax-funded health insurance established  
1986 Spain NHS created 
1989 South Korea* (social insurance system established 1977) 
 
Notes: (*) Countries admitted to the OECD after its founding in 1961: Japan (1964), Finland (1969), 
Australia (1971), New Zealand (1973), Mexico (1994), Czech Republic (1995), S Korea, Hungary, and 
Poland (1996), and Slovakia (2000).                                           Sources: Cutler (2002), p.884; Lister (2005) 
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Figure 3.1: Total expenditure on health as percentage of GDP: selected countries (OECD), 
OECD mean and EU 15 mean, 1970-2004 
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Source: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.2: Total expenditure on health as percentage of GDP in selected OECD countries (i): 
selected years 1960-2004 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 4.0 4.2 4.5 6.9 6.8 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.8 9.2 
Austria 4.3 4.6 5.2 7.0 7.5 6.5 7.0 9.7 9.4 9.6 
Belgium - - 3.9 5.6 6.3 7.0 7.2 8.2 8.6 10.1 
Canada 5.4 5.9 7.0 7.1 7.1 8.2 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.9 
Denmark   7.9 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.3 8.9 
Finland 3.8 4.8 5.6 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.8 7.4 6.7 7.5 
France 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.4 7.0 7.9 8.4 9.4 9.2 10.5 
Germany - - 6.2 8.6 8.7 9.0 8.5 10.3 10.4 10.9 
Greece - - 6.1  6.6 7.4 7.4 9.6 9.9 10.0 
Iceland 3.0 3.5 4.7 5.7 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.4 9.2 10.2 
Ireland 3.7 4.0 5.1 7.3 8.3 7.5 6.1 6.7 6.3 7.1 
Italy - - - - - - 7.7 7.1 7.9 8.4 
Japan 3.0 4.4 4.5 5.6 6.5 6.7 5.9 6.8 7.6 8.0 
Luxembourg - - 3.1 4.3 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 8.0 
Netherlands - - - 6.9 7.2 7.1 7.7 8.1 7.9 9.2 
New Zealand - - 5.1 6.5 5.9 5.1 6.9 7.2 7.7 8.4 
Norway 2.9 3.4 4.4 5.9 7.0 6.6 7.7 7.9 8.5 9.2 
Portugal - - 2.6 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.2 8.2 9.4 10.0 
Spain 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.6 5.3 5.4 6.5 7.4 7.2 8.1 
Sweden - - 6.8 7.6 9.0 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.4 9.1 
Switzerland 4.9 4.6 5.5 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.3 9.7 10.4 11.6 
United Kingdom 3.9 4.1 4.5 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.0 7.0 7.3 8.3 
United States 5.1 5.6 7.0 7.9 8.8 10.1 11.9 13.3 13.3 15.3 
EU 15 (mean) 3.8 4.1 5.2 6.4 7.0 7.1 7.3 8.1 8.2 8.9 
OECD (mean) (ii) 3.8 4.4 5.2 6.6 7.0 7.1 7.4 8.1 8.3 9.1 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990; (ii) 
In order to reduce statistical error, the mean values are presented for the OECD member states included 
here (at time of year shown); (-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Source: OECD (2006b)  
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Table 3.3: Public health expenditure as proportion of total expenditure on health: selected 
OECD countries (i), selected years (1960-2004) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
Australia 50.4 57.2 63.0 67.1 68.9 67.5 
Austria 69.4 63.0 68.8 73.5 69.9 70.7 
Belgium - - - - 75.8 71.1 
Canada 42.6 69.9 75.6 74.5 70.3 69.8 
Czech Republic - 96.6 96.8 97.4 90.5 89.2 
Denmark - 83.7 87.8 82.7 82.4 - 
Finland 54.1 73.8 79.0 80.9 75.1 76.6 
France 62.4 75.5 80.1 76.6 75.8 78.4 
Germany - 72.8 78.7 76.2 78.6 78.2 
Greece - 42.6 55.6 53.7 52.6 52.8 
Hungary - - - 89.1 70.7 72.5 
Iceland 66.7 66.2 88.2 86.6 82.6 83.4 
Ireland 76.0 81.7 81.6 71.9 73.3 79.5 
Italy - - - 79.1 73.5 76.4 
Japan 60.4 69.8 71.3 77.6 81.3 81.5 
Korea - - - 38.5 46.2 51.4 
Luxembourg - 88.9 92.8 93.1 89.3 90.4 
Mexico - - - 40.4 46.6 46.4 
Netherlands - - 69.4 67.1 63.1 62.3 
New Zealand - 80.3 88.0 82.4 78.0 77.4 
Norway 77.8 91.6 85.1 82.8 82.5 83.5 
Poland - - - 91.7 70.0 68.6 
Portugal - 59.0 64.3 65.5 72.5 71.9 
Slovak Republic - - - - 89.4 88.3 
Spain 58.7 65.4 79.9 78.7 71.6 70.9 
Sweden - 86.0 92.5 89.9 84.9 84.9 
Switzerland - - - 52.4 55.6 58.4 
Turkey - - 29.4 61.0 62.9 72.1 
United Kingdom 85.2 87.0 89.4 83.6 80.9 85.5 
United States 23.4 36.5 41.3 39.7 44.0 44.7 
Mean (ii) 61.4 73.3 79.5 77.1 73.4 72.5 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD 
after 1990. (ii) In order to reduce statistical error, the mean values are presented for the 
OECD member states included here (at time of year shown); (-) No data available (in 
OECD database) 
 
Source: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.4: Public expenditure on health, per capita (US$ mil purchasing power parity) in 
selected OECD countries: selected years (1960-2004) 
 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 48 107 435 717 876 1161 1652 1940 
Austria 53 121 530 702 976 1544 1863 2207 
Belgium - - - - - 1434 1726 2165 
Canada 53 209 592 955 1295 1466 1760 2210 
Czech Republic - - - - 547 820 887 1214 
Denmark - 321 814 1072 1259 1522 1962 - 
Finland 34 141 467 759 1148 1080 1289 1712 
France 44 155 558 855 1174 1548 1858 2475 
Germany - 196 756 1070 1325 1829 2098 2350 
Greece - 68 270 - 453 651 849 1141 
Hungary - - - - 530  576 606 959 
Iceland 38 108 620 964 1380 1556 2166 2777 
Ireland 32 96 423 501 571 870 1326 2063 
Italy - - - - 1097 1103 1499 1828 
Japan 18 104 414 614 866 1279 1599 1832 
Korea - - - 69 139 191 359 591 
Luxembourg - 145 594 822 1427 1879 2663 4603 
Mexico - - - - 124 164 235 307 
Netherlands - - 524 698 962 1294 1424 1894 
New Zealand - 169 446 559 820 962 1252 1611 
Norway 38 129 566 815 1153 1594 2541 3311 
Poland - - - - 275 308 413 552 
Portugal - 30 188 230 441 686 1178 1304 
Slovak Republic - - - - - - 532 687 
Spain 9 62 290 403 687 861 1088 1484 
Sweden - 268 874 1147 1428 1503 1928 2399 
Switzerland - - - 741 1063 1383 1768 2382 
Turkey - - 22 37 103 132 284 418 
United Kingdom 72 142 429 608 825 1161 1502 2176 
United States 34 128 443 707 1093 1664 2017 2727 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 
1990; (-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.5: Total expenditure on health growth rate ($US mil. at purchasing power parity): 
selected OECD countries, 1960-2005 (5 year intervals) 
 
1960-
1965 
1965-
1970 
1970-
1975 
1975-
1980 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2004 
Australia 0.38 0.31 0.64 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.20 
Austria 0.30 0.46 0.56 0.44 0.17 0.32 0.43 0.17 0.15 
Belgium - 1.00 0.58 0.46 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.26 
Canada 0.36 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.24 
Czech Republic - - - - - 1.00 0.38 0.07 0.28 
Denmark - 1.00 0.34 0.39 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.18 
Finland 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.03 0.18 0.24 
France 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.26 0.19 0.24 
Germany - 1.00 0.54 0.41 0.30 0.23 0.41 0.15 0.12 
Greece - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 0.36 0.25 0.26 
Hungary - - - - - 1.00 0.13 0.19 0.35 
Iceland 0.44 0.45 0.57 0.53 0.40 0.34 0.18 0.33 0.24 
Ireland 0.31 0.49 0.61 0.50 0.25 0.16 0.36 0.36 0.35 
Italy - - - - - 1.00 0.10 0.25 0.15 
Japan 0.61 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.23 0.13 
Korea - - - - 1.00 0.49 0.36 0.33 0.34 
Luxembourg - 1.00 0.55 0.48 0.31 0.43 0.30 0.36 0.43 
Mexico - - - - - 1.00 0.30 0.29 0.28 
Netherlands - - 1.00 0.41 0.25 0.33 0.24 0.22 0.27 
New Zealand - 1.00 0.54 0.19 0.24 0.37 0.27 0.26 0.27 
Norway 0.39 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.24 
Poland - - - - - 1.00 0.30 0.28 0.27 
Portugal  1.00 0.71 0.47 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.13 
Slovakia - - - - - - - 1.00 0.23 
Spain 0.64 0.58 0.57 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.28 0.23 0.32 
Sweden  1.00 0.42 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.21 
Switzerland 0.24 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.24 
Turkey - - 1.00 0.43 0.09 0.61 0.18 0.62 0.27 
UK 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.28 
USA 0.34 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.28 
 
Notes: (*) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990. (**) In 
order to reduce statistical error, the mean values are presented for the OECD member states included here 
(at time of year shown).  
 
Source: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.6: Macroeconomic cost control measures for healthcare in selected OECD countries 
 Hospitals Physicians Prescription Drugs 
Canada 
- Global budgets 
established 
with universal coverage; 
tightened in 1970s; 
- Certificate of Need 
required for expansion 
1984: Physicians must 
accept government 
payment as payment in 
full. 
- 
France 
1984-85: Global budgets 
introduced for public 
hospitals; 
1993: Global budgets 
introduced for private 
hospitals 
1979: Fee schedules 
tightened. 
1994: National target: for 
pharmaceutical 
expenditures 
Germany 
1977: Health Insurance 
Cost Containment Act 
 
1984-86: Global budgets 
introduced for hospitals 
1977: Expenditure cap on 
ambulatory care /  
Global budgets for 
physician associations;  
1993: Prescription drug 
budgets for physicians. 
1982: Out-of-pocket 
payments for drugs 
increased. 
 
1989: Reference pricing 
system. 
Italy 1990s: Move from per diem to DRG, payment - - 
Japan 
Early 1980s: Tighter fee 
schedules; 
1985-87: Hospital beds 
and expansion capped. 
Early 1980s: Tighter fee 
schedules. - 
UK Global budgets established with NHS. 
Salaries established with 
NHS. - 
US 1983: Prospective payment for hospital admissions 
1992: Fee schedule for 
physicians. - 
 
Sources: Cutler (2002); Docteur & Oxley (2003); Lister (2005) 
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Table 3.7: Healthcare expenditure by type of provider (i) (%TEH): Selected OECD countries 
(ii), 1985, 1995 & 2000 
 Hospi-tals 
Nursing 
homes & 
resid’l 
care 
Ambula- 
tory (iii) 
Medical 
goods 
(iv) 
Public 
health 
orgs 
Admini
stration 
Other 
ind’s 
(v) 
Total 
(vi) 
1985         
Australia 40.2 8.4 29.7 10.1 0.8 3.1 - 92.3 
Canada 41.2 10.4 27.3 10.0 4.5 1.3 0.5 95.2 
Denmark 49.2 25.1 15.2 8.9 - 0.5 - 98.9 
France 48.7 0.7 24.3 18.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 97.7 
S. Korea 33.8 - 23.9 25.1 2.6 9.8 2.4 97.6 
UK - - - - - - - - 
USA 36.6 7.5 30.3 10.8 2.7 6.1 0.7 94.7 
1995         
Australia 35.7 7.1 32.8 13.9 1.6 3.2 - 94.3 
Canada 34.8 9.8 29.0 14.6 5.3 2.2 0.4 96.1 
Denmark 47.8 20.6 17.6 11.7 - 0.9 - 98.6 
France 44.5 1.2 25.1 21.2 2.4 1.7 1.3 97.4 
Germany 31.4 7.1 26.7 19.6 1.8 5.5 4.1 96.2 
Japan 49.8 1.2 28.7 9.1 3.0 2.0 - 93.8 
S. Korea 31.5 - 33.1 19.9 - 5.6 3.0 93.1 
Switzerland 32.6 15.8 30.8 9.4 2.8 5.3 - 96.7 
UK - - 15.3* 17.3* 1.6 2.1 3.2 39.5 
USA 34.9 7.6 34.9 10.4 3.2 5.8 0.6 97.4 
2000         
Australia 33.8 6.4 32.0 17.3 0.3 4.3 - 94.1 
Canada 30.7 9.6 27.3 18.5 5.1 3.6 0.3 95.1 
Denmark 47.6 21.7 16.6 11.3 - 0.9 - 98.1 
France 41.6 1.4 24.9 24.1 2.5 1.9 1.2 97.6 
Germany 30.2 7.9 27.1 20.5 1.8 5.8 3.8 97.1 
Japan 48.7 2.8 27.9 11.8 3.0 2.2 - 96.4 
S. Korea 32.2 0.3** 36.8 17.1 1.1 4.9 2.5 94.9 
Luxembourg 32.3 17.6 26.7 13.3 - 6.0 0.3 96.2 
Netherlands 35.2 10.4 23.2 16.5 1.5 4.6 3.6 95.0 
Norway 35.9 16.3 23.9 13.7 1.5 - 1.7 93.0 
Portugal 36.3 1.7 30.7 24.1 - 1.4 1.4 95.6 
Switzerland 32.4 17.0 30.8 9.5 2.6 5.1 - 97.4 
UK *** 56.4 2.7 15.3 17.3 0.3 2.1 3.2 97.3 
USA 32.2 7.4 34.7 13.2 3.3 6.3 0.6 97.7 
Mean (vii) 37.0 8.2 26.4 19.5 2.2 3.6 1.6 98.5 
 
Notes: (i) The categories for provider types vary between countries, particularly between hospital and long 
term care which often share similar characteristics. Therefore figures show must be taken as more or less 
indicative rather than absolute; (ii) Countries have been selected based on availability of data; (iii) 
‘Ambulatory’ includes physician services, dental services and other primary care, (iv) ‘Medical goods’(v) ‘Other 
Industries’ includes secondary providers of services in the healthcare sector, (vi) ‘Total’ indicates sum of 
categories shown (because of inconsistencies between categories the total does not sum up to 100%); (vii)  
Mean shown only for 2000 due to greater sample of countries; (-) No data available (in OECD database); (*) 
1998 figures; (**) 2003 figures; (***) 1999 figures.                                                          Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.8: Total expenditure on inpatient care as proportion of total expenditure on health: 
OECD countries, selected years 1960-2004 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 43.0 43.5 44.1 47.9 51.6 48.6 46.3 42.8 37.0 - 
Austria - - - - - - - 41.3 39.3 41.7 
Belgium - - 25.7 29.3 33.1 34.0 32.8 34.4 - - 
Canada 43.7 49.1 52.6 54.4 53.8 51.6 49.1 44.6 30.5 28.9 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - 29.0 33.6 - 
Denmark - - - - 61.6 60.4 55.3 55.0 53.2 30.1 
Finland 39.9 44.4 46.4 44.4 46.3 46 44.7 42.0 38.2 34.8 
France 38.4 40.0 40.2 44.5 49.4 47.6 44.3 43.2 39.9 33.8 
Germany - - 30.8 33.6 33.2 34.1 34.7 36.1 35.8 34.7 
Greece - - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary - - - - - - 65.2 54.8 29.3 - 
Iceland 37.0 37.8 50.9 48.4 59.1 56.5 53.8 53.3 53.5 54.8 
Ireland - - - - 58.8 - - - - - 
Italy - - - - - - 42.4 44.5 41.2 42.4 
Japan 34.1 28.0 26.4 30.3 30.9 32.8 33.0 36.8 38.4 39.1 
Korea - - - - - 25.0 28.1 22.0 23.8 23.0 
Luxembourg - - - 27.6 31.3 27.4 26.4 31.3 36.0 33.1 
Mexico - - - - - - - - 37.3 33.9 
Netherlands - - - 52.8 54.6 54.1 49.2 49.1 36.5 - 
New Zealand - - - - 72.2 76.2 60.4 - - - 
Norway 38.1 37.1 68.2 69.8 63.9 64.8 61.7 - 42.8 40.9 
Poland - - - - - - - - - 28.1 
Portugal - - - - 28.7 26.4 32.3 33.9 - - 
Slovak Republic - - - - - - - - 26.4 30.4 
Spain - - - 34.4 54.1 55.7 44.1 31.0 28.2 25.9 
Sweden - - - - - - - 53.4 50.9 31.3 
Switzerland 35.7 40.5 44.4 47.5 47.5 46.7 47.9 47.9 46.8 47.6 
Turkey - - - - - - 33.4 28.7 19.9 - 
United Kingdom - - - - - - - - - - 
United States 34.6 34.9 40.2 42.4 43.9 40.0 35.6 31.8 28.4 26.8 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990. (-) 
No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Source: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.9: Public expenditure on hospital services (%TEH): selected OECD countries, 
selected years (1960-2003) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Australia 29.6 27.6 28.3 33.8 34.7 32.8 28.9 26.2 26.9 27.6 
Canada 27.5 38.3 42.6 42.5 38.9 37.4 35.8 31.6 28.0 27.0 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - - - 41.2 
Denmark - - 51.7 52.8 50.1 47.3 45.7 46.6 45.9 46.2 
France 29.3 34.0 36.0 40.9 46.5 43.7 41.6 40.9 38.1 35.2 
Germany - - - - - - - 28.2 26.9 25.8 
Hungary - - - - - - - - 31.5 31.2 
Ireland - - - - - - - - 45.8 40.3 
Japan - - - - - - - 44.5 42.9 42.0 
Korea - - - - - 11.4 14.8 15.6 18.6 17.8 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - - 30.9 30.0 
Mexico - - - - - - - - 25.4 27.0 
Netherlands - - - - - - - - 27.1 25.9 
Norway - - - - - - - - 34.5 34.5 
Poland - - - - - - - - - 26.8 
Portugal - - - - - - - - 35.2 32.8 
Slovakia - - - - - - - - 25.5 30.4 
Spain - - - - - - - - 36.5 35.2 
Switzerland - - - - - - - 21.9 22.7 25.2 
Turkey - - - - - - - - 32.0 35.3 
UK (*) - - - 58.7 56.5 52.8 47.9 45.6 41.7 39.2 
USA 14.6 12.8 21.1 22.5 22.0 21.1 19.2 21.0 18.4 17.9 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990;  
(*) Figures were not available in OECD data but calculated from Office of Health Economics (2007) pp 71, 
133; (-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b); Office of Health Economics (2007) 
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Table 3.10: Public spending on inpatient care as percentage of total public spending on 
healthcare: OECD countries, 1960-2003 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Australia 63.5 59.4 56.1 52.3 63.4 55.5 52.5 47.5 39.0 40.7 
Austria - - - - - - - 44.5 45.2 47.6 
Belgium - - - - - - - 29.1 33.7 - 
Canada 70.3 79.5 67.9 64.3 62.3 59.7 57.4 53.9 37.4 35.5 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - 31.9 37.1 38.5 
Denmark - - - - 67.1 66.8 66.0 63.1 60.6 58.0 
Finland 56.1 58.3 55.8 52.6 53.9 53.2 51.4 50.6 46.7 44.4 
France 46.3 47.0 46.8 51.3 56.8 54.7 53.3 52.4 48.6 41.0 
Germany - - 33.7 35.8 36.1 37.6 39.1 38.5 38.1 36.9 
Greece - - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary - - - - - - - 32.8 36.7 36.7 
Iceland 55.6 60.0 76.9 55.5 67.0 64.9 62.1 63.5 64.8 66.7 
Ireland - - - 67.2 59.8 77.9 80.1 80.4 71.0 - 
Italy - - - - - - 51.6 57.9 53.0 52.6 
Japan  38.0 31.0 38.1 40.6 43.1 39.4 40.1 42.4 42.6 
Korea - - -   26.0 33.8 36.8 33.0 29.3 
Luxembourg - - - 27.0 27.6 29.0 26.9 32.9 37.9 34.0 
Mexico - - -      54.5 48.0 
Netherlands - - - 64.4 64.4 63.1 56.9 56.4 46.8 47.4 
New Zealand - - 69.3 75.5 77.9 83.2 69.6 - - - 
Norway 48.9 45.9 74.4 72.6 75.0 75.6 74.5 - 47.8 45.9 
Poland - - - - - - 46.0 46.2 41.1 40.9 
Portugal - - 46.6 42.0 41.7 41.8 45.0 50.2 - - 
Slovak Republic - - - - - - - - 29.5 34.4 
Spain 42.8 33.6 28.4 39.6 54.9 55.9 54.2 37.9 34.2 32.0 
Sweden - - 69.5 72.0 74.0 59.1 55.5 60.9 59.4 36.6 
Switzerland - - - - - - - 49.4 48.4 50.1 
Turkey - - - - 40.0 20.5 28.2 - 26.9 - 
UK 52.1 51.1 56.3 58.1 41.9 37.2 34.9 34.8 - - 
USA 59.0 56.9 58.9 57.2 57.1 53.9 46.8 41.8 36.9 35.1 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990.  
(-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.11: Public coverage of population against costs of in-patient care: OECD, selected 
years 1960-2004 (% of population covered) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 77.0 84.0 89.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Austria 78.0 92.0 91.0 96.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 98.0 
Belgium 58.0 86.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 98.0 98.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Canada 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Czech Republic 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Denmark 95.0 95.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Finland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
France 76.0 - 95.6 97.3 99.1 99.2 99.4 99.4 99.9 99.9 
Germany 85.2 87.0 89.2 92.1 92.3 91.2 88.8 91.4 90.7 89.8 
Greece 30.0 40.0 91.0 98.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Hungary - - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Iceland 90.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Ireland 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Italy 87.0 91.0 93.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 
Japan 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Korea - - - - 29.8 52.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Luxembourg 90.0 - 99.6 99.8 99.8 - - 98.6 98.2 99.7 
Mexico - - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 72.6 71.9 69.1 69.2 68.8 76.6 72.9 74.1 72.3 69.8 
New Zealand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Norway 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Poland - - - - - - - - - - 
Portugal 18.0 32.0 52.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Slovakia - - - - - - - 19.2 19.7 19.0 
Spain 50.0 55.0 61.0 81.0 84.0 - 98.1 98.6 98.9  98.9 
Sweden 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Switzerland 74.0 82. 89.0 94.0 96.5 98.0 99.5 99.5 100.0 100.0 
Turkey   26.9 33.6 38.4 42.1 55.1 65.0 - 67.2 
UK 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
USA - - - - - - 24.5 26.4 24.7 26.6 
 
Notes: (-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.12: Inpatient beds per 1000 head of population in selected OECD countries 
(including acute and long-term care beds): selected years 1960-2004 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 9.7 9.1 8.2 7.9 7.8 6.2 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.8 
Austria - - - - - 10.9 10.1 9.3 8.6 7.7 
Belgium - - - - - - 8.1 7.3 7.1 6.8 
Canada - - - 6.9  6.8 6.8 6.0 5.0 3.8 3.4 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - - 8.8 8.7 
Denmark - - - 8.5 8.1 7.0 5.6 4.9 4.3 4.0 
France - - - 10.6 11.1 10.5 9.7 8.9 8.1 7.5 
Germany - - - - - - 10.1 9.7 9.1 8.6 
Greece 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.2 5.5 - 4.9 4.7 - 
Hungary - - - - - - - 8.8 8.1 7.8 
Ireland - - - - 9.1 8.2 6.1 5.2 4.7 4.2 
Italy 9.1 9.8 10.8 10.7 9.7 8.3 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.2 
Japan - - - - - - - 15.4 14.7 14.2 
Korea - - - - - - 3.1 4.4 6.1 7.3 
Luxembourg - - - - - 12.5  11.7 10.7 6.9 6.7 
Mexico - - - - - - 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Netherlands - - - - - - 5.9 5.3 5.2 4.8 
Norway - - - - - 5.9  4.6 4.0 3.8 3.7 
Portugal - - - - - 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7 
Slovak Republic - - - - - - - 8.3  7.8 7.2 
Spain - - - - 5.4 4.9 4.6 4.3 3.7 3.4 
Switzerland 8.2 8.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.8 6.5 5.5 4.1 3.8 
Turkey 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 
United Kingdom - - - - - - - 4.8 4.3 4.1 
United States 9.2 8.8 7.9 6.8 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.3 
 
Notes: (i) Countries not shown have sparse data in OECD database and/or joined OECD after 1990.  
(-) No data available (in OECD database) 
 
Source: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.13: Microeconomic measures, (market) incentives in selected OECD countries 
 Legislation / Reforms 
Canada 
1991: Federal Payments to provinces cut 
1991: Tighter supply-side limits by provinces (closing & 
merging of hospitals) 
France 1996: proposal for Global Budget 
Germany 
1989 Health Reform Act 
 
1993: Healthcare Structure Reform Act 
Italy 1992: Reform to create regional enterprises 
Japan 1997: Reform to increase coinsurance substantially 
Sweden 1989: Purchaser-provider split introduced 
UK 
1990: Community Care Act introducing ‘internal market’ 
(purchaser-provider split & GP ‘fundholders’) 
 
1998: Internal market repealed; Primary Health Groups 
introduced to replace GP fundholders 
 
2000: NHS Modernisation Act 
US 
1973: HMO Act 
 
1997: Balanced Budget Act 
 
Sources: Cutler (2002); Docteur & Oxley (2003) ; Lister (2005) 
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Table 3.14: Public expenditure on pharmaceuticals* and other non-durable medical goods (% 
total expenditure on pharmaceuticals): OECD countries in selected years 1960-2004 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 36.4 41.5  44.9 56.1 43.7 46.5 44.8 54.0 54.0 - 
Austria - - - - - - - 58.3 68.5 70.7 
Belgium - - 58.5 56.5 57.3 51.0 46.8 43.0 - 77.4 
Canada 0.7 1.0 2.1 14.7 24.7 29.4 32.9 33.3 35.4 37.8 
Czech Republic - - - - - - 89.0 83.8 76.0 - 
Denmark - - - - 49.9 45.5 34.2 48.6 48.7 55.9 
Finland - 22.2 33.7 46.5 46.7 44.5 47.4 45.3 50.2 56.0 
France 53.8 63.3 67.3 66.4 66.5 67.1 61.9 61.4 65.1 70.6 
Germany - - 63.4 73.0 73.7 71.9 73.1 71.7 72.5 74.8 
Greece - - 60.0 - 60.0 - 56.7 70.9 70.5 77.9 
Hungary - - - - - - 79.3 66.7 61.2 - 
Iceland - 35.7 43.2 49.5 51.1 61.9 82.4 78.2 60.8 59.2 
Ireland - - 50.0 42.9 52.7 60.7 65.0 77.3 80.1 88.7 
Italy - - - - - - 62.8 38.3 44.4 51.2 
Japan - - - - - 60.6 61.1 68.3 66.0 68.7 
Korea - - - - - 11.8 13.3 16.2 33.0 48.0 
Luxembourg - - 83.5 85.3 86.4 86.0 84.6 81.7 81.6 83.7 
Mexico - - - - - - - - 0.3 11.6 
Netherlands - - - 64.4 66.7 63.3 66.6 88.8 58.3 - 
New Zealand - - 77.0  77.7 81.1 80.4 74.6 70.1 - - 
Norway - 21.9 35.8 50.8 42.1 43.2 78.5  58.1 60.2 
Poland - - - - - - - - - 36.5 
Portugal - - 68.7 - 68.6 64.7 62.3 63.3 56.2 57.6 
Slovakia - - - - - - - - 82.6 82.7 
Spain - - - - 64.0 62.5 71.7 71.1 73.5 72.3 
Sweden - - 62.9 67.1 71.8 70.1 71.7 73.4 70.0 70.0 
Switzerland - - - - - - - 53.3 60.8 67.2 
Turkey - - - - 100.0 90.0 88.4 88.0 62.6 - 
UK - 66.7 59.4 66.9 67.6 64.1 66.6 63.5 - - 
USA 1.7 2.4 5.6 8.1 8.7 9.3 12.5 16.4 19.2 24.4 
 
Notes: (*) Includes prescription and OTC drugs; (-) No data available (in OECD database). 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.15: Out-of-pocket expenditure on health as percentage of total private expenditure 
on health (OECD countries): selected years 1980-2004  
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Australia 43.4 50.0 50.5 49.6 65.2 - 
Austria - - - 49.7 55.3 50.1 
Belgium - - - - - 83.5 
Canada - - 56.7 55.4 53.5 49.4 
Czech Republic - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.5 
Denmark 93.1 94.6 92.6 93.3 91.0 - 
Finland 87.7 85.8 81.4 83.9 82.0 80.9 
France 64.0 66.9 48.7 45.5 43.4 34.9 
Germany 48.5 49.6 46.8 51.2 49.6 47.9 
Greece - - - - 94.7 95.7 
Hungary - - 100.0 100.0 89.8 88.0 
Iceland - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Ireland - 59.5 58.7 54.7 50.5 65.9 
Italy - 68.2 73.8 87.9 86.2 83.0 
Japan - - - 90.2 90.1 93.4 
Korea - 88.0 91.7 84.4 80.1 76.0 
Luxembourg 100.0 85.5 79.5 81.9 65.2 69.9 
Mexico - - 97.9 97.0 95.3 94.4 
Netherlands - - - - 24.3 20.8 
NZ 86.8 82.8 82.2 70.7 69.9 76.1 
Norway - - 84.6 96.5 95.5 95.2 
Poland - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.5 
Portugal - - - - 80.8 76.8 
Slovakia - - - - 100.0 100.0 
Spain - - 83.2  84.6 83.1 81.0 
Sweden - - - - - - 
Switzerland - 75.7 74.9 71.4 74.1 76.8 
Turkey - - - 100.0 74.6 69.1 
UK 80.8 - 64.5 67.6 - - 
USA 41.0 37.6 32.9 27.4 26.5 23.8 
 
Sources: OECD (2006b) 
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Table 3.16: H ealth expend iture b y so urce of  funding in selected  OECD countries: 1980, 1990 and 2000  
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4. Chapter 4: Rise of an International Healthcare Services Market 
The trend of commercialisation within the context of market-oriented reforms for healthcare 
services, indicated in the preceding chapter, suggests that the ground is increasingly fertile for an 
expanding international market in healthcare services across the OECD member states. Some 
policies have evidently been more receptive than others to privatizing consumption and the 
provision of healthcare services. Yet there is significant evidence of a shift in the dynamic of the 
mixed economy of care across countries whether moving towards ‘state-based’ or ‘market-based’ 
healthcare systems.  
This shift can be seen as healthcare services becoming increasingly commodified and the 
private for-profit sector is, in many cases, an increasingly expanding component of the public-
private mix for healthcare as states seek to strengthen competition in service delivery and/or 
financing within their healthcare systems. Even if public and private sector providers or financing 
institutions are not required to compete directly, the for-profit private sector has tended to capitalise 
the most on the ‘pro-competitive’ turn in healthcare policy.  
Against the background of a broader international agenda for the liberalization of services 
markets, the space gradually being opened for private operators as a result of public policy raises an 
important question about the extent to which internationalisation of cross-border trade in healthcare 
services has actually been developing. While arguably the vast majority of healthcare service firms 
do not operate internationally,53 most segments of the sector are populated by at least a handful of 
providers that have established market presence overseas in at least one and often more countries. 
As shown in subsequent chapters, the strategies for expansion of market share of several for-profit 
healthcare service companies over the years has involved the development of overseas portfolios 
alongside their core domestic business.  
This chapter explores this theme of long-term changes in internationalisation of healthcare 
sector companies. The key question it raises is whether, and how, we can gauge a significant 
expansion of private healthcare service companies in their global reach through investments and 
                                                   
53 Here I wish to distinguish between participation in a global economic system which virtually no institution 
is completely isolated from – such as the impact of transnational circulation of capital, international supply-
chains, or the effects of information and communication technologies – and presence in overseas markets 
through joint ventures, acquisition of competitors, or establishment of new facilities. 
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business operations overseas. Moreover, what does this reveal about the commercialisation trend 
that has been developing over the past few decades? 
As such, in this chapter I have focused on developing a framework for analysis of the 
internationalisation of healthcare service companies. To do this I have looked for quantitative and 
qualitative data that would help to formulate a picture of the scale and scope of internationalisation. 
While data scarcity has not allowed me to locate an overarching international dataset providing an 
overview of international trade in healthcare services, the tentative results of my research of rather 
fragmented sources are still indicative of an intensification of international trade in healthcare 
services.  
As a starting point I have used Fortune Magazine’s Global 500 (G500) annual ranking of the 
largest companies in the world in terms of revenues (Fortune, 1995 & 2005).54 I have used the 
listing for two separate years in 1995 and 2005 as a means of gauging the extent to which the 
number of large companies involved in the healthcare sector has changed over time. Having 
selected companies that are involved in the healthcare sector, I have utilised available data from 
company annual reports, websites and any supplementary market research data in order to map the 
ways in which such companies have developed international market share through overseas 
investments, joint ventures and acquisitions strategies. The picture generated from this data allows 
us to reflect more clearly on patterns in an emerging international healthcare services market.  
In the first section of the chapter I briefly situate cross-border trade in healthcare services 
within the broader trend of international trade in services and discuss some key issues and 
limitations in the analysis of international trade data regarding healthcare services. In the following 
section, I focus on a breakdown of the healthcare sector companies listed in the G500 in the two 
years mentioned, looking for key patterns and trends in the development of their overseas 
portfolios. I conclude the chapter with a reflection on the key findings. 
                                                   
54 Until 1989 Fortune listed only non-US industrial corporations under the title ‘International 500’, while the 
‘Fortune 500’ contained and still contains exclusively US corporations. US companies were added to the 
‘International’ list to compile a global list of top industrial corporations as ranked by sales in 1990. Since 
1995 the list has taken its current form to include top financial corporations and service providers by revenue. 
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4.1.  A global market? Measuring the intensification of international trade in 
healthcare services 
While a quantitative assessment of the internationalisation of trade in services is rather 
limited on its own, in terms of understanding the deep linkages between national markets, it is still 
an important precursor to being able to gain a sense of what is being analysed when we discuss the 
international healthcare services market and qualitative changes within it. However, in my research 
it has become clear that data that may be utilized to gain a holistic and fully accurate picture of 
international trade in healthcare services - whether relating to public or private sector organizations 
– and typically are rather fragmented, partial and usually only cover very recent time periods.  
Therefore, analysis of long-term historical trends is rather difficult to carry out. 
International trade in services has been a steadily growing sector of the world economy over 
the past three decades and a great body of export data has grown around this field. Though 
relatively small compared to manufactured goods, the share of total world annual ‘exports’ in 
services grew from 15.8% of combined goods and services exports in 1980 to around 19% in the 
early 2000s (WTO, 2006). How much of this growth in services as an ‘export’ product is accounted 
for by the healthcare sector, however, is currently hard to determine despite the healthcare sector 
having indeed become an increasingly significant component of national economic output 
(measured in terms of GDP) in most OECD countries.  
4.1.1.  Methodology and issues with data collection 
In spite of fairly good international comparative healthcare expenditure data supplied by the 
OECD, there is little indication from composite international datasets – such as the UN National 
Accounts and UN Service Trade databases (UN, 2008a&b), or the OECD Industry Structural 
Analysis (STAN) database (OECD, 2008) - of precisely the scale of international trade in healthcare 
services that has been taking place over the past few decades. Instead, most international data 
available on exports is composed of aggregate cross-sector figures so that data specifically on 
healthcare services is usually buried within these. Moreover, the OECD Health database (OECD 
2008b), while containing export data for the pharmaceutical sector, itself derived from the OECD 
STAN, contains no such data for healthcare services.  
Thus, faced with the lack of an existing systematic data source for the international healthcare 
service market, using the G500 listing offers a rather imperfect but nonetheless insightful way to 
track the changing number of healthcare companies that are amongst the worlds largest in terms of 
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revenues. Initial inspiration for using the G500 listing rests on J.W. Salmon’s study of the corporate 
transformation of healthcare in the US, in which he derives a US-focused listing of ‘major investor-
owned’ US healthcare corporations from the US-focused Business Week magazine (Salmon, 1995, 
p23). Salmon’s use of this business listing serves mainly to demonstrate the scale that US healthcare 
corporations had reached at that time within the US economy overall, supporting his arguments 
about the need to assess changing ownership patterns of these companies, the growing 
corporatisation of the US healthcare sector and the implication of these rapid changes for US 
healthcare policy; issues already tentatively raised by Relman (1980) and Star (1982). While 
Salmon (1995) provides an insightful historical analysis in his paper, his use of this dataset does not 
go beyond simply listing the companies along with revenue figures and key areas of business. 
Meanwhile, Holden’s study of the internationalisation of corporate healthcare tentatively 
showcases the potential for the G500 listing as a means to gain an overview of the international 
healthcare market (Holden, 2005a). It offers a starting point for identifying criteria on which to 
measure the degree to which the world’s largest healthcare corporations have internationalised their 
operations, how many of them are internationalised and, like Salmon’s study, intimates a basis for 
discussing related changes in the structure of the international healthcare market. The insight of this 
approach, however, is limited by the presentation of data from only one year of the G500. 
Moreover, the data presented are almost entirely based on crude quantitative indicators of the 
degree of internationalisation (‘sales abroad’, ‘staff numbers overseas’ and ‘number of countries 
with operations’) for the year 2002.  
While such indicators offer some empirical measurement of internationalisation they also 
obscure the more specific dynamic of each market segment as well as the companies analysed. This 
is a feature that is present, although only superficially developed by Hall (2001) in an earlier 
exploratory listing of internationalised healthcare corporations within a broader analysis of several 
dimensions of the Globalization, Privatisation and Healthcare, which seeks to identify the complex 
of international agents involved in the furthering of commercial interests in healthcare globally, 
including international institutions with an impact on national health policy (World Bank, WTO, 
and IMF) and healthcare MNCs. In this case the data on companies is derived from the Public 
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) database which, although containing an extensive 
number of entries for healthcare and healthcare-related companies, is somewhat limited by the fact 
that entries in this database seem to be on the basis of links to trade union activity as opposed to the 
goal of listing companies based on degree of internationalisation.    
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Despite the limitations I have noted in these studies, I have sought to build on these for 
analysing the scale and scope of internationalisation of healthcare companies. Building on Holden’s 
approach, I have grouped different firms operating in the healthcare services sector by broad 
categories relating to market segments of the healthcare sector in which these companies operate. 
This includes: (i) private health and medical insurers, (ii) secondary providers of services to the 
healthcare sector, (iii) direct providers of healthcare services, and (iv) producers of medical / 
healthcare products. While I include pharmaceutical companies in the overall summary of 
healthcare companies from the G500, I have chosen to exclude them from further analysis in the 
chapter due to their status as manufacturing companies as opposed to service providers.  
Besides using Holden’s broad categories, my analysis takes a step further by examining more 
closely the degree of internationalisation of different sectors based on the development of firms in 
the various market segments, and including factors such as sub-sectors and additional dimensions of 
market penetration overseas where this has proven relevant. Part of this has been to select two years 
by means of which it is possible to see changes over an extended time period. The extended tables 
that follow in each sub-section (Tables 4-5-4.7) show greater detail for individual companies 
organized around the market categories mentioned. 
 
4.2.  Examining the global reach of the Global 500 companies in the 
healthcare sector 
 
The company data used, shows that the number of G500 companies operating in the 
healthcare sector increased more than 60% between 1995 (48) and 2005 (77), both as main area of 
business and as a subsidiary business.  
In the health sector overall the largest number of firms is concentrated in the production of 
medical and medical-related goods: 60.4% of the total health sector firms listed in 1995 and 42.8% 
in 2005. Of these around two thirds were pharmaceutical firms with the rest focused on manufacture 
of medical equipment and IT (Table 4.2) 
If we exclude producers of medical and healthcare technologies from the list, there were 
more than twice the number in 2005 (44) than a decade previously (19) (Tables 4.2). The extended 
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table 4.4 shows greater detail for individual producers of medical and health goods organised 
around key areas of business. 
4.2.1.  Private Health and Medical Insurance 
Looking at the different market segments in the G500, by far the largest category for 
healthcare services firms has been in the provision of health/medical insurance: over 29.2% in 1995 
and 27.3% 2005 (Table 4.2). Of these, the majority are major diversified financial services 
conglomerates for which insurance in general, and health/medical insurance specifically, is a 
subsidiary area of business (Table 4.4, 4.5). Five of the 23 companies in the G500 - CIGNA, 
Humana, Wellpoint, Aetna, and United Health Group, all of which are US-based corporations - 
count healthcare as a core part of their business activity. In either case, health insurance has tended 
to be an outgrowth of life insurance activities, though in the case of specialist health insurance 
providers these are all firms that have engaged in the provision of health insurance and managed 
care services for much longer than many of the diversified insurance firms and in some cases are 
exclusively focused on the healthcare sector (Table 4.4, 4.5). 
One thing in common is that, prior to moving into international ventures, all of the health 
insurance providers in the G500 developed substantial market share in their home markets. The key 
difference, however, is that many of the diversified financial services firms have come to the 
healthcare sector through expansion from banking and general insurance, after acquisitions of 
smaller competitors in previous years. A case in point is Allianz, which developed its health 
insurance portfolio initially in Germany,55 where it is now the third largest private health insurance 
provider (Allianz, 2006), and then in Western Europe, through acquisitions of smaller life/health 
insurance firms in the region.56 During the 1990s, Allianz stepped up its international expansion 
with acquisition of US life insurance firms, as well as in the Asian region (particularly South Korea) 
so that it now has commercial presence providing life and health insurance products in 30 countries 
across Europe, North and South America and South East Asia. Allianz’s non-German ventures 
amounted to nearly 68.2% of life/health premiums earned in 2005 (Allianz, 2006, p.58). Similarly, 
                                                   
55 Allianz was a German-based firm, amassing market share mainly in Germany and Western Europe, until 
2006, when it legally converted to a European company (Societas Europaea). In a juridical sense this could be 
regarded as one of the more internationalised ownership structures for large multinationals.  
56 Italy, France, Switzerland and Spain, Allianz’s biggest markets outside of Germany, accounted for roughly 
33% of premium earnings in 2005; this is my own estimation based on Annual Report data (Allianz, 2006, 
p.58). 
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the Dutch-based ING Group developed from a primarily banking and asset management market to 
insurance markets in which it came to dominate in the Netherlands (also becoming prominent in 
Europe by the end of the 1990s), with the union of two major Dutch banking conglomerates in 
1990.57  From its initial acquisition of a US life/health insurance provider (Life of Georgia) prior to 
formation of ING Group,58 it has since diversified its activities in health insurance in Europe, North 
America and Asia, notably with the acquisition of Aetna International from Aetna Inc. in 2000 
(Aetna, 2000).  
Meanwhile Cigna, Humana, and Aetna all came to health insurance in the US from the life 
insurance market finding opportunities in commercial provision of health insurance in the post-
WWII period and exploring the managed care market since the 1970s. They since became amongst 
the top five managed care providers in the US, and all have explored to some degree the exportation 
of the managed care concept overseas - particularly in South America - with the formation of a 
Latin American equity fund (Latin Health Fund) in which they have all been partners since the 
early 1990s (Lethbridge, 2002). Nonetheless, not all the G500 firms have sought overseas 
expansion, while some that had delved in international market expansion during the 1980s and 
1990s have also withdrawn, or significantly reduced, their international ventures in order to 
concentrate on their home market.  
A case in point is Wellpoint which has no international interests currently, being a for-profit 
spin-off and ‘independent lisencee’ of the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA); itself a 
federation of 39 independent, largely non-profit health insurance companies with market presence 
in all 50 US states but also two further independent licencees in South America (Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Association, 2006).59 The remaining four health insurance/managed care firms also display 
varying degrees of international market penetration. Besides participation in the Latin Health Fund, 
Humana’s first major international foray began in 2004 with the setting up of a European venture in 
London offering ‘independent’ commissioning services to the UK’s NHS (Humana, 2006) while 
Aetna Inc. divested a minor portion of its Aetna International subsidiary to a Mexican insurance 
                                                   
57 ING was formed in 1990 with the merger of two major Dutch banking companies, Nationale-Nederlanden 
and NMB Postbank Groep (ING Group, 2005). 
58 Nationale-Nederlanden had minor presence in the Dutch insurance sector prior to the merger, but made its 
first major entrance into the international insurance market with the acquisition in 1979 of the US insurer Life 
of Georgia and in turn, gave ING Group significant market presence in Asia, maintained even after the 
eventual sale of Life of Georgia in 2004 (ING Group, 2005). 
59 Taking the entire Blue Cross Blue Shield companies including non-profit and for-profit (including 
Wellpoint), it is estimated to account for 44% of national US health insurance market (Robinson, 2004b). 
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firm and the majority to ING Group in 2000 allegedly in order to concentrate on the domestic US 
market (Aetna, 2000). 
Three main strands of business characterise the health insurance firms that have developed 
international market presence. One key strand has been the provision of (supplementary) private 
health insurance for expatriates and their dependants in the multinational corporate sector. In many 
cases this has been an outgrowth of the national corporate markets in which these companies had 
gained considerable market share to begin with (i.e. Robinson, 2004b; Foubister et al, 2006). The 
expatriate corporate market continues to comprise a significant part of the international private 
health/medical insurance operations of the major insurance conglomerates, and in some cases has 
resulted in spin-off companies dedicated to this sector. For example, Aetna International and 
UnitedHealth International (of UnitedHealth Group) both were formed in the early- to mid-1990s 
specifically to develop this market segment, and while the former was sold off in 2000, Aetna still 
retains a foothold in this market through a re-formulated programme for expatriates (Aetna Global 
Benefits) set up in 2004. Nearly all the major diversified financial services firms that offer health 
insurance products engage in the corporate market to some degree where group employer 
subscriptions constitute the bulk of revenue from premiums. A further aspect to this strand is that it 
also provides a basis for supporting ‘medical tourism’, a market which has been explored 
increasingly over the past decade by health insurers seeking to offer reduced cost treatment for 
prospective patients. 
The second, related, strand of international business is focused on providing insurance 
products to corporate group clients and individuals through firms they have acquired in other 
countries or through joint ventures with overseas insurers. It is related to the first strand in view of 
the facility that commercial presence gives to serving the corporate sector in different national 
locations. However, the nature of the private health/medical coverage depends on the specific 
market characteristics of the countries where they operate (Mossialos et al 2002, OECD, 2004b). 
Indeed, the bulk of these ventures tend to be voluntary supplementary and/or complementary 
private health/medical insurance packages.  They cover primarily hospitalisation and 
pharmaceutical costs, where the greatest opportunities have been to expand market share in view of 
a general drift in many countries towards expanding voluntary private health insurance as part of 
the healthcare financing mix (OECD, 2004b). 
In a third strand of business, the major insurance firms are important, not just because of their 
presence in the health insurance market, but also as re-insurers for secondary providers offering 
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health/medical insurance products, including some retail chains or other health insurance providers. 
Indeed, French-based insurance conglomerate AXA, which has a major stake in the European 
insurance sector, is a key re-insurer in the UK private medical insurance market (Foubister et al, 
2006), particularly since its acquisition of Guardian Royal Exchange - which itself had acquired 
PPP, the second largest private medical insurance (PMI) provider in the UK, a year previously - in 
1999.  In the UK AXA/PPP underwrites several health insurance packages offered by UK providers, 
including some of the country’s main supermarket retailers that have sought to offer insurance 
through their retail branches, and several smaller health/life insurance firms. 
4.2.2.  Secondary Supply of Services to the Healthcare services sector 
The biggest shift in the G500 between 1995 and 2005 has been for secondary suppliers of 
services to the healthcare sector (from one in 1995 to thirteen in 2005), which includes a quite 
diverse set of business activities ranging from catering, to medical equipment supply services, 
Health IT infrastructure developers, and one management consultant firm (Table 4.6). Some of 
these firms operate in quite a large number of countries compared to direct service providers or 
even core health/medical insurance providers. Even so, with the exception of the medical goods 
distributors, the healthcare sector tends to constitute only a small portion of their overall business 
activity.  
For instance Compass Group, a UK based food services and support firm established a 
presence in up to 90 countries through around 20 different brands and subsidiaries, accounting for 
67% of its total sales, though after 2003 it also sold several core assets in the catering sector, 
reducing its overall operations to 55 countries over the next three years. While only 13% of its 
annual turnover came from serving the healthcare sector in 2005 (Compass, 2005), the group 
established significant market presence contracting in healthcare food services and facilities 
management in North America and Western Europe (mainly the UK), since its acquisition of three 
key subsidiaries in 2001. This includes the US-based Morrison which supplies services to the North 
American hospital and senior living sector, including some 475 clients in the US and 11 hospitals in 
Canada (King, 2001)60;  the UK-based Medirest whose supply of ‘hotel services’ to the hospital 
sector includes contracts with 130 UK NHS and private hospitals (in addition to contracts in North 
America, Europe and Australia through one of its own subsidiaries) (Compass UK, 2006); and 
                                                   
60 In 2001 Morrison ranked as the third largest provider in the US healthcare food service sector just behind 
Sodexho (King, 2001). 
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Crothall Services Group which provides janitorial and facilities management services primarily in 
the US market (Compass Group, 2006). A similar trend of diversification within catering and 
support services is visible in the French-based Sodexho, which has an extensive portfolio of 
contracts in North America (43% of its total revenues in 2005) and the European region (46% of 
revenues in 2005), while 17.6% of its total revenues are derived from serving the healthcare sector, 
with a further 5.9% serving the seniors convalescent market (Sodexho, 2005). 
The supply and distribution of pharmaceutical, medical and surgical products is also a sector 
where there is a notable trend of internationalisation through acquisition. For instance the US-based 
Cardinal Health has operations in 20 countries with around 10% of its revenue generated abroad 
through a number of subsidiaries and brand medical products distributors (Cardinal Health, 2005). 
Most of its non-US business is concentrated on the marketing and distribution of medical equipment 
and products through two key medical technology brands (‘Alaris’ and ‘Pyxis’) with its most 
important commercial presence in Western Europe, followed by Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Taiwan. 
Another pharmacy supply/wholesale and retail firm Alliance Unichem, demonstrates a similar 
pattern of organic growth and mega-merger as this company came together in 1997 combining what 
was already a major UK pharmacy distributor/wholesaler with retail interests (UniChem Plc) with 
another major cross-European pharmacy retailer/distributor (Alliance Sante AM).61 Between them, 
the originating firms had established commercial presence in pharmacy wholesale and retail through 
acquisition and joint venture in the UK and Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Spain. After 1997, Alliance Unichem strengthened its position in these existing 
markets, also entering the pharmacy wholesale markets in Portugal, and Egypt (Alliance Boots, 
2006). In 2006 Alliance Unichem was acquired by Boots Group, creating the UK’s largest 
pharmacy retailer (17% market share) and one of the largest distributors/wholesalers of medical and 
pharmaceutical products (Alliance Boots Ltd). Outside of the European market where Alliance 
Boots has significant commercial presence through ownership,62 the 2006 merger also created a 
company with a market presence through joint venture in Thailand as well as several Middle 
                                                   
61 Alliance Sante had been formed in 1991 through the merger of Alleanza Alute Italia and two French firms 
ERPI and IFP (Alliance Boots, 2006). 
62 In 2007, 97% of Alliance Boots pharmaceutical wholesale revenues are derived in Western Europe (nearly 
two thirds of which is in France and UK and Spain combined), while 10% of pharmacy retail revenues 
(including health and beauty products) were derived from outside the UK (Alliance Boots 2008, p.35).  
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Eastern Countries, and brand presence and franchises in the US, bringing its total market scope of 
direct ownership, associated trading and franchises to 20 countries (Alliance Boots, 2008). 
4.2.3.  Direct supply of healthcare services  
By contrast with insurance and secondary services, direct suppliers of healthcare services (i.e. 
hospitals, pharmacy firms, and nursing homes) have not increased so dramatically in number 
amongst the G500 (Tables 4.2 & 4.7.  Nonetheless, underlying this modest increase are still some 
rather interesting developments particularly with regard to the pharmacy sector, which has seen a 
rapid and continuing growth, concentration and market consolidation of large, in some cases 
diversified, national and international retail conglomerates. Several of the firms involved in 
wholesale and distribution are also present in pharmacy retail giving firms that have diversified in 
both these areas of the pharmacy sector added capacity to expand nationally and/or internationally. 
Having said this, the trend of concentration and international expansion is still quite uneven, with 
mainly a handful of firms (including those in the G500) actually achieving rapid and diversified 
growth through national and/or international acquisition. While historically rapid national growth 
through acquisition is also a trend identifiable with the hospital sector, international expansion by 
the same means has been more uneven than compared with the retail sector. 
Pharmacy retail and wholesale 
Three key trends are notable in the period between 1995 and 2005, which underlie the 
increasing number of horizontally and vertically integrated companies involved in the pharmacy 
sector. First, market consolidation through acquisition and merger has been an important trend in 
both pharmacy wholesale/supply and retail. The Alliance Unichem merger in 1997 consisted of one 
of the most important such unions in the European market at the time. Since this company’s 
acquisition by Boots Group, its expansionary strategy nationally (UK) and internationally has been 
all the more significant for a company that continually seeks to grow its wholesale and related 
distribution activities ‘organically and through acquisitions, including investments in associates and 
joint ventures’, particularly ‘in new geographical markets which are typically large, fast growing 
and where we see the potential for market consolidation’; in reference to Russia and China, its two 
most recent locations of commercial presence (Alliance Boots 2008, p.3). Alliance Unichem, was 
already established as a cross-European pharmacy wholesale and retail firm, and since 2006 
Alliance Boots operates pharmacies in nine countries, including the UK where the majority of its 
revenues are derived in this segment. As a counterpart to this ‘mega-merger’ trend in the US, CVS 
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demonstrated spectacular growth through acquisition between the late-1980s and late-1990s, 
placing it in the position of being the largest pharmacy retail chain in the country by the end of 
2005. Unlike its UK counterpart, however, CVS is not engaged in overseas ventures, focusing 
instead on national market consolidation in pharmacy retail and establishing market presence across 
34 states at the end of 2005 (Jack, 2006). Moreover, few US-based G500 pharmacy retail chains 
have actually established international commercial presence. 
A second key trend emerging primarily in the national setting but which has secondary 
implications for internationally established firms is that pharmacy retail has also increasingly been 
engaged in by retailers whose primary business is outside the pharmacy sector. For example, the 
major supermarket chains in the UK (including Tesco, Sainsbury’s, ASDA and Morrisons) now 
have in-store pharmacy dispensaries in a significant number of their major stores around the UK.  
ASDA for instance has a rapidly expanding presence in the UK pharmacy sector with pharmacy 
units in 30% of its stores in 2004 and a 100% annual growth rate in a number of in-store pharmacies 
in the early 2000s (Burgess & Rigby 2004; Schmidt & Ploch 2004). Similarly, the US market has 
seen several national retailers providing pharmacy services in-store (i.e. Publix and Albertsons).  
Despite such bold entries by general retailers into the pharmacy sector, internationalisation is 
still rather uneven in this sector, given that few of the UK or US supermarket retail chains 
mentioned have developed international portfolios. One key exception has been Wal-Mart which by 
late 2005 has come to operate in 15 countries through its various subsidiary retailers and joint 
ventures, accounting for around 20% of its total revenues. Wal-Mart’s acquisition of the UK’s 
ASDA in 1999 also put the latter in the position of being one of the strongest retail chains in the 
country, also seeing rapid expansion of its pharmacy segment since the early 2000s. On the other 
hand, Tesco, already an internationalising retail chain (primarily in the European region) since the 
early 1990s,63 has entered into pharmacy retail only in the UK, which accounts for 79% of its total 
sales revenues in 2005. Despite only offering a pharmacy service in the UK, it had nonetheless 
established in-store pharmacies in around a third of its UK stores by the mid-2000s. 
A third key trend has been the diversification of both general and pharmacy-specific retailers 
into non-core clinical and para-clinical services, such as the optician and dental service sectors. 
Several large pharmacy retail conglomerates diversified rapidly into such sectors between the mid-
1990s and 2000s (CVS, Rite Aid, Walgreen) primarily through acquisitions. Prior to its acquisition 
                                                   
63 Tesco established commercial presence in 13 different countries by 2005 (Tesco, 2005). 
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of Alliance UniChem, Boots the Chemist already made forays into the supply of spectacles and 
basic opthalmic services. More recently it acquired a company offering optical laser surgery, whilst 
also entering the dental services market to compete in a more liberalized UK market after both these 
sectors began to see a scaling back of public (NHS) coverage during the 1990s. Its venture into the 
delivery of non-core clinical services, however, is still rather limited in scale with no international 
spread as yet.  
Hospital services 
Though the hospital sector seems rather weakly represented in the G500 listing, there have 
been a couple of companies entering this league in the years between 1995 and 2005 (Table 4.6). 
Based on my broader research into this sector I should note that this obscures a larger group of 
hospital service providers that have engaged in overseas ventures which do not have sufficient 
revenue levels to be entered in the international listing.64 This point reflects perhaps more strongly 
than analysis of the other market segments so far, that the G500 listing presents limitations for 
extrapolating the degree to which a particular market segment has become internationalised. 
Nonetheless, some key points can still be made based on those entries included that resonate more 
broadly with the international commercial hospital services sector. 
First, as with most other market segments analysed so far, it is notable that international 
expansion has followed from domestic market dominance for most hospital firms engaged in 
overseas ventures. A prime example is the largest of the international hospital service providers 
represented in the G500 in 2005, namely Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). In its home 
market (the US) HCA gradually established itself since its foundation in the 1960s as one of the 
largest hospital chains across both for-profit and non-profit categories, eventually operating 165 
hospitals across 20 states by 2005 (HCA, 2005). In the same year, HCA operated in three countries 
outside the US, with six units in the UK and two in Switzerland, employing around 2% of its total 
staff abroad. Similarly, the US for-profit hospital chain, Tenet was formed in 1996 as a result of the 
                                                   
64 Several European companies have engaged in overseas ventures during the 1990s, including the Swedish 
Capio and the German Fresenius (Hall, 2001). Moreover, the East Asian market has seen some companies 
engaged in overseas ventures with hospital firms making acquisitions of hospitals and nursing home facilities 
mainly within the region (Hall, 2003). Also, the UK’s BUPA began investing in a few overseas hospital 
ventures during the 1990s, while from the mid-2000s the Australian Ramsay Healthcare and the South 
African Netcare have also demonstrated aspirations for entry into the international hospital market with key 
acquisitions in the UK since 2006 marking important steps for these companies’ expansionary strategies 
(Laing & Buisson, 2008). 
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merger between two of the top five for-profit hospital chains competing with HCA since the 1960s: 
National Medical Enterprises (NME) and American Medical Holdings Inc (AMI). Prior to this 
merger, these two companies had projects in 10 countries between them.65 Though NME and AMI’s 
international commercial presence appears greater than HCA’s, the bulk of these projects consisted 
of consulting contracts for the construction of private hospitals in most of the countries. Even so, a 
notable overseas venture involved AMI’s acquisition of London’s Harley St. Clinic as early as the 
1960s making it the first major hospital corporation to undertake international expansion. Overseas 
expansion for HCA, NME and AMI, was mainly built up during the 1970s and 1980s only after 
having developed a strong market base in their domestic market (Berliner & Regan, 1987). 
By contrast to these US corporations, the presence of Samsung (South Korea) in the G500 
listing represents a rather unique case of a large diversified trading company that has entered the 
healthcare services sector as a direct provider. As an MNC, around 18% of Samsung’s gross 
revenues are derived from overseas markets dealing in products ranging from electronic devices, to 
shipbuilding and engineering, with operations in over 80 countries (Samsung, 2006a). As a 
healthcare service provider, Samsung owns and operates a handful of hospitals exclusively in South 
Korea. The parent company’s strong position in the high-tech electronic devices market has been a 
key factor behind its emphasis of cutting-edge high-tech medical services provided in its hospitals 
(Samsung, 2006b). Samsung shows no indication of being interested in international expansion in 
the hospital sector.  However, while its presence in the hospital services market is an exception in 
terms of organizational structure to the other examples presented so far, it does reflect the 
diversified business portfolios of many parent companies involved in the healthcare services sector. 
A second point is that the few companies that have engaged in international ventures reflect 
the difficulties of establishing and developing an international portfolio in this sector.  While HCA 
and Tenet (at least the international activities of its predecessors) engaged in several overseas 
ventures between the 1960s and early 1990s, by the late 1990s both these companies had started to 
reduce their international commercial presence. The first of the two to divest overseas ventures was 
Tenet which sold its international portfolio in late 1990s to concentrate on the domestic US market, 
particularly at a time that it was facing adversity in its home market.  Interestingly, some of Tenet’s 
overseas market share was absorbed by HCA which at the time was still expanding its market share 
                                                   
65 These included contracts in Saudi Arabia, Greece, Canada, the UK, Spain, Singapore, Australia, and 
Malaysia. 
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domestically.  (However, even HCA also sold part of its international portfolio during the 1990s, 
notably in the UK, as the company faced financial trouble in its domestic market.66 More recently, 
during the mid-2000s, reports indicate that HCA pulled out of the Swiss market selling its units to 
local private hospital firms in face of declining revenues in that market. 
To some degree, the difficulties faced by private hospital corporations in developing and 
retaining overseas ventures can in part be explained by the fact that this is a typically highly 
regulated sector.  However, regulatory barriers to entry are not single-handedly causal to market 
entrance and subsequent expansion of market share. Indeed, the highly regulated hospital sector in 
the UK, where public sector dominance of hospital services initially left limited space for the 
private hospital sector, also proved a propitious market to enter at a time when the private sector 
competition was rather weak in the 1960s and 1970s. The subsequent entrance of a government 
sympathetic to the private sector in 1979 was also to some degree a boon for overseas market 
entrants in the UK (Higgins, 1988). By contrast, entry into markets with an already strong private 
sector presence seems to present a greater barrier to foreign-owned market entrants. Non-regulatory 
structural constraints (such as demand) can have an impact on the opportunities to expand in 
overseas markets for all companies, though in a market segment such as hospitals with high fixed 
costs this can be an important deterrent from international expansion of their business. 
Besides regulatory and demand-based factors, a third point is the role of investment the 
expansion of commercial hospital enterprises. This has been of key importance in the development 
of the US for-profit hospital sector since its inception in the 1960s and has become increasingly so 
in subsequent decades (Reinhardt, 1989; Cutler & Horwitz, 2000; Robinson, 2002a). For the most 
part, it has been investment partnerships in their domestic market that have assisted international 
expansion. However, an important development can be noted in more recent years, with the 
acquisition of HCA in 2006 by investment firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., in partnership with 
Bain Capital (equity) Meryll Lynch (investors) in 2006 (Bank Loan Report, 2007). In the process, 
HCA became a privately owned corporation, after having been a publicly listed company in the US 
for over 30 years. The significance of this particular investment decision for the hospital sector, as 
well as for the healthcare services sector, is hard to tell at this point in time. However, the 
                                                   
66 Following a ‘mega-merger’ with Columbia in 1996, the recently formed Columbia/HCA became the 
subject of a federal healthcare fraud investigation. Managing this high-profile negative exposure and a change 
in corporate direction were key reasons for HCS scaling back its international and US operations (Galewitz, 
2000). 
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acquisition of Alliance Boots by the same investor group in the following year presents an important 
development in the healthcare services market, with a major international capital investment that 
could well set a precedent for future multinational investment decisions. 
4.3. The commercial basis of internationalisation  
While data offering an insight into the scale and scope of internationalisation of healthcare 
services is rather limited, the analysis of available data is revealing about the degree to which 
internationalisation has been a substantive trend - at least since the mid-1990s. At the broadest 
level, my findings show that internationalisation of healthcare services is growing but continues to 
be a rather limited development. This reflects somewhat Moran and Wood’s (1996) findings over a 
decade earlier when comparing globalization in the healthcare sector to other spheres of economic 
activity. Nevertheless, I have found that internationalisation is highly variable in the extent to which 
it has developed between and within different market segments, as well as between different 
national locations. In this last section of the chapter, I briefly reflect on some key points emerging 
from the analysis so far about the extent of internationalisation in healthcare services and about the 
commercial basis for the internationalisation of healthcare. 
4.3.1. The scale and scope of internationalisation of healthcare services 
Internationalisation has not been an altogether new phenomenon in several of the dimensions 
of service supply analysed in this chapter.  
While overseas market penetration by commercial healthcare service providers and insurers 
is not especially novel, it is nonetheless a trend that has seen some intensification in the past couple 
of decades. A key observation is that there seems to be a regional dynamic in internationalisation as 
companies seek expansion through acquisition, or establish themselves in markets where other 
major national and multinational corporations from outside the healthcare sector provide a key 
customer base for their private healthcare services. For example, many of the US firms have 
established their most important overseas markets in North and South America, while Western 
Europe is a second major sphere of commercial presence for US firms. Likewise, most of the 
European firms have made substantial acquisitions within the European Economic Area (EEA), 
with the North American market being a close second in some cases. In any case strong links 
between North America and Western Europe are notable as, for example, where US insurance firms 
have made acquisitions in Europe, much as European firms have made entries into the US market.  
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Cross-border commercial links are by no means isolated to Western Europe and North 
America.  Indeed, an important trend in the past couple of decades has been the establishment of 
commercial presence by US and European firms in developing countries. Several US HMOs have 
established a market presence in South America which has been a steadily growing market for 
commercial hospital and health insurance ventures, especially over the past decade. For instance, 
the Latin America Fund, mentioned above, was set up specifically to develop ties with this region 
(Waitzkin & Iriart, 2001; Iriart et al, 2001; Iriart, 2005). Developing countries, however, are not 
singly host to North-South flows of market penetration. Indeed, there are notable regional relations 
that have developed in the past couple of decades. South East Asia, and Latin America have seen 
especially entrance from regional players. India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand have seen entrance 
from Singapore for instance, while Chile and Argentina have seen entrants from Mexico. Also a 
handful of Asian companies have also penetrated Northern markets with acquisitions of European 
and US healthcare service firms. The most significant perhaps in recent years has been the 
acquisition of both HCA and Alliance-Boots by the same Hong Kong-based investment firm. 
Meanwhile, there is considerable variation in the capacity for firms to internationalise 
between market segments. For instance, the more traditional supply chain (i.e. pharmacy wholesale) 
and retail firms (whether mainly pharmacy suppliers or larger diversified retail firms) have 
displayed considerably greater levels of market penetration than specifically medical service 
suppliers. Hospital firms, even where they have established major leading commercial 
conglomerates in their home market, have had a variable experience in penetrating and staying in 
overseas markets. With the exception of the US, such hospital conglomerates are limited in number 
in most countries.  
This point partly reflects the inevitable bias towards large national and international 
conglomerates in using the G500 listing as a method of mapping international commercial presence 
in the healthcare services sector. An extensive geographic market such as that of the US means that 
national market share is large enough to account for sufficient revenues to be listed for a number of 
hospital corporations that is not reflected in the ‘global’ market share of many other companies with 
an even larger number of overseas ventures. Thus, firms that are engaged in overseas ventures do 
not feature in the G500 list even while being significant market leaders within their national 
markets (i.e. Tenet hospitals) as well as, in some cases, being engaged in several overseas ventures. 
Examples include several US hospital chains and managed care firms that actually feature amongst 
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the Fortune 500 top US firms (by revenues), while several European hospital providers can also be 
included amongst the more internationalised firms. 
4.3.2. Internationalisation and the expansion of commercial healthcare 
services 
So far, except for a few hints, this chapter has uncovered little overtly, on the way in which 
internationalisation of healthcare services contribute toward changing the structure of national 
healthcare service markets. For instance, where healthcare systems have developed niche markets 
for overseas patients, this may be seen as an important source of economic growth, and has been 
particularly important for those developing countries that have been able to capitalise on lower cost-
margins arising from exchange rate differences between higher-income and lower income countries 
in such a market. However, this also may come at a cost of supplying sufficient access to services 
for domestic populations, which is symptomatic both of national healthcare planning in cases where 
they are employed by public providers but, as is apparent from the examples I have given here, it 
also contributes to some extent to the expansion of private sector market share since private 
providers are often major employers of overseas staff. Though it would be rather tenuous to cite this 
as a causal factor in the commercialisation of domestic healthcare service providers, there are 
indications that commercial hospital providers rely considerably on overseas staff, which can be a 
useful factor in keeping down labour costs, to the extent that many of these are frequently junior 
doctors or recently qualified nurses. 
The cross-border establishment of commercial presence, on the other hand, suggests a much 
more significant impact on national markets. Although a focus on the G500 listing means there is an 
inevitable bias towards analysis of larger corporations, many of which are multinationals, it is still 
indicative of some important trends with regard to the potential for internationalising commercial 
corporations to impact on overseas national markets.  Indeed, considering several large 
multinational conglomerates amongst both health insurance suppliers and hospital providers, they 
have been important in changing the structure of their domestic markets as companies through 
expansion of market share prior significant internationalisation. In the former case the trend has 
been for absorption into ever larger diversified insurance and financial product companies, allowing 
parent companies to spread risk more easily across their different fields of business, but also 
demonstrating a tendency to focus on the most profitable areas of health insurance such as the 
‘corporate market’ supplying corporate professionals in other multinationals or large national 
corporations.  
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For the most part, their entrance into the health insurance market can be seen as an addendum 
to their main portfolio of business, having either acquired smaller providers of diverse insurance 
products over the years, or entered in to the health insurance market as a strategy of penetrating new 
and upcoming opportunities in what looks likely to become a much more liberal market for 
healthcare service products in many developed and developing countries. Particularly in the latter 
case, where East Asian markets are frequently cited as being promising new markets for entrance 
due to the opening up of formerly rather protectionist economies with highly restrictive regulations 
for foreign direct investment. For instance the Chinese market, particularly after joining the WTO, 
has been increasingly open to new entrants, which have regularly entered joint ventures with 
domestic insurance providers since the middle of this decade. Those that ‘traditionally’ have 
engaged primarily or exclusively, in health or medical insurance have also internationalised by 
seeking opportunities in countries with more liberalised market conditions, which is exemplified by 
a number of US managed care organizations (MCOs) entering several Latin American countries. 
Broader economic liberalization and privatization policies in these countries, leading to the 
dismantlement or undermining of domestic social insurance and tax financing systems, have 
facilitated the growth of private health insurance which has been a key target market for the US 
MCOs. 
As such, the analysis so far points to the importance of the national context for creating the 
conditions for internationalisation of trade in healthcare services. The regulatory environment in 
different national locations can be as important as the specificities of the national market structure 
in determining the opportunities arising for the development of commercial (for-profit) provision 
and financing of healthcare services. This point is developed in greater depth in the following two 
chapters with historical analysis of the US and UK healthcare service sectors. 
 
 
 
4.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has focused on developing a framework for analysing trends in the emergence of 
an international healthcare services market. Researching companies listed in the Fortune 
111 
 
Magazine’s Global 500 (G500) indicates the degree to which the healthcare sector is not only an 
area of growing national expenditure (as percentage of GDP) but also one that is increasingly host 
to major nationally established as well as multinational corporations (MNCs).  
The tentative results of my research based on limited data and rather fragmented sources are 
still indicative of an intensification of international trade in healthcare services. The primary finding 
is that the international healthcare services market demonstrates a highly uneven degree of 
internationalisation between individual firms and market segments. A second key finding is that 
internationalisation is, to a considerable extent, dependent on the facility for commercial 
opportunities to develop, which in turn is rather dependent on the specificities of the national 
market structure and regulatory context. The analysis so far indicates an intensification of 
international commercial exchanges in the healthcare services sector.  
To appreciate what this might mean in terms of the changing market structure in the national 
context, the next step for the thesis is to examine the way in which commercial transformation has 
been developing within specific national locations. As such, in the following two chapters I explore 
in particular, cases of the US and UK, the national context for the development of an international 
market in healthcare services. 
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Figure 4.1: World Exports in Goods and Services ($USD), annual: 1980-2004 
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Table 4.1: World Exports in Goods and Services ($USD), selected years: 1980-2004 
 Goods Services Total 
 $ bill % $ bill % $ bill 
1980 1,934 84.2 363 15.8 2,297 
1985 1,877 83.1 382 16.9 2,259 
1990 3,433 81.5 780 18.5 4,213 
1995 5,105 81.1 1,189 18.9 6,294 
2000 6,374 81.1 1,485 18.9 7,859 
2004 8,974 81.0 2,100 19.0 11,074 
Source: World Trade Organisation (2006) 
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Table 4.2: Healthcare Sector Firms listed in the Fortune Global 500 (summarised by type of 
business): 1995 and 2005 
 1995 2005 
Type of Firm Core Subs 
Total by 
area of 
activity 
Total 
as % 
of 
health 
sector 
Core Subs 
Total by 
area of 
activity 
Total 
as % 
of 
health 
sector 
(a) Providers of 
services to the 
end consumer 
1 3 4 8.3 5 5 10 13.0 
•Hospital providers 1 0 1  2 1 3  
• Pharmacy 0 2 2  3 4 7  
• Assisted living 0 1 1  0 0 0  
         
(b) Producers of 
goods 9 20 29 60.4 13 20 33 42.9 
• Pharmaceutical 
products (Prescription 
& OTC) 
9 6 15  13 5 18  
•Health IT systems 0 6 6  0 2 2  
• Medical electronic 
equipment (imaging & 
other) 
0 8 8  0 10 10  
• Medical products 0 0 0  0 3 3  
         
(c) Suppliers of 
services to state 
providers or private 
providers 
0 1 1 2.1 6 7 13 16.9 
• Distributors/ 
Wholesalers of pharma 
or medical supply 
0 0 0  6 0 6  
• Health IT 0 0 0  0 3 3  
• Catering (hospitals/ 
nursing homes) 0 1 1  0 3 3  
• Cleaning (clinical 
premises) 0 0 0  0 0 0  
• Health Consulting 0 0 0  0 1 1  
         
(d) Private health/ 
medical insurance 2 12 14 29.2 6 15 21 27.3 
         
Health Services 
Total (a, c & d) 3 16 19 39.6 17 27 44 57.1 
Health Total 12 36 48 100.0 30 47 77 100.0 
 
Sources: Fortune (1995 & 2005); Company documents and websites 
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Table 4.3: Producers of medical and health goods listed in Fortune’s G500, 1995 & 2005 
Company 
Home 
Country 
G500 
Rank 
Areas of Business 
Total 
Revenues 
($mill) Core Subsidiary 
Pfizer USA 75 Pharmaceuticals Animal Health $52,921 
Johnson & 
Johnson USA 88 Pharmaceuticals Surgical Instruments $47,348 
GlaxoSmithKline UK 122 Pharmaceuticals - $37,304 
Bayer DE 124 Pharmaceuticals 
Diagnostic 
Equipment  - 
Novartis CH 186 Pharmaceuticals - $28,247 
Roche Group CH 209 Pharmaceuticals Diagnostics $25,166 
Merck & Co. 
Inc. USA 239 Pharmaceuticals - $22,939 
Bristol-Myers-
Squibb USA 258 Pharmaceuticals - $21,886 
Astrazeneca UK 267 Pharmaceuticals Medical Devices $21,426 
Abbott 
Laboratories USA 285 Pharmaceuticals Medical Equipment $20,473 
Sanofi-Aventis FR 321 Pharmaceuticals Vaccines $18,710 
Wyeth USA 346 Pharmaceuticals - $17,358 
Eli Lilly USA 445 Pharmaceuticals - $13,858 
Procter & 
Gamble USA 77 
Household 
Products Pharmaceuticals $51,407 
Nestle CH 43 Food Pharmaceuticals $69,826 
Tyco USA 103 Electrical Products Medical Products $41,042 
3M USA 295 Diversified Medical Products $20,011 
Kimberly-Clarke USA 394 
Personal Paper 
Products Medical Products $15,401 
Mitsubishi 
Chemical JAP 288 Chemicals Pharmaceuticals $20,372 
Loreal FR 336 Cosmetics Pharmaceuticals $18,077 
Akzo Nobel NL 380 Chemicals Pharmaceuticals $15,781 
Sources: Fortune (2005) 
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Table 4.4: Healthcare Sector Firms in the Fortune Global G500 summarising the number of 
overseas ventures and areas of business in 2005 
 
Company 
Home 
Country 
No. 
Overseas 
Ventures[1] 
Areas of Business 
Total 
Revenu
es 
($mill) Core Subsidiary  
Health insurance providers  
CIGNA USA 27 
Health Insurance/ 
Managed Care 
Life, accident & 
disability insurance $18,176 
Humana USA At least 6 
Health Insurance/ 
Managed Care 
Equity Investment & 
health system 
management services $14,418 
Wellpoint USA 0 
Health Insurance/ 
Managed Care 
Pharmacy Benefit 
Management $20,815 
Aetna USA 9 
Health Insurance/ 
Managed Care 
Life insurance/ 
Pensions $19,904 
UnitedHealth 
Group USA At least 40 
Health Insurance/ 
Managed Care 
Health Information 
Services/ Health IT $37,218 
Aegon NL 13 General Insurance 
Pensions, Asset 
management, Life& 
accident, Health 
insurance $35,463 
Assicurazioni  
Generali IT 64 General Insurance 
Accident & Health 
insurance/ managed 
care $83,268 
Allianz 
Group DE 70 
Property/Casualty 
& Life Insurance 
Asset Management 
Banking; Health 
insurance (subset of 
Life insurance) 
$118,93
7 
AXA FR 90 
Property & Life 
Insurance 
Pensions & 
retirement products; 
Asset Management; 
Health Insurance 
$121,60
6 
Legal & 
General UK 3 
General Insurance; 
Life & Pensions 
Health insurance 
(subset of Life & 
Pensions) $21,770 
Massachusett
s Mutual Life 
Insurance 
Company USA 6 
General Insurance; 
Life Insurance 
Health & Accident 
Insurance; Long 
Term Care 
Insurance; Pension 
products; Asset 
Management $23,159 
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Table 4.4: (continued) 
 
 
Company 
Home 
Country 
No. 
Overseas 
Ventures[1] 
Areas of Business Total 
Revenues 
($mill) Core Subsidiary 
Health insurance providers (cont.) 
Fortis BENELUX 10 
Banking; 
General 
Insurance 
Accident & Health 
insurance $75,518 
MetLife USA 16 
General 
Insurance; Life; 
Retail banking; 
Liability 
Accident & Health; 
Dental insurance/; 
Long-Term Care; 
Reinsurance $39,535 
Munich Re 
Group DE 43 
Reinsurance; 
Primary 
Insurance 
Asset Management; 
Health Insurance; 
Managed care $60,706 
NorthWestern 
Mutual USA - Life Insurance 
Long Term Care 
insurance; Asset 
Management; 
Investment 
Services; Employee 
Benefits $17,806 
New York Life 
Insurance USA 9 
Life Insurance 
& Annuity; 
Investment 
Management 
Health insurance / 
managed care 
products $27,176 
State Farm 
Insurance USA - 
General & Life 
Insurance; 
Investment; 
Banking 
Health & Disability 
insurance/ 
Managed care; 
Long Term Care 
insurance; Business 
insurance $58,819 
ING Group NL 50 
Banking; Life 
and general 
insurance; Asset 
Management 
Health Insurance; 
Pensions; 
Reinsurance; Real 
estate; Employee 
Benefits $105,886 
Sumimoto Life 
Insurance JAP 3 
General & Life 
Insurance 
Health insurance; 
real estate $31,000 
American 
International 
Group (AIG) USA 50 
Financial 
services; 
General 
Insurance 
Corporate sector 
Health Insurance $97,987 
AFLAC USA 1 
Supplemental 
Health & Life 
Insurance 
Supplemental 
Accident & Illness 
insurance $13,281 
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Table 4.4: (continued) 
 
 
Company 
Home 
Country 
No. 
Overseas 
Ventures[1] 
Areas of Business 
Total 
Revenues 
($mill) Core Subsidiary 
Providers of secondary services to the healthcare sector 
Compass 
Group UK 90 
Contract catering 
for various types 
of business; 
Restaurants 
Hospital Catering; 
Vending; Cleaning 
and other janitorial 
services under 
various subsidiaries $21,104 
Sodexho 
Alliance FR 80 Catering 
Hospital & nursing 
home catering $14,854 
Sysco USA 1 Catering 
Hospital & nursing 
home catering $29,335 
Amerisource 
Bergen USA 2 
Pharmaceuticals 
Distribution 
Med Supplies 
Distribution; 
Pharmaceuticals 
Packaging $53,179 
Cardinal 
Health USA 6 
Pharmaceuticals 
Distribution 
Medical & Pharma 
Equipment/Technol
ogies Provision; 
Clinical 
Improvement 
Services $65,131 
Alliance 
Unichem UK 15 
Wholesale 
Pharmacy and 
Distribution 
Retail Pharmacy; 
Marketing of 
beauty products $16,305 
Franz Haniel 
(Group) DE 15 
Pharmaceuticals 
Distribution/ 
Wholesale 
Retail Pharmacy; 
Property 
restoration; Steel 
recycling; Textile 
services; Mail 
order; Building 
materials $30,245 
McKesson USA 9 
Pharmaceuticals 
Distribution/ 
Wholesale & 
Supply 
Medical-Surgical 
Equipment Supply 
& Logistics; Health 
IT $80,515 
Computer 
Sciences 
Corporation USA 29 
IT Services 
(Outsourcing & 
Systems 
Development) 
Health IT; 
Consulting $15,849 
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Table 4.4: (continued) 
 
 
Company 
Home 
Country 
No. 
Overseas 
Ventures 
Areas of Business 
Total 
Revenues 
($mill) Core Subsidiary 
Providers of secondary services to the healthcare sector  (cont.) 
Electronic 
Data Systems USA 48 
IT Services 
(Outsourcing & 
Systems 
Development) Health IT $21,033 
Accenture USA 75 
Management 
Consulting Health Consulting $13,674 
Mediceo 
Holdings JAP 0 
Wholesale 
pharmaceutical & 
medical products - $15,500 
Direct providers of healthcare services 
Hospital 
Corporation of 
America 
(HCA) USA 2 Hospitals - $23,502 
Tenet 
Healthcare USA 0 Hospitals - $12,496 
Samsung 
Group S.Korea 
World-
wide 
Electronics 
Manufacture and 
Trading 
Hospitals, Medical 
school & Life 
Sciences research; 
Life Insurance; 
Financial Services; 
ICT & Networks; 
Heavy Industries; 
Engineering & 
Construction; 
Chemicals $13,919 
CVS USA 0 Pharmacies - $30,919 
Rite Aid USA 0 Pharmacies - $16,816 
Walgreen USA 0 Pharmacies 
General 
Merchandise $37,508 
Albertsons USA 0 Supermarkets Pharmacy $40,052 
Publix USA 0 Supermarkets Pharmacy $18,686 
Tesco Plc UK 13 Supermarkets 
Pharmacy; health 
insurance $62,458 
Wal-Mart 
Stores USA 14 Supermarkets 
Pharmacy; Optician 
and clinical 
services $287,989 
 
[1] Includes different types of subsidiary business, whether wholly owned by G500 company listed, 
part owned through joint venture, or where G500 company has direct equity stake. 
Sources: Fortune (2005) 
 
119 
 
Table 4.2: Health  Insurance Provid ers l ist ed in  Fortun e’s G500 an nual ranking,  2005 [ 1]  
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able 4.6: Providers of Secondary Services to th e H ealthcare Sector in Fortune’s G500, 200  
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5. Chapter 5: Between Market, State and (Global) Market: 
Commercial Transformation of the US Healthcare Services  
The key focus of this chapter is to examine the emergence of a commercial (for-profit) 
healthcare services market in the US and the qualitative implications of this transition for the 
structure of the US healthcare system and its particular mixed economy of healthcare. I focus 
primarily on the hospital sector and its interaction with the changing structure of health insurance 
marked by the emergence of large healthcare service conglomerates and amongst these at least a 
handful of major multinationals. While the US in many ways is an outlier compared to most other 
OECD countries, examining these changes in the US provides insight in terms of the more general 
trend internationally regarding the commercialisation of healthcare services, as well as offering and 
offers an important reference point for analysing commercialisation in other countries.  
Indeed, the US healthcare system was the earliest to experience a structural shift in its 
healthcare services from a sector characterized by private non-profit organizations to one in which 
several large multi-institutional for-profit organizations have come to dominate market share during 
the last quarter of the 20th century. By the end of the 1990s a considerable number of both for-profit 
and non-profit entities across a range of healthcare services were absorbed into ‘investor-owned’ 
commercial conglomerates, with concentration of ownership in a relatively small number of these. 
While at the beginning of the 21st century the corporate commercial expansion is an almost taken-
for-granted feature of the US healthcare system, it is nonetheless a development that is intimately 
connected to changes in public policy that saw a shift from an accommodatory (Starr, 1992) to a 
pro-competitive (Marmor, 1998) framework of engagement with the private healthcare services 
sector. Despite little indications from my research that international expansion of a handful of these 
commercial actors was an intentional outcome of public policy, the impact of the ‘pro-competitive’ 
turn has been a significant contingent factor in the internationalisation strategies of a number of the 
healthcare service corporations. 
 
In the first section of the chapter I briefly situate the context out of which a for-profit 
healthcare market structure arose during the 1960s and 1970s, noting the important role played by 
(Federal) public policy in this process. The next section (5.2) tracks the emergence of commercial 
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conglomerates in the hospital sector, while in section 5.3 I look at developments in the health 
insurance sector. The chapter then makes a brief analysis of the relationship between these two 
sectors and developments in public policy (section 5.4), followed by a brief analysis of the 
international expansion of US hospital and insurance firms in section 5.5.  
 
5.1. From cottage industry to corporate growth industry: The changing 
mixed economy of healthcare in the US  
Although the US stands out, in relation to most other OECD countries, for the degree to 
which healthcare has remained outside of direct public regulation and administration, this has meant 
neither a complete absence of government role, nor a purely profit-driven system of healthcare 
historically. Examining some features of the earlier structure of healthcare services is necessary to 
contrast with the changes that have taken place in the last quarter of the 20th century, which are the 
most relevant to this thesis. 
5.1.1. The non-profit roots of the US healthcare services sector 
The extremely limited presence of the federal government in both healthcare financing and 
provision from the inter-war years through to the post-WWII decades,67 set it apart from most other 
advanced capitalist countries of the era that had already begun to develop sizeable public insurance 
schemes for healthcare.68 Instead, fraternal and benevolent societies largely filled the gap in 
collective health financing, while religious-based and other non-denominational philanthropic 
charities provided most of the hospital services, and a substantial number of physician-owned 
proprietary hospitals were also in operation, making up around half of the total hospital stock until 
the early 1930s (Stevens, 1999, pp.30-39, Steinwald & Neuhauser, 1970).69 Physicians were almost 
                                                   
67 No cabinet-level department existed for healthcare until 1953 when, under President Eisenhower, the US 
Department of Healthcare, Education and Welfare was legislated in Congress. 
68 At the state level, sparse initiatives had developed to give means-tested assistance to the poor and a small 
number of public hospitals were developed in some municipalities, while after 1930 US war veterans, through 
the Veterans Administration, received some degree of support and access to a small number of public 
hospitals of variable quality (Starr, 1982, 154-162). 
69 Most of these were affiliated to specific labour unions or others that were locally based working men’s 
clubs linked to manufacturing, heavy industry, extractive industries, and railways, while a small number of 
service sectors such as banking and public sector employment groups were also host to health sickness funds 
(Dobbin, 1992). 
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exclusively individual private practitioners offering their services on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis 
through solo primary care practices, hospitals and/or clinics, or hired by large companies 
(particularly in labour-intensive sectors) to provide basic in-house medical services to their workers 
(Starr, 1982, pp.200-215).70 From the mid-1930s, however, what could arguably be referred to as a 
“cottage industry” (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1984, pp.15-20), composed of diffuse localised 
networks of physician-led clinical services and voluntarist health insurance schemes, began to shift 
towards a hospital-centred medical sector in which employer-based health insurance was the 
defining feature of collective financing of healthcare.  
Amid a number of different and independently emerging organizational innovations in the 
1920s and 1930s, the (non-profit) Blue Cross health plan (founded in 1929 by hospitals in Texas), 
was welcomed by employers and grew over the next few decades to become one of the biggest 
health insurance groups across the US, but also essentially defined the model for all subsequent 
employee health plans (Starr, 1982, pp.331-4).71 Excluded from the Social Security infrastructure 
that was set up in the mid-1930s under the New Deal, health insurance became crystallized as a 
fringe benefit. A series of war-time federal wage and price controls (and in the absence of 
comparable controls on fringe benefits) indirectly and unintentionally encouraged health insurance 
to become a core aspect of US corporate wage-bargaining between organized labour and especially 
large employers from the 1940s (Dobbin, 1992; Quadagno, 2004b).72 This had not been single-
handedly the work of Blue Cross, but its success paved the way for a number of other non-profit 
organisations also entering similar relationships with healthcare providers. Furthermore, many 
                                                   
70 Fee-for-service involves the unbundled billing of individual services. Particularly in the hospital setting, 
where a number of medical practitioners of different specialisms may offer services to patients, the bill 
involves the separate invoicing of services to the payer. 
71 By the late-1930s a number of innovatory changes had taken place in healthcare delivery as a variety of 
autonomous initiatives experimented with more rationalised medical service provision - such as the division 
of labour between clinicians, and laboratory and diagnostic work - and greater integration between service 
delivery and financing. Particularly the advent of multispecialty group practices (such as the Mayo clinic) and 
medical cooperatives in the 1920s, and pre-paid hospitalization schemes and group practice in the 1930s 
(such as the Ross-Loos clinic, the Kaiser group, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and Group Health Association) were 
beginning to challenge the existing social organization of medicine (Starr, 1982, pp.290-310). 
72 The most notable of these federal interventions included the 1942 National Labor Wage Board (NLWB) 
which instituted a national wage freeze and the Revenue Act of the same year (Dobbin, 1992, pp. 1436-8).  
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commercial (for-profit) insurance companies entered the health insurance business during the 1930s 
to take advantage of the growing demand for health insurance.73 
5.1.2. The post-New Deal era 
After 1945, the first major federal capital investment programme for hospitals, together with 
financial support for medical training and biomedical research increased dramatically in the ensuing 
three decades and created the impetus for massive expansion in the supply of healthcare services 
and medical products (Stevens 1999; Starr, 1982). Where Blue Cross had previously covered much 
of the cost of capital investment in hospitals, the 1946 National Hospital Survey and Construction 
Act (or ‘Hill-Burton’ Act after its chief sponsors in Congress) effectively took over this function for 
the majority of the nation’s community hospitals until 1974.74 The Hill-Burton programme allocated 
over $4.6 billion in grants and $1.5 billion in loans that led to the construction of, or equipment for, 
roughly 6,800 healthcare facilities in more than 4,000 communities, contributing to 30% of the 
annual cost of construction (Mantone, 2005, p.6-7).75  By 1968 it had helped to finance 9,200 new 
medical facilities (including hospitals and other clinical service providers), with a total of 416,000 
new beds. When expenditures ended under the act by 1975, the federal government had assisted in 
financing almost one-third of all hospital projects in the nation, contributing about 10% of the 
annual costs of all hospital construction (Starr, 1982, p.285).  
Notably this financial contribution to the development of the hospital system was focused 
predominantly on public and secondarily on non-profit community hospitals, but excluded 
                                                   
73 The commercial insurers set limits on benefits, often custom-tailored to the desires of each employer, and 
competed largely for the younger cohorts offering lower premium prices to groups that were effectively 
understood to require less usage of healthcare services. This was an important distinction early on between 
non-profit and for-profit health insurance, which although on the one hand related to distinct markets, also 
threatened considerably the risk pool constructed by non-profit health insurers which made their business 
viable. 
74 The Hill-Burton Act (42 U.S.C. §§291-291ol) expired in 1966, and was followed by the Comprehensive 
Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966 (42 U.S.C. §§243, 245a, 246), which 
expired in 1974. This was then expanded in 1974 under the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act (42 U.S.C. §§300k-l-300k-3) and repealed by Public Law (No. 99-660 §701(a), 100 Stat. 
3799) in 1986 under the Reagan administration (cf. Paschall, 2007, note 1, p.475). 
75 The popular ‘Hill-Burton’ title for this Act of Congress is derived from its two chief advocates, Senators 
Lister Hill of Alabama and Harold H. Burton of Ohio, Hill being the main driving force behind it. Their 
original proposal languished in the Senate Education and Labor Committee until November 1945 when the  
then President, Harry S. Truman, announced a comprehensive and prepaid medical insurance program for all 
Americans that would be tied to the Social Security program of the pre-WWII New Deal. (Perlstadt, 1995). 
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proprietary (for-profit) facilities.76 Over its life span, the vast majority of this funding went into 
private non-profit hospitals and, as such, helped to prop up a large number of hospitals that were 
economically unviable due either to their dilapidated condition and/or lack of resources to offer 
sufficient array of services. Recipient organizations were consequently protected to a certain degree 
from the direct pressures that market competition had wrought over the past three decades 
(Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1984, p.18; Stevens 1999).77  
The federal government also put money into expanding the number of medical personnel and 
actively promoted the training of physicians after 1945. Between 1950 and 1970 the medical 
workforce increased from 1.2 million to 3.9 million, while medical research grants (largely 
distributed through the National Institute of Health) rose from $180,000 in 1945 to $4 million two 
years later, $46.3 million in 1950 and $400 million in 1960 (Starr, 1982, p.335-347). Medical 
schools expanded rapidly between the 1940s and 1970s as the infusion of large amounts of public 
money generated new opportunities for developing specialist research and training and also for the 
employment of larger faculties. The average income of medical schools tripled from $500,000 to 
$1.5 million a year during the 1940s, and by 1958-59 the average school’s income was up to $3.7 
million and ten years later to $15 million (Starr, 1982, p.352). 
Meanwhile, a small though growing number of federal state-based assistance programmes 
began to provide some coverage for those groups that were effectively disenfranchised from 
employer-based health insurance. Much of this relied on the New Deal era provisions for social 
assistance and security,78 but also appeared in numerous abortive attempts to insert some provisions 
for national health insurance either as separate bills of Congress, or attached to other programmes 
for health care including both The Hill-Burton hospital investment programme and its short-lived 
                                                   
76 Despite insistence by its Congressional sponsors that it should be directed towards those institutions that 
were most in need of capital investment in relatively deprived parts of the country (Stevens, 1999, p.217). 
77 While the ‘market’ did not rely on profit margins or investor accountability at this time (at least to the 
extent that it does currently), competitive survival did rely to a considerable extent on links to health 
insurance providers and their ability to provide the necessary cash for capital investment. 
78 Particularly, what was to be Medicaid, drew on a number of programmes of categorical cash assistance, 
including old-age assistance, aid for the blind, aid to families with dependent children and, added in 1950, aid 
to the permanently and totally disabled. Medicaid’s federal matching funds provided a key impetus for 
expanding these general assistance programmes as most states or local government units would benefit a great 
deal from the extra funds (Stevens & Stevens, 2007, p.118). 
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predecessor the National Hospital Bill (1942) (Perlstadt, 1995, pp.82-83).79 However, it was the 
introduction of the public Medicare and Medicaid programmes as amendments to the 1935 Social 
Security Act in 1965 which did the most to increase the scale of public financing for healthcare 
services. From 24.7% in 1960, the public share of total expenditure on healthcare had quickly 
grown to 37.5% by 1970 increasing further in recent years to 45.4% by 2005 (Table 5.1 & Figure 
5.1. By far the greatest share of public spending was soon directed at Medicare (which is 
exclusively federal) and Medicaid (split between federal and state administration and sourcing of 
funds), as their combined outlay grew from 22.6% of total public expenditure in 1966 to 46.1% in 
1970, expanding further to 72.6% by 2005 (Table5.2 & Figure 5.2. An important feature was that 
these programmes were administered by and closely modelled after Blue Cross, and included 
unlimited payments to hospitals for capital expenditures (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1984 p.17). 
As such, the newly established public financing programmes were set up in a way that would 
further reinforce the private sector structure of US healthcare, but also preserve employer-based 
financing as the keystone of its financing structure. 
Like the Hill-Burton Act the 1965 public programmes played an important public subsidy 
role for the private healthcare sector; particularly Medicare, given its primary focus on hospitals. 
Lacking adequate regulation of this public expenditure, the greatly increased public funding that 
these programmes delivered became a key source of capital accumulation for an array of industries 
related to healthcare, constituting a major impetus for expansion of the healthcare services sector as 
an industry (Relman, 1980; Starr, 1982; Stevens, 1999). Financed on a ‘cost-plus’ basis, the 
emerging healthcare industries were reminiscent of the sprawling “military-industrial complex” 
which had been growing on the basis of a vast public subsidy system particularly since the Second 
World War (Perelman, 1993, pp.93-108). Indeed, certain critics of the corporate transformation of 
healthcare at the time describe what was emerging in healthcare as, a “medical-industrial complex” 
(Ehenreich & Ehenreich, 1971; Salmon, 1975), for which the hospital sector, though still largely 
non-profit, became an ideal conduit for the generation of substantial surplus extraction by 
                                                   
79 Under President Roosevelt, an attempt had been made to attach national health insurance to the investment 
in hospitals and other clinical facilities. Resistance from both the medical profession and what, by this time, 
was the dominant employer-based health insurance industry saw that the National Hospital Bill did not 
survive the Congressional stage. A similar pattern developed leading up to the Hill-Burton Act, but this time 
an early example of incrementalist politics undertaken by the sponsors of the Bill, which ultimately climbed 
down from a request for national health insurance to seek merely that recipient organisations should allocate a 
certain amount of hospitalisation to those unable to pay (Perlstadt, 1995). 
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increasingly bigger and more powerful for-profit healthcare firms (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 
1984, p.18).  
This early manifestation of for-profit business in healthcare was chiefly composed of medical 
goods manufacturers and suppliers - particularly pharmaceutical firms and medical equipment 
producers - making the most of the expanded healthcare service infrastructure and growing public 
financing for scientific research. But a new dimension of the “medical-industrial complex” was 
emergent between the late 1960s and 1970s - the full scale and implications of which were only 
realised from the 1980s and intensified during the 1990s - involving the market expansion of 
peripheral supply firms80 and of financial intermediaries81 (Salmon, 1975, pp.610-1). A further 
aspect of the “new medical-industrial complex” (Relman, 1980) involved the rapid growth of 
corporate organisational forms in healthcare services and the concentration of many for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals and health insurance organizations into large conglomerates, but also the 
eventual diversification of many of these large multi-institutional groups into several spheres of 
healthcare provision, ranging from hospital management services, to nursing homes and long-term 
care facilities, the supply of medical equipment and later, even the provision of some health 
insurance tied to specific hospital groups.  
Meanwhile, by the 1990s, the ‘revolution’ in health insurance, which ensued when Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) began to expand as a competing institutional form to the still 
predominant indemnity insurers, further deepened this corporate transformation that was taking 
place. The transformation taking place in the hospital and health insurance sectors, however, was 
not only one of corporatization through the concentration into larger conglomerates. It was also 
driven to a considerable degree by a new commercial form of organization where investment 
capital, acquired through independent financers or through public listing to bankroll these emergent 
corporation’s strategic growth, were becoming a commonplace feature in the post-1970s US 
healthcare services market. 
                                                   
80 This included construction firms, pharmaceuticals supply, hospital equipment and supplies, information 
systems and communications. 
81 Particularly Blue Cross and Blue Shield, as well as the commercial insurance firms, whether those focused 
on health insurance or offering health insurance as part of a broader insurance market. 
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5.2. Commercial transformation in the hospital sector 
The first major change came shortly after the introduction of the Medicare and Medicaid 
programmes, as the proprietary (for-profit) hospitals began to rapidly consolidate from a large 
number of small independent physician-owned entities into a relatively small number of large 
hospital chains (Steinwald & Neuhauser, 1970; Bays, 1983b). The chain concept was by no means 
new,82 but the key difference was how this transformed the nature of the for-profit hospital in its 
management and source of funds. Excluded from the tax-exemptions that were enjoyed by the non-
profit sector, corporate concentration was in many respects a business strategy to make the most of 
newly available public spending through Medicare/Medicaid. But also excluded from access to 
Hill-Burton funds it was, furthermore, a strategy for attracting capital investment funding from 
investor groups.  
The Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) is the archetypal example of this first wave of 
hospital mergers. Established in the mid-1960s in Nashville Tennessee as a 50-bed acute care 
facility, its founders sought to create a chain of hospitals in a similar vein to the Holiday Inn hotel 
chain, buying supplies in bulk and raising money from Wall Street investors as a national 
corporation (Geyman, 2004, p.23). The 1965 public funding programmes proved ideal for such a 
new venture, particularly as their payment criteria did not bar proprietary hospitals from access to 
this source of funding. HCA expanded considerably over the next few years buying out small 
proprietary hospitals, and rapidly becoming the market leader for several years operating 50 
hospitals by 1973 and 376 by 1983 (Lutz & Gee, 1998).83  
Another hospital chain firm, National Medical Enterprises (NME) also developed a large 
network of hospitals. Incorporated in 1968, NME acquired its first hospitals in California in 1969 
(four general and three convalescent facilities) and offered public stock. Cost management and 
physician input techniques became part of NME’s trademark features as it concentrated on building 
services around community hospitals over the next few years. Having already developed diversified 
aspects of the business,84 during the early 1970s, it focused on growth mainly through the building 
                                                   
82 Catholic hospitals and other non-profit and VA hospitals were also frequently organised as chains 
(Steinwald & Neuhauser, 1970, p.832). 
83 It should be noted that while these figures include the full number of hospitals that HCA operated, it only 
owned half of these, while managing the rest. 
84 This included hospital equipment and supplies, a hospital-consulting firm, and even a construction 
company that specialized in building hospitals (Eamer, 1989). 
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of new facilities and through some purchases of existing hospitals, soon expanding outside of its 
California base to surrounding states (Eamer, 1989). A first wave of concentration thus revolved 
largely around acquisition of individual hospitals and the construction of new facilities, amounting 
to what was for the most part a geographically proximate corporate expansion and rationalisation. 
Nonetheless, these emergent healthcare corporations began to show aspirations for establishing 
market presence beyond their headquartered regions, and national market presence became an 
important objective for several for-profit hospital corporations. 
5.2.1. Expansion and market concentration in the 1980s 
On the whole, the majority of chain proprietary hospitals in this first wave of concentration 
posed relatively little anti-competitive threat to the bulk of non-profit hospitals, having only one 
unit in most cases in each market where they were present (Reardon & Reardon, 1995; Dranove, 
2000, p.116). The non-profit hospital sector had gained much market strength since the interwar 
years, particularly with the success of indemnity insurers like Blue Cross, but also with tax 
exemptions encouraging the expansion of non-profit hospitals. The generous public capital 
investment from Hill-Burton after 1945 and the inclusion of capital costs in Medicare were 
especially important factors that helped to place non-profit hospitals in the lead for most of the post-
WWII decades. By the mid-1980s, however, few could mistake the fact that corporate hospital 
chains were fundamentally changing the structure of the market and that proprietary hospitals could 
no longer be regarded as mere transitional entities with only secondary position vis-à-vis non-profit 
hospitals (Reardon & Reardon, 1995; Stevens, 1999).85 The 1980s saw the concentration trend 
develop further, as some of the largest chain groups had grown considerably in scale and market 
share throughout the 1970s. By 1987, HCA had become the largest for-profit hospital chain in the 
US, owning almost 200 acute-care facilities across 28 states and a further 45 facilities in eight other 
countries (Geyman, 2004, p.23); while NME had become the fourth largest investor-owned hospital 
chain in the US, with the majority of its revenues coming from acute-care hospitals (Eamer, 1989).  
                                                   
85 This earlier ‘transitional’ nature of proprietary hospitals is attested by the massive reduction of what were 
basically small physician-owned facilities that were originally set up to fill the gap, largely in areas that were 
underserved or where hospitals were absent. By the 1930s, with the growth of non-profit institutions, many of 
these actually sought conversion to non-profit status, largely due to the economic advantages offered by tax-
exemptions for charities, but also in view of the deep antipathy for ‘for-profit’ medicine held by the majority 
of the medical profession, and informally sanctioned through the medical associations. 
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But the 1980s also saw a substantial reduction in the scale of the hospital sector overall. 
While the hospital sector was (and still is) by far the largest sector of the health care industry (fig 
5.3), and although the growth rate in hospital expenditures increased rapidly in the 1980s (Stevens, 
1999), the total number of community hospitals in the US declined from 5,830 in 1980, to 5,194 in 
1995, and 4.915 in 2000 (Table 5.3 ).86 This trend is also reflected in the decline in number of 
community hospital beds and beds per 1,000 of population, going down to 988,287 hospital beds in 
1980, and continuing declining so that by 1995 there were only 871,976 reduced further to 823,560 
hospitals beds by 2000 (a total decrease of 17%), which corresponds to only 2.9 hospital beds per 
1000 people in 2005, down from 4.3 beds in 1980 (Table 5.4). The contraction of the hospital sector 
had a great deal to do with the massive growth in costs which brought pressure to control them 
involving a strategy to reduce hospital length of stay, leaving many facilities with unused bed 
capacity. In these changing market conditions, between the late 1970s and late-1980s, hospital 
chains sought to diversify their activities outside of the acute and community hospital sector. 
NME’s hospital management expertise was already being hired out from the late-1970s to non-NME 
owned hospitals both within the US and in some facilities outside the US (Eamer, 1989).87 It also 
began to shift focus from acute-care hospitals to nursing homes, acquiring the rival National Health 
Enterprises (NHE) in 1982. This move brought an additional 66 long-term care facilities into 
NME’s ownership and made it the second largest nursing home owner in the early 1980s. 
Furthermore, it focused on developing its products-and-services segment, including health-care 
equipment rental for home use and visiting-nurses agencies until Medicare and Medicaid 
restrictions from the mid-1980s made the latter less lucrative.  
 
Another example is American Medical International (AMI), which had emerged from its 
early days as the first investor-owned healthcare service firm in 1960, and had already been 
diversifying since the late 1960s. In the early 1980s especially, AMI set about rapid growth by 
acquisition of small hospitals across the country (and internationally) spending $750 million 
                                                   
86) (American Hospital Association, 2002). 
87 Particularly in Saudi Arabia, helping to develop Saudi hospitals during the 1970s. 
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between 1980 and 1983 to expand, modernize and diversify its operations.88 But this strategy 
proved unsustainable as occupancy rates in AMI’s hospitals dropped almost 50% by 1986, and in 
the face of profit losses and potential takeover bids, the company proceeded to divest a significant 
amount of its hospital stock after 1987, eventually merging with IMA Holdings Corporation in 1989 
to form American Medical Holdings, as the new company continued to divest a number of 
companies, including many of its international acquisitions.   
The non-profit sector was no less affected by declining hospital business. Mergers between 
non-profit hospitals, as well as between for-profit and non-profit hospitals, were a key development 
of the 1980s in addition to developments exclusively within the for-profit field (Stevens, 1999). 
While policy makers began to relax the antitrust specifications that had previously been a barrier to 
major concentration trend, many of the mergers that came in this period involved the acquisition of 
more profitable entities by larger firms (Dor & Friedman, 1994). This was despite the claim by 
many hospital providers that acquisitions and mergers were simply a strategy for survival in a 
declining hospital sector. That is not to underplay the significance of the decline, since many 
hospitals began to face the challenge of the cost-control agenda that was emerging at this time in 
Federal public policy for the health sector (Marmor, 1998). This was particularly so after the 
introduction of Medicare Prospective Payer System (PPS) in 1982, when reimbursement according 
to Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) for Medicare patients and the growth in managed care began 
to undercut the economies of cost-plus billing that had been a key pillar of hospital profitability 
(Kuttner, 1996a, p.363). The changing regulatory and market situation became a stimulus for a 
second wave of corporate transformation as concentration accelerated along with the massive 
growth in scale of large for-profit chains, their increase in market power and new strategies 
employed to retain and/or increase profitability. 
The most (in)famous example was the merger of HCA and Columbia, by which the merged 
company came to own and control over half the entire for-profit hospital stock in the country 
(Kuttner, 1996a). Columbia was one of the main hospital market giants to emerge in the late-1980s. 
Formed in 1987, Columbia Healthcare Corporation began with the acquisition of two hospitals in 
                                                   
88 AMI’s origins are in an independent medical reference laboratory (Medlabs) that contracted with Los 
Angeles-area hospitals. After buying a failing hospital in 1960 it went public, changing its name to American 
Laboratories and engaged in a number of acquisitions over the next few years. Renamed American Medical 
Enterprises in 1965 after it began to diversify into pharmacies, medical supplies, and further acquisitions of 
hospitals, of which a notable case is its acquisition of London’s Harley Street Clinic in 1969 (Griffith, Illife & 
Rayner, 1987). 
144 
 
Texas, and soon formed a partnership with a group of physician investors (El Paso Healthcare 
System, Ltd. (EPHS)). This marked the beginning of a series of acquisitions of medical/surgical 
centres and hospitals in a rapid consolidation of the Texas market over the next three years and 
establishing a full-service network, while creating limited partnerships with physician investors. By 
1993, Columbia had broadened its scope to 19 other states with the acquisition of Galen Health 
Care (formerly under the Humana hospital management group), quadrupling its total number of 
hospitals, and increasing its revenues to over $5 billion (Lutz & Gee, 1998).  
Meanwhile HCA had gone through a period of divestment of much of its hospital stock 
during the mid-1980s following the decline in bed occupancy and increased pressures placed on its 
profitability by state and federal cost-control regulations. Another key example was the controversy 
that followed from NME’s overcharging, fraudulent and illegal billing practices, particularly in its 
psychiatric units.89 The negative publicity that followed led NME to divest most of its psychiatric 
stock (selling 71 of its 81 psychiatric units) partly to offset the cost of court settlements and re-
brand itself as Tenet.  
5.2.2. Structural change in the 1990s  
Concentration into systems increased considerably in the 1990s as the share of patient care in 
hospital systems vis-à-vis independent hospitals rose from 39% to 57% between 1991 and 1999 
(Andrews, 2005). In this period, hospital concentration developed as much among non-profits, as 
amongst proprietary hospitals, as competition increased considerably not only between for-profit 
institutions but also between for-profits and non-profits. Indeed, as community hospital numbers 
were in decline, a number of hospitals were being absorbed into multi-institutional systems. Where 
1,579 hospitals nationally could be found in such systems in 1985, by 1999 the number of hospitals 
absorbed into larger groups had grown by just over a third to 2,238 (Table 5.3; see above). A crucial 
impetus for the competitive environment was an announcement in 1993 by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice issuing guidelines that effectively encouraged hospital 
mergers and acquisitions with the view that they were not necessarily anti-competitive (Andrews, 
2005).  
                                                   
89 Specifically, NME was fined $379 million 1994 on criminal charges by the Justice Department and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (after a court case brought in 1991, which started a chain of 130 
suits against NME over the next three years) that its psychiatric hospitals had paid for referrals and kept 
patients incarcerated until their insurance ran out (Myerson, 1994; Kuttner, 1996a, p. 363). 
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While not completely removing the anti-trust edifice upon which government regulation of 
the healthcare sector had been built (Havighurst, 2001), it did relax it considerably based upon the 
premise that, as with the first wave of hospital consolidations, most hospital chains did not pose a 
substantial anti-competitive threat in local markets. Nonetheless, the evidence of actors such as 
Columbia/HCA and NME (Tenet) serve as examples that competitive (or anti-competitive) 
behaviour frequently took place in a way other than simply local market penetration. While cases 
such as these represent the pinnacle of corporate for-profit ownership and its consequences for 
market structure, the great bulk of healthcare groups are much smaller in terms of their portfolio 
and impact on national and local market share. Antitrust cases have been brought against several 
other hospital groups over the years. Yet, this also highlights the geographic dispersion of the 
healthcare market across the 50 US states and their respective legislative procedures where antitrust 
regulations are actually enforced. 
By the late-1990s a third period in structural transformation of the hospital sector had been 
taking place, which involved the more open targeting of non-profit hospitals and by the early 2000s 
a trend of for-profit conversion of non-profit hospitals seeking means to survive in a competitive 
market.90 At this point, the investor role continued to be an important source of finance as non-
profit hospital providers sought to bolster their waning fortunes in times of increased purchaser 
activism in the face of rising costs of insurance subscriptions (Robinson, 2000 & 2002a). The major 
hospital systems that had consolidated over the previous three decades continued with renewed 
acquisitions, although at this stage the hospital sector has already declined considerably in face of a 
shift towards home care and primary care that has resulted from longer-term market changes and 
public policies. Nonetheless, by 2000 80% of hospitals were part of multi-hospital systems 
(Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2005, p. 171). 
5.3. Health Insurance and the rise of Managed Care 
The changes described regarding the hospitals sector cannot be abstracted from important 
developments in the health insurance market - still the primary source of funding for hospitals after 
the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid - where a profound shift took place after the 1970s. 
                                                   
90 A somewhat eerie echo of the developments in the hospital sector in the early 20 th century but in 
reverse, although this may be to oversimplify the most recent trend 
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Indemnity insurers had been criticised heavily for reimbursing hospital fees without adequate 
control over expenditure (Patel & Rushefsky, 2006). This was beginning to be an issue as much for 
employers experiencing increasing subscription premiums as for the public sector programmes 
which were spending rapidly increasing amounts after 1965 to pay for hospital reimbursement. In 
1973 the Health Maintenance Organization Act (HMO Act) was passed, encouraging the 
conversion of health insurance plans to HMOs or the setting up of new ones in order to stimulate 
competition in the insurance sector. The HMO Act was part of a number of ‘pro-competitive’ policy 
strategies being introduced from the 1970s by the Federal government to induce cost control in 
healthcare provision (Marmor, 1998).  
For most of the 1970s, HMOs did not in fact grow as rapidly as expected with poor rates of 
enrolment and take-up by employers (Enthoven, 1993). On the other hand this was a formative 
period for what would become a dominant organizational form for managing and organizing 
healthcare services consumption two decades later. By the early-1990s the HMO ‘revolution’ 
became much more visible particularly as the 1980s were a decade of both high healthcare prices 
and changes in public policy that sought much more stringent controls on costs. From analysis of 
the managed care market in the early 2000s significant growth in numbers of HMOs and also in the 
numbers of people enrolled under such schemes were reported between the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s. Where in 1984 there were only 337 HMOs with 17 million enrolees by 1988, there were 31 
million members enrolled in 643 HMOs and by 1996 there were more than 50 million managed care 
enrolees (Estes, 2001). To give a better picture of the scale of the pervasiveness of managed care, 
nearly 75% of U.S. workers with health insurance received that coverage through an HMO, a PPO, 
or a point of service plan (PSP) by this time (ibid). 
Interestingly, the 1973 HMO Act actually stipulated that HMOs would be non-profit 
institutions. Though there may have been a premonition of the consequences for moral hazard in 
having for-profit institutions to control costs, the simple fact was that the majority of insurance 
firms with the possibility of becoming HMOs were non-profit institutions in the early 1970s. 
However, by the late-1980s, the health insurance sector had taken a definitive swing towards an 
increase in for-profit institutions gaining significant market share. For-profit conversion increased 
considerably during the 1990s. For-profit institutions, which already owned 35-40% of health care 
services and facilities in 1990 continued to expand over the next decade so that nine out of the ten 
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largest HMOs were for-profit institutions by the mid-1990s (Relman, 199291 cited in Bodenheimer 
& Grumbach, 2005, p.172; Zelman, 1996).The consolidation of most of the larger insurers, more 
aggressive selective contracting, and an increased rate of conversion to for-profit status, so that ‘by 
the mid-1990s, there were more for-profit HMOs than not-for-profits’ and after a period of intense 
competition, mergers and consolidation a relatively small number of large and mostly non-profit 
HMOs covered over 80 million people (Geyman, 2004, pp. 38-39). Most notable was the 
consolidation activity amongst health maintenance organizations (HMOs), as larger ones bought out 
numerous smaller competitors and/or merged with other large conglomerates. By the late-1990s six 
HMOs controlled around 40% of the market (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2005, p. 171), amongst 
which were some of the largest companies in the country by revenues and, as indicated in the last 
chapter, a number of the largest 500 companies in the world by revenues: Aetna, Cigna, United 
HealthCare, Foundation Health Systems, Pacificare, and Wellpoint Health Networks. 
5.4. The commercial transformation of American healthcare 
While the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid programmes were an important turning point in 
expanding the role of government in healthcare financing, the transformation of the US healthcare 
services sector has been a process that has developed through a series of often contradictory public 
policies that have sought, in various ways and to various degrees, to address the tensions that 
emerged after 1965 in the financing and delivery of healthcare. As public financing mushroomed 
dramatically after 1965, with the share of public spending on health historically remaining at less 
than 46% of total expenditure on health (Table 5.1), one of the biggest issues has been the ever 
growing total expenditure on healthcare, which had already reached 7.2% of GDP in 1970 (up from 
5.2% in 1960), and has grown incredibly to 12.3% in 1990 and already in excess of 15% since 2002 
(Figure 5.4). The public share of this rising expenditure was the biggest cause for concern, 
particularly as the post-WWII era of economic growth and prosperity that had been an essential 
element in the expansion of both public financing and of private employer-based health insurance.  
Direct financing has also been supplemented through tax exemptions for health insurance 
and non-profit hospitals, contributing about $25 billion more in 1982 (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 
1984, p.18), while tax exemptions for health insurance in 1995 reached $45 billion (Howard, 1997, 
p.28). These figures are not easy to pin down in the same way that for instance public expenditures 
                                                   
91 Relman, A.S. (1992), The choices for healthcare reform, Pennsylvania Blue Shield Institute. 
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are recorded, however they reveal a significant aspect of the overall public contribution to 
healthcare that is not typically accounted for in either national healthcare expenditure accounts, and 
for this reason nor do they feature in international comparative assessments of the US public outlay 
for healthcare. Howard points out the relevance of tax exemptions as ‘the exclusion of employer’s 
contributions for health insurance premiums from corporate income taxation is a huge subsidy’, 
which together with the tax expenditure for employer pensions constitute the largest single 
components of the ‘hidden welfare state’ (Howard, 1997, pp. 28-29).92 
The key to this point is that for-profit hospitals were excluded from access to the same kind 
of public sources of finance. While tax subsidies have benefited non-profit private hospitals, 
particularly in the post-WWII years, for-profit hospitals were obliged to look elsewhere for 
covering capital costs. While in receipt of Federal payments channelled through MCOs and other 
insurers, capital costs were to a large extent derived from private investors and shareholders for 
those for-profit hospitals that were publicly listed. As indicated in the earlier examples of hospital 
providers, investment capital helped support the expansion of several of the larger for-profit groups. 
Adding to this situation, the elimination of indirect subsidies and tax exemptions in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, compounded by reductions in both Medicare and Medicaid payments as part of a 
more general Federal cost-containment strategy brought many non-profit hospitals into a position of 
reduced revenue flows. Several of these hospitals were pushed towards for-profit conversion and in 
many cases absorption into larger for-profit groups (Himmelstein & Woolhandler 1984, p.20). 
Compounding this situation, the promotion of DRG-based payment would mean that 
hospitals could no longer benefit from ‘cost-plus’ financing, with a fixed lump sum determined by 
the patient's diagnosis instead, so that for the first time, hospitals would profit by providing fewer 
services to each patient. (Himmelstein & Woolhandler, 1984). Even so, the for-profit conversion of 
hospitals has actually been somewhat limited compared, for instance, to the insurance sector. 
Throughout the early to mid-1990s, over 100 non-profit hospitals were taken over by for-profit 
chains, of which Columbia/HCA for instance, itself the product of an earlier merger of two major 
HMOs, was particularly effective at buying out its small competitors (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 
2006, p.172).  Non-profit status has continued to remain strong in the private hospital sector, mainly 
                                                   
92 Tax exemptions for both insurance and pensions enable employers to write off the costs of providing 
benefits to workers as a business expense. 
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due to intense community resistance to for-profit conversion.  As such, there is in fact a pattern of 
hostile competition between non-profit and for-profit hospitals which is often overlooked in 
publications that focus solely on the for-profit conversion aspect (Wells, 2000, p. 643). Even so, the 
process of for-profit conversion is not an inevitable situation, particularly as non-profit hospitals 
may opt for retaining their ties with their local communities where key stakeholders in their 
organizational structure may place these interests above acquisition of investment capital (Cutler & 
Horwitz, 2000).   
One key trend is that the payers (insurers) are the ones that are increasingly holding economic 
power in the financing-provision nexus. By controlling a key source of income for hospitals, large 
MCOs with extensive market share such as Aetna, Humana, and Cigna are able to set the terms on 
pricing. This scenario points to a double-sided relationship in the concentration process witnessed 
amongst both hospitals and health insurance firms. The emergence of preferred provider networks 
during the 1990s as a mechanism for MCOs to be selective over health service providers offering 
services at lower cost has been a major factor in shaping the dynamic of the US private healthcare 
service market. With the concentration of payers (each in their respective geographic market niches) 
and their power to determine the terms of payment, particularly smaller hospitals (in terms of bed 
numbers) have also been pushed to rationalise their activity (i.e. reductions in bed numbers and 
buildings) and in some cases to merge with larger multi-institutional hospital systems (Robinson, 
1999; Cutler ed, 2000). Thus integration may be a strategy in many cases for survival in a market 
with high uncertainties stemming from reduced public cash flows relating to changing regulatory 
conditions (i.e. changes in Medicare and Medicaid conditions for payment), as much as a product of 
commercial expansionism in the search of increasing profit margins. 
5.5. Internationalisation of commercial healthcare services 
Several of the larger hospital groups demonstrated international expansionary strategies over 
the years, although as shown in Chapter 4 some of these did not gain long-term success in overseas 
ventures. For several hospital firms, international expansion started with a handful of contracts in 
Middle Eastern countries to develop healthcare provision serving US military bases located in these 
countries during the early-1970s. This initial penetration soon expanded into contracts to build and 
manage facilities with the host states since these countries had little experience with modern 
hospitals and medical care services (Berliner & Regan, 1987).  Many of these contracts were made 
available to American for-profit hospital companies, though as these countries began to develop 
their own capacity of (often US-trained) managers and develop their own building industries, these 
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contracts began to dry up. Lack of funds in the post-oil crisis era and political instability in the 
region at the time also led to contract terminations, though as Berliner and Regan have noted, ‘the 
experience that the companies acquired in building and managing hospitals in the Middle Eastern 
countries was certainly a positive incentive to expand such operations’ (1987, p.1281).  
Entry into several European countries followed as next steps in a search for overseas 
opportunities, with US hospital chains able to establish a distinct niche within the European market 
largely focused on high-tech services and high amenity hospitals, particularly in countries which 
presented limited or weak domestic competition. A particular example for this was the UK, where 
several US for-profit chains established their market presence since AMI’s acquisition of London’s 
Harley St. Clinic, and the subsequent penetration by HCA and Humana with a small but steadily 
growing portion of the UK market throughout the 1980s (Mohan, 1991). 
It is interesting to compare the incentives for internationalisation at this time compared with 
the incentives in later decades, particularly the 1990s when the big ‘boom’ in overseas markets 
began to take place amongst HMOs. By the 1990s, several of the internationalising hospital chains 
had begun to withdraw from their overseas ventures. Instead some HMOs began to invest more 
actively in overseas markets, particularly in several Latin American countries where MCOs 
Humana and United Health, for instance, have established strategic partnerships with private 
investment consortia. The fate of HMOs overseas however has been variable also, despite a greater 
capacity for insurance firms to find markets in covering overseas patients and corporate clients 
consisting of US multinational employers in different national locations (Wells, 2000).  
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have been examining historical trends in the emergence of commercial 
healthcare services in the US. In doing so, I have been looking at the nationally specific conditions 
for the emergence of commercial (for-profit) forms of healthcare provision in the US as a point of 
reflection vis-à-vis other OECD countries and particularly the UK case, which I analyse in the 
following chapter. Indeed, a key general observation from this chapter is that although the US 
diverged considerably from many other OECD countries - particularly those of Western Europe - in 
developing a more socialized healthcare system, the commercial transformation in private 
healthcare services was, to a large extent, an indirect outcome of Federal public policy for 
healthcare reform.  
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Having gained momentum by the late 1970s, the commercial transformation rapidly came 
to define and shape the structure of the US healthcare system, becoming an embedded feature of the 
political economy of healthcare policy over the coming decades. Attempts by the Federal 
government over the past three decades to contain growing costs of healthcare - in part associated 
with this corporate for-profit growth pattern, by introducing mechanisms for controlling growing 
hospital costs through market-based principles, without addressing the fundamental imbalances in 
the system, particularly the ever growing problems of un-insurance and under-insurance – have, in a 
number of ways, been instrumental in maintaining the corporate for-profit element in the hospital 
and health insurance sectors. 
Compared to most other OECD countries the US can be seen as a ‘net-exporter’ of 
healthcare services as several large corporations have, over the years, sought to enter overseas 
markets. The latter trend can be explained in terms of the market conditions within the US but also 
in terms of the capacity of large commercial entities already used to acquiring capital finance for the 
development of market share in their domestic market. How such international market expansion is 
articulated in the overseas markets is reflected on through examination of commercial 
transformation in the UK’s private hospital and insurance sectors in the following chapter.  
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Table 5.1: National Expenditure on Health (NEH) by source of funds in $USD (bill) and as 
percent of NEH by source of funding: (selected calendar years) 1960-2005 
 
NEH 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
$bill           
Total 27.5 42.2 74.9 133.1 253.4 439.3 714.0 1,016.5 1,353.6 1,973.3 
Private  20.7 31.7 46.8 77.2 147.0 261.9 427.3 551.7 757.0 1,076.6 
Public  6.8 10.5 28.1 55.9 106.3 177.4 286.7 464.8 596.6 896.8 
%            
Private  75.3 75.1 62.5 58.0 58.0 59.6 59.8 54.3 55.9 54.6 
Public  24.7 24.9 37.5 42.0 41.9 40.4 40.2 45.7 44.1 45.4 
 
Source: Centres for Medicare & Medicaid  (2006) 
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Figure 5.1: Public and Private Share of Spending on Healthcare in the USA: 1960-2005 
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Source: Centres for Medicare and Medicaid (2006) 
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Figure 5.2: Medicare and Medicaid expenditure as a percentage of public expenditure: 1966-
2005 
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Source: CMS (2006) 
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Table 5.2: Med icare and M edicaid expend iture ($mil l and p ercent ages of Natio nal , Public,  Federal  an d St ate/Local  exp enditure) over  5 year interv als:  1966- 2005  
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Figure 5.3: Share of national expenditure on health by category: 1960-2005 
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Table 5.3: Number of community hospitals (i): 1980-2000 
Year All Hospitals In Health System (ii) 
1980 5,830 - 
1981 5,813 - 
1982 5,801 - 
1983 5,783 - 
1984 5,759 - 
1985 5,732 1,579 
1986 5,678 1,735 
1987 5,611 1,781 
1988 5,533 1,857 
1989 5,455 1,835 
1990 5,384 1,822 
1991 5,342 1,827 
1992 5,292 1,814 
1993 5,261 1,829 
1994 5,229 1,956 
1995 5,194 1,990 
1996 5,134 2,058 
1997 5,057 2,222 
1998 5,015 2,176 
1999 4,956 2,238 
2000 4,915 2,217 
 
Notes: (i) All non federal, short-term general, and special hospitals 
whose facilities and services are available to the public; (ii) Hospitals 
that are part of a corporate body that may own and/or manage 
health provider facilities or health-related subsidiaries as well as 
non-health-related facilities including freestanding and/or subsidiary 
corporations; (-) Data not available. 
 
Source: American Hospital Association (2002) 
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Table 5.4: Number of beds and number of beds per 1000 people: 1980-2000 
 
Year Number of Beds Beds per 1,000 
1980 988,287 4.36 
1981 1,001,801 4.37 
1982 1,011,989 4.37 
1983 1,018,452 4.36 
1984 1,016,987 4.31 
1985 1,000,598 4.21 
1986 978,283 4.07 
1987 956,529 3.95 
1988 944,276 3.86 
1989 932,185 3.78 
1990 926,436 3.72 
1991 922,822 3.66 
1992 919,505 3.61 
1993 917,847 3.56 
1994 901,056 3.46 
1995 871,976 3.32 
1996 862,352 3.25 
1997 853,287 3.19 
1998 839,988 3.11 
1999 829,575 3.04 
2000 823,560 2.93 
 
Source: American Hospital Association (2002) 
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Figure 5.4: National Expenditure on Health trends ($USD bill and as percentage of GDP), 
selected years: 1960-2005 
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6. Chapter 6: Towards the Global Market: Transformation of 
the UK’s Private Healthcare Services Sector 
At first glance, the UK’s private healthcare services sector seems rather diminutive compared 
to the extensive network of commercial providers and insurers in the United States. The differences 
are not just apparent in terms of scale, but also in terms of the degree to which commercial (for-
profit) healthcare is embedded in the political economic structure of the two countries’ healthcare 
systems. While commercial healthcare services in the US have grown out of a system heavily 
oriented towards a market-based mode of organization, even as increasing Federal and State 
intervention contributed to a growing public sector role in the US healthcare system, the dominance 
of the public sector NHS in the UK’s healthcare service landscape - coupled with the preponderance 
of a public and largely tax-based system to finance it - has tended to overshadow the role played by 
the private sector in the post-WWII era. Yet, over time, the UK’s private sector has grown 
considerably in size and in recent years has begun to absorb a growing share of the UK’s healthcare 
services market. This has been the case particularly as public policy has begun to overtly pursue a 
role for the private sector in the country’s healthcare mix. 
In this chapter I focus on the development of the UK’s private acute hospital and insurance 
sectors to gain a picture of the changing market structure since they began to break with their post-
war residual market position in the late-1970s. The significance of this juncture is that it is closely 
linked to the entrance of the first foreign-owned healthcare service firms in the UK market. The 
chapter looks at the reconstitution of the private sector following this juncture, while focusing in 
greater detail on its development during the 1990s and into the mid-2000s. In doing so, I seek to 
understand the relationship between public policy for healthcare services and changes in the private 
healthcare services market structure in the UK as a contrasting case study to my analysis in the 
previous chapter of this relationship in the US. As such, I analyse key mechanisms that have been 
important in the commercial transformation of the private sector during this time. What emerges 
from this analysis is the importance of public policy in laying the ground for expansion of the 
private sector, whereby an initially accommodatory and later more overtly pro-competitive policy 
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context have been the backdrop against which intra-private sector competition has gradually 
resulted in a more commercial and, moreover, more internationalised market structure. 
The first section of the chapter briefly situates the emergence of a commercial private 
healthcare services sector within the context of the UK’s post-WWII mixed economy of healthcare. 
In this section I also elaborate on the key juncture of the late 1970s for the ensuing commercial 
transformation of the sector. In the following section (6.2) I look more closely at developments in 
the 1990s, pinpointing key mechanisms in the changing structure of the private market. This is 
followed (section 6.3) with an analysis of more recent developments between the late 1990s and 
mid-2000s, noting the transformation not only in the structure of the private sector, but also in its 
relationship to public policy for healthcare services. Section 6.4 looks more closely at the ‘new’ 
mixed economy of care in which private provision has become an increasingly important 
component of total healthcare service production, with considerable assistance from a change in the 
public sector contracting regime. I conclude the chapter with a brief reflection (section 6.5) on the 
significance of the developments analysed in the chapter in terms of the relationship between 
internationalising healthcare services and the commercial transformation witnessed in the UK’s 
private hospital and medical insurance sectors. 
6.1. The private sector in an era of accommodation 
After 1948 the private provision of healthcare services assumed a complementary position in 
relation to the newly established public NHS. As a result of absorption of the majority of the 
country’s hospitals into the public sector, the NHS established a near monopoly of healthcare 
provision.  It substituted what had previously been a rather fragmented system of charities and 
voluntary hospitals, private medical clubs, occupational medical services and works clubs, fee-for-
service insurance, friendly societies, as well as subscription-funded public medical services, and ad 
hoc medical fee payment (Doyle & Bull, 2000; Rivett, 1998). The 1946 NHS Act brought the bulk 
of the country’s hospital stock (including acute, mental and elderly care facilities) into public 
ownership. In addition, the 1946 Act brought the vast majority of general practitioners into a public 
service contract, ensured the coverage of most dental, opthalmological services and medical 
prescriptions through public taxation, combined with national insurance contributions (a form of 
hypothecated taxation). Thus, a healthcare system was created that would be free at the point of use 
and guaranteeing, as much as possible, universal and equitable coverage, even while substantial 
elements of the system remained outside state ownership (Mencher, 1967; Rivett, 1998).  
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The result of the establishment of the NHS was a healthcare system in which the state would 
be responsible for the vast majority of overall health expenditure, a trend that has persisted into the 
21st century (as shown in Table 6.1). But though the NHS still accounts for the bulk of the country’s 
total expenditure on healthcare there has been a slight decline over the years in the public share of 
this expenditure, marking to some degree a growth in private consumption of healthcare services 
and products.  Indeed, from a mere 2.4% of total health expenditure accounted for by private health 
and medical insurance products in 1975, by the early 2000s this source of funding has come to 
account for over 7% of total health expenditure. Coupled with personal expenditure on medical 
products, total private spending (including PMI and OOP payments) has almost doubled over the 
same period from 7.4%  in 1975 to 14.3% in 2004 (Table 6.1).  
Nonetheless, in the immediate post-war years the private healthcare services sector was very 
much in a marginalised position. It consisted primarily of the private acute hospitals that were not 
nationalized with a closely linked private medical insurance sector. Out of over 2000 hospitals 
across the UK in 1948 about 300, mainly small religious charity-based units, remained outside the 
national scheme. This residual number of private hospitals consisted of mainly small-scale units - of 
less than 50 beds and often no more than 20 beds each - mostly based in the mental health sector 
and elective surgery (Mohan, 1970, pp.3-4). Meanwhile nearly half of private acute provision was 
actually retained within the NHS structure as NHS ‘pay-beds’. This had been part of a key political 
compromise between the then Labour government and the medical profession (through its various 
representative bodies) to retain the possibility of private practice, which enabled the NHS Act to 
come into legislation (Navarro, 1978).  
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6.1.1. Emergent post-WWII private sector 
While the creation of the NHS essentially marginalised the private acute sector - at least for 
the coming three decades - the latter had already begun to reorganize as a complementary niche 
sector catering to wealthier members of the population.  Such people were willing and able to pay 
for more rapid access to treatment (and thereby avoid NHS waiting lists), were able to choose the 
timing of elective surgery, and experienced the greater sense of comfort offered to paying patients 
with more individualised space (i.e. single-bed wards) with more attentive service, whether 
perceived or real (Laing, 1992; Calnan, Cant & Gabe, 1993). 
In the face of competition from the NHS, both as universal provider and having cornered a 
substantial portion of the private acute market share, some private hospital providers also began a 
process of concentration (Higgins 1988); notably the creation of the Nuffield network of hospitals 
which, in the long run, established itself as an undisputed market leader in private acute care. 93 
However, private hospital services were only made affordable to most users through the 
development of private medical insurance, and by the late 1950s, a structured health insurance 
sector was already taking shape to substitute what had otherwise remained a highly fragmented and 
often quite unreliable private financing structure (Higgins, 1988).94 The instigation of the London 
based Hospital Services Plan (later becoming PPP Healthcare) and the amalgamation of 89 small 
scale regional health insurance providers came to form the British United Provident Association 
(BUPA), which formed the financial backbone of private healthcare for the next few decades and 
eventually, along with Western Provident Association (WPA), became the largest private medical 
insurance (PMI) providers in the UK in subsequent years. Indeed, PMI saw ‘a strong underlying 
increase in the volume of demand (subscriber numbers)’ through modest though constant levels of 
                                                   
93 In the immediate post-WWII years, Nuffield had been primarily focused on elderly and disabled long term 
care (as the Nuffield Nursing Homes Trust). But as many other small operators of care homes and acute 
hospital facilities were finding it hard to continue operating in such an intense climate of competition from the 
NHS, Nuffield’s move to concentrate and re-position itself as a key player in the private acute market, initially 
absorbing smaller providers and, by the upturn in the private hospital market of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, to build new facilities (Higgins, 1988). Since that time, despite various reconfigurations in the private 
acute market, Nuffield has retained a leading position amongst the three top private hospital providers in the 
UK with over 50 hospital and clinical facilities (Laing & Buisson, 2005) (as shown in Table 6.4 later in the 
chapter). 
94 Until the creation of NHS, many hospitals (including the most prestigious London based clinics) relied 
heavily on charitable donations, as wealthy patients were could not provide a sufficient source of income to 
sustain annual costs. Patients without the financial means often had to rely on the altruism of doctors 
(Higgins, 1988; Rivett, 1998).  
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growth between the 1950s and early 1970s (Laing & Buisson, 2002, p.169), as depicted in Figure 
6.1 below.  
While the universal coverage provided through the 1946 NHS Act would now deliver a basis 
for access to healthcare to a substantial portion of the population (both working class and middle 
class) that previously could not support or struggled with the financial burden of seeking basic and 
acute medical services, ‘nationalization’ itself was not sufficient to eliminate demand for private 
healthcare. As many hospital consultants retained the right to practice privately, this was matched 
by a continued demand - at least by those who could and would pay for private consultation and 
treatment – thereby keeping alive a two-tier system in some areas of healthcare, even while the 
private aspect of the healthcare mix equation was now considerably diminished (Mencher, 1967). 
Moreover, though founded as a comprehensive service, the NHS maintained gaps of coverage in 
certain areas of care. Most notable were long-term care for the elderly and disabled and, to some 
degree, for mental health services (Rivett, 1998). Primarily the provision of pregnancy termination 
services - and later fertilization treatment once more commonly available - were areas that notably 
continued to be offered to a large extent outside of NHS provision (Laing, 1991). Furthermore, 
disengagement of the need to pay for treatment from access to services could not be maintained 
comprehensively in the long run in all areas. Soon enough, limited prescription costs began to be 
levied, including on spectacles, certain dental treatments and on medicines.  
Crucially, the lack of an extensive capital investment programme (at least until the 1960s 
with the Hospital Plan) to help fill the geographical and infrastructural gaps of a network of 
hospitals that was essentially a holdover from the pre-WWII period (Mohan, 1970 & 2002b), meant 
that supply of clinical services in all specialties was insufficient in the long run.  At the same time, 
increasing utilisation by patients previously effectively disenfranchised from regular access to 
healthcare services meant that growing demand was soon pushing supply of resources - both 
infrastructural and financial - to the point where, lengthy waiting lists were an increasingly common 
feature by the late 1970s.  In the event, an ambitious programme for construction of new public 
hospitals and refurbishment and expansion of existing facilities in 1962, neither succeeded in 
creating the necessary geographic redistribution of resources to meet all access inequalities, nor 
arrived in time to stem the expansion of an embryonic post-WWII private hospital sector (Mohan, 
2002). 
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6.1.2. The private sector as a substantive component of the healthcare mix 
Private hospital provision experienced an unprecedented (and yet to be superseded) 
spectacular period of growth between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. It was based around a 
combination of mutually impacting - though not necessarily causally related - developments. A 
rapidly growing overseas patient market, based initially on an influx of Arab patients as a result of 
new oil wealth at the time, was accompanied by a massive, though short-lived, increase in private 
medical services targeted at overseas patients. This spike in demand was centred on London-based 
private hospitals such as the Harley Street clinic specialising in cardiac surgery (Rayner, 1984; 
Laing, 1992, p.13).95 The NHS-based private sector also benefited considerably from this boom in 
overseas patients. However, concerned about the implications of a public institution (the NHS) 
being complicit in two-tier healthcare provision, but more importantly, with the problem of hospital 
consultants (even if a minority) exploiting NHS resources to support their part-time private practice 
(within or without the NHS), the 1974-79 Labour government sought to abolish this intra-NHS 
private provision (Rivett, 1998).  
While never fully implemented and eventually reversed under the Conservative government 
almost immediately after election in 1979,96 the ban created an environment in which the non-NHS 
(‘independent’)97 private sector anticipated opportunities to develop its market share in the absence 
of its main private sector rival, NHS pay-beds, which still accounted for over 40% of private acute 
market share by income until the late 1970s (Table 6.2). The pay-bed abolition policy inadvertently 
created the stimulus for subsequent expansion of private acute medical services; though some 
analysts impute a broader stimulus to demand for private sector healthcare relating to already 
increasing NHS waiting lists (Laing, 1992 & 2002). Between 1979 and 1981, in a period of 
decreasing public confidence in the NHS and with the newly elected Conservative government in 
                                                   
95 By 1983 the sudden increase in overseas patients from the Middle East had already dissipated, dropping to 
a mere 398 from 1,699 three years previously (Rayner, 1984). 
96 Only around a quarter of NHS pay beds had been phased out by this time (Laing; 1992; Mohan, 1986) 
97 ‘Independent’ as a descriptor of the private healthcare sector can be used only rather circumspectly, 
considering the degree to which: first, the majority of surgical staff are employed by both public and private 
sector providers (even after liberalisation of working time regulations in 1981, allowing for a greater number 
of hours worked in the private sector);  second, the focus of the majority of private acute providers on elective 
surgery procedures that the private sector has historically relied on as an ‘alleviation’ of the public sector case 
load;  third, and related to the second point, the continued reliance of private providers on outsourcing of the 
NHS case load to the private sector;  fourth, private medical staff receive the majority of their training in the 
public sector institutions, thereby limiting if not eliminating a substantial overhead cost.   
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power, which signalled a more pro-private-sector stance from public policy, private medical 
insurance saw a massive growth in subscription rates (Laurance, 1983; Rayner, 1986).  
Much of the growth in demand stemmed from employer group subscriptions offered as 
fringe-benefits, which accounted for the largest growth area in private medical insurance during the 
1980s. However, this was not immediately a sign of weakening of the NHS in favour of the private 
sector. Indeed, the initial boom quickly gave way to a drop in subscription rates both in their rate of 
growth and in real terms: many policies were not renewed and corporate subscribers became 
gradually more wary of spending on such fringe benefits for their employees as long as the public 
sector remained a universally accessible service. Nonetheless, by 1985 already 8.9% of the 
population was covered by PMI compared with 4.1% in 1975 (Laing & Buisson, 2008, p.166) 
(Table 6.3),98 making it the largest percentage growth in total PMI coverage for the UK since the 
mid-1950s when the UK PMI market was first attempting to transform itself as a substantive 
element in the mixed economy of UK healthcare.  
Even though the 1979-1981 PMI ‘boom’ was short-lived (see Fig 6.1 above), it still signalled 
the growing mainstream significance of the private sector in healthcare for, belying the temporary 
spike in PMI subscriptions was a substantial expansion in private sector acute capacity. Indeed, 
possibly the most important consequence of the governmental pay-beds policy had been a rapid 
expansion in private hospital construction, with nearly half the new buildings centred in the London 
region. By the early 1990s there were nearly double the number of private hospitals and bed 
numbers in the London area compared with the late 1970s and early 1980s. Laing (1992) quotes 25 
private hospitals comprising a total of 1,605 beds between them in the London region in 1977, 
growing to 42 hospitals and 3,054 beds in 1991, with 154 hospitals (7,035 beds) in 1980 compared 
with 216 hospitals (10,911) for the UK as a whole (Laing, 1992, p.13).  
By the time the Thatcher government sought to reinstate NHS pay beds and reduce 
restrictions on consultant’s private practice with a new contract in 1979 (Griffith et al, 1987), the 
expansion of the non-NHS private sector was already well under way. In 1979 a Royal Commission 
                                                   
98 But even then as is also the case currently, consumption of private sector healthcare was not to the 
exclusion of consumption of NHS services, these being free to all and, moreover, covering the bulk of acute 
and primary care services not available in the private sector. 
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on the National Health Service had determined the private sector contribution to acute care as not 
more than marginal nationally.99 The authors stated that although  
‘[i]nformation to enable us to reach precise conclusions about the relationship between 
the NHS and private practice was lacking, […] it was clear to us that the private sector 
was too small to make a significant impact on the NHS, except locally and 
temporarily’ (Parliament, 1979, § 22.64). 
Acknowledging ‘that the private sector probably responded much more directly to patients’ 
demands for services than the NHS, and provided a useful pointer to areas where the NHS was 
defective’ (ibid) the crucial point was the gaps in service provision offered by the NHS: 
‘One such was clearly the provision of abortion services: half the abortions performed 
on residents of the UK were undertaken privately. Another was the provision of 
nursing homes for the elderly; and patients waiting for cold surgery in the NHS might 
opt to pay rather than suffer discomfort and inconvenience for months or even years. 
Other important reasons for choosing the private sector were the convenience of being 
able to time your entry into hospital to suit yourself, being assured of reasonable 
privacy and choosing your own doctor’. (ibid) 
Rather than concluding with a justification for expanding the private sector, this was taken as a 
pointer to the more pressing need for the NHS to ‘make more effort to meet reasonable 
requirements of this kind’ (ibid). 
Even so, studies conducted during the 1980s and early 1990s, showed how private provision 
was growing in more than just the areas that had structurally been neglected with the creation of the 
NHS. Sure enough, the largest segment of post-1948 private sector provision lay in long-term care. 
Besides this, however, private clinics in England and Wales were responsible for 22.4% of 
pregnancy terminations in 1981, far exceeding private sector case load in any other category. The 
next largest share was located in orthopaedic services (5.8%) and various skin and subcutaneous 
related treatments (5.4%) (Williams et al, 1984, p.447). Other specialties demonstrated a 
considerably lower share of non-NHS treatment of less than 4% of cases. Nonetheless, non-NHS 
private sector acute case load was already estimated at around 7-8% of overall acute care services 
for England and Wales (Williams et al, 1984, p.448), while total privately funded admissions 
(including NHS pay beds and non-NHS facilities) amounted to 13% of total elective operations and 
procedures (excluding abortions) in 1981 (Laing & Buisson, 2005, p.135).  
                                                   
99 Though private healthcare was not the main focus of the Royal Commission’s report, it did offer an 
assessment of its likely impact on the NHS, still a contentious issue at a time when the 1979 Conservative 
government was intent on reversing the abolition of private practice within the NHS.  
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It is hard to tell precisely the scale of increase in non-NHS private acute case load compared 
with the pre-1974 period due to lack of available reliable data. However, it is clear that the NHS 
privately financed share of elective surgery had been substantially supplanted by the non-NHS 
private sector, declining further to 12.3% of market share by 1986 (having decreased from 25.3% in 
1981) (Table 6.2). The substantive growth in the private sector provision, as well as the notable 
shift towards the non-NHS private sector demonstrated at least that while still marginal in terms of 
overall service provision, the private sector could no longer simply be an easily neglected 
component in an assessment of the UK’s healthcare service capacity (Williams et al, 1984; Rayner, 
1987; Laing, 1992).  
6.2. Structural change in the private hospital and health insurance markets in 
the 1990s 
Though underlying demand for private healthcare did not fundamentally decline during the 
1990s, the decade proved to be one of substantive change in both the structure of the private market 
and furthermore, in the way the sector related to the public sector as both competitor and 
collaborator.  In a number of respects this was a period of intense competition, with changes driven 
largely by cost pressures that had a mutual impact between hospital providers and PMI carriers. 
This situation stemmed in part from changes in developments in the healthcare market overall with 
overcapacity of bed numbers, following prior expansion, leading to some contraction in the scale of 
private bed capacity, but also a small reduction in numbers of hospitals. 
6.2.1. Key developments in the 1990s 
Overcapacity was a long standing problem for the private acute sector. Having expanded 
rapidly in the early 1980s, occupancy rates increased but, with a shift towards day surgery, bed 
capacity was already being used differently to what it was before. While total private acute care 
activity continued to increase until the late 1990s, the number of beds registered with the 
Department of Health in hospitals and clinics was falling. Average bed occupancy decreased 
somewhat from 54% in 1990 to around 50% in 1997 (Department of Health, 1998). Some changes 
in the pattern of supply were also evident, which have contributed in the long-term strategic focus 
of much of the private acute sector towards elective surgery and ultimately, set the basis for the later 
attention given to contracting with the public sector in the 2000s. One of the most important 
outcomes was that the independent acute hospital sector underwent a further period of consolidation 
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as large hospital groups expanded their portfolio of hospitals and market share, primarily through 
acquisition in the late 1990s.  
Changing patterns of supply 
Possibly the most important trend in terms of the type of work that private sector providers 
undertake is found in a concerted shift towards day surgery. Research during the 1990s 
demonstrated a clear decline in numbers of inpatients compared with a rise in numbers of patients 
treated with minimally invasive procedures. Between 1992 and 1998 there was a substantive 
increase in day case surgical patient numbers, estimated at around 68% upwards change, compared 
with a 5.2% decline in inpatient numbers (Laing & Buisson, 2005).  Parallel to the shift towards day 
surgery has been an increasing specialization based around high-technology. Procedures, including 
more complex neurosurgery, health surgery and other highly invasive procedures requiring use of 
intensive care beds became a key part of niche market building.  
One analysis reported that in the early 2000s, a relatively small number of private hospitals 
have intensive care beds, estimating fewer than 100 beds across the UK at the time (Keen, Light 
and Mays, 2001, p.44).  Despite the provision of such high tech and invasive procedures, limited 
resources were available for recovery in the case of post-operative complications, being staffed and 
equipped only for immediate recovery from surgery. Their explanation for this has been that costs 
reasons fundamentally underlay the lack of provision of long-term post-operative care, given the 
relatively high costs of long-term intensive care. NHS intensive care units were at times passed on 
cases where post-operative complications arose. 
Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration has not been commonly practiced by PMI and Hospital providers. A key 
exception has been BUPA which, having begun as a federation of various small private 
health/medical insurers, entered the hospital market through acquisitions in the late 1960s. At the 
time, the private acute market was so small that this type of vertical integration was more an 
outcome of the private sector trying to maintain its space in an otherwise adverse market 
environment where the NHS clearly dominated acute and most other medical services. With such a 
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strong position in the private acute and PMI market, BUPA maintained this combined structure for 
most of the succeeding years.100  
As BUPA developed its hospital division in the 1980s, in the relatively buoyant private 
market of the decade, vertical integration seemed to be a more important strategy for securing 
market share. However, BUPA also maintained that its provider and insurance branches of business 
were not integrated operationally. Meanwhile a brief flirtation with vertical integration in the PMI-
Hospital market came with a joint venture in 1997 between the US-based HCA Columbia (having 
recently been created out of a joint venture in the US) and the UK’s PPP Healthcare. By 2000 PPP 
sold its four London hospitals to HCA, following acquisition by the French multinational insurer 
AXA. 
Hospital–Insurer Relations: Networks 
Consolidation was facilitated through the development of hospital networks by the two major 
PMI carriers, which in turn threatened the stability of demand in hospitals excluded from the 
networks. The mid- to late-1990s led to some key innovations in the relations between PMI and 
private acute providers, to some extent based on techniques borrowed from the US market, as  the 
development of network products by the major insurers marked a new approach to cost containment 
which led to a degree of restructuring of private health in the UK. Underlying this approach had 
been the realisation that low utilisation of hospital capacity rendered hospital provision 
unnecessarily expensive. If patient referrals can be channelled to the most efficient, high quality 
hospitals then their high fixed costs are spread over larger volumes of activity and resulting unit 
cost savings can be shared between the hospital and insurer (Laing & Buisson, 2005). By directing 
their subscribers to a limited network of preferred providers (efficient/high quality), insurers can 
close the circle linking efficiency to demand, which the previous market structure failed to do. 
 Thus insurers moved towards selecting hospitals to give preferred provider status to those 
hospitals they judged as having best quality-price trade-off (high quality service at competitive 
prices). Preferred provider status was also accompanied by a move towards prospective payment for 
services, whereby insurers would agree fixed prices for procedures with hospitals in the network. 
                                                   
100 In the late 1990s and mid-2000s BUPA, interestingly, began to divest itself of its hospital stock in order to 
focus more on its PMI business. By mid-2007 it had entirely exited the hospital market, though the following 
year re-entered with the acquisition of a single London-based hospital unit (the Cromwell Hospital), and more 
recent reports show that it has continued with acquisition of a further few hospital units. 
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Key to this was the utilization of pricing mechanisms based on diagnostic related groups (DRG) and 
other group based payments according to a schedule agreed by the PMI carrier. 
Monopolistic tendencies at the end of the 1990s 
Consequent to this move towards preferred provider networks, the larger hospital groups, 
with greater resources and capacity to monitor the quality of consultants work, tended to benefit 
primarily from this development.  This also had a detrimental effect on smaller hospitals, including 
commercial but especially charitable hospitals, whether free-standing or of a small number of units. 
The rise in preferred provider trend was also met with alternatives by different providers, seeking 
simultaneously to capture a growing self-pay market and to counter-act the growing influence of 
PMI companies. In some cases hospitals developed their own services based on guaranteed fixed 
prices for selected procedures, some of which they offered directly to patients rather than insurers. 
This particular strategy also saw a slight rise in self-paying patients. Nuffield Hospitals, for 
example, started to offer low interest and interest-free loans to patients, enabling private users to 
pay for hospital care by instalments rather than having to rely on PMI. 
For the largest insurers, in particular BUPA and AXA PPP, a network strategy gave them the 
opportunity of demanding larger discounts from their participating hospitals, keeping premium rates 
more competitive and offering added value to their customers in the form of enhanced quality 
assurance. BUPA’s first national network product, ‘Health Fund’, was launched in May 1996 
involving the first case in the UK of a ‘directional’ PMI product whereby individual subscribers 
were offered the option of receiving discounts (or additional benefits) in return for agreeing to use a 
restricted ‘network’ of 150 hospitals. The insurer’s approach to selecting network partners was to 
include in its list all the hospitals belonging to the major independent chains en bloc, and to fill in 
with others according to local requirements. Though it initially excluded NHS PPUs, BUPA soon 
moved to set up routine referral routes for tertiary treatment in private patient facilities in NHS 
centres of excellence. In 2004, ‘industry sources indicated that around 54% of BUPA’s company 
and individual subscribers had opted for network products, with the proportion on the rise as a 
higher proportion of subscribers are choosing network products’ (Laing & Buisson, 2005, p.72).  
In February 1997, PPP Healthcare (acquired by AXA in 1999) launched its own preferred 
provider network scheme, encouraging customers to opt into the network by offering a cash 
discount claimed to equate to a 15% cut on comparable premiums outside the network. Whereas 
BUPA included major chains en bloc, PPP opted to select hospitals locally, by locality, following a 
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tendering and quality assessment process. Moreover, NHS PPU’s were able to bid to be PPP 
network hospitals (Laing & Buisson, 2005, p.72), neutering somewhat BUPA’s prior attempt to 
exclude NHS PPU’s, being its closest competitor for market share (29% of subscriber income, to 
BUPA’s 37% in 1997; See Table 6.4).  
The danger with the preferred provider networks, noticeable increasingly since the early 
2000s, has been the tendency towards generating monopolies. The larger insurers recognised - and 
intended - that it would lead to closure of some hospitals (with smaller non-affiliated hospitals 
being the most vulnerable) and the emergence of more local monopoly situations by certain 
providers. Once local competitors have been eliminated, the bargaining power of network hospitals 
is increased. In such a situation, market analysts have suggested that ‘the continued existence of 
large numbers of relatively small scale NHS pay bed units, and now possibly Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTCs), can be essential to maintain a healthy degree of competition’ (Laing & 
Buisson, 2008, p.71) 
Relations with workforce 
Keen, Light and Mays (2001) reported an important trend in the 1990s of private hospitals 
focusing attention on quality assurance. The trend could be interpreted as an important measure to 
garner prospective and existing customer assurance in the face of several media-reported cases of 
adverse outcomes from private treatment, such as a case of the heart surgeons based in a Bristol unit 
of BUPA Hospitals found guilty of professional misconduct by the General Medical Council in 
1998. Indeed, the problem of quality was a concern of a Health Committee of the House of 
Commons examining a wide range of evidence given on bad experiences of using private hospitals 
(ibid, p.46) 
‘For aspects of services delivered by their employees, particularly nurses and their 
general management, they had implemented a number of processes, including the 
Health Quality Service’s organisational audit, and processes based on ISO 9002, an 
international set of quality standards’. (ibid, p.45)  
However, it was a key point that quality measures such as these were primarily focused on general 
organisational processes, rather than directly on clinical quality assurance. 
Safety and quality assurance had several applications and implications. One has been to gain 
greater control over the work of health professionals, including consultants and nursing staff. As 
consultants are not employed directly by hospital providers, but rather as independent contractors, 
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there is reason to find ways to extend control over the activities of private practitioners. For 
example  
‘BUPA, had been implementing rules that would ensure surgeons had to undertake 
reasonable numbers of a particular operation before they could operate in its hospitals’ 
(ibid, p.45).  
‘On the other hand, given the status of private practitioners, it has also been rather 
difficult for hospital firms to successfully implement clinical quality measures given 
that they negotiate with consultants on a range of issues including clinical quality, and 
pricing’ (ibid, p.46). 
Nevertheless, to date there has been no clear move to offer prospective patients information over 
practitioner outcomes, and there is no more transparency of this sort than in the public sector. 
6.3. Pro-competitive public policy for healthcare under New Labour and 
further structural change in the private sector 
While a component of the healthcare mix was firmly established by the late 1990s, the turn to 
the 21st century has seen further structural change for the private healthcare sector, whereby the 
state has provided a stimulus for renewed competitive re-organisation in the sector. By 2003, the 
large independent hospital groups began to restructure their business ‘in response to perceived 
competitive challenges’ (Laing & Buisson, 2008, p.78) arising from a struggle to acquire a part of 
the market share emerging from public sector contracts for the delivery of a variety of diagnostic 
and elective surgical services. The competitive struggle for new market share from public sector 
procurement was precipitated by a radical shift in New Labour’s policy position on healthcare: one 
that would come to embrace provider diversification, grafted uneasily onto (greater) competitive 
stimuli within the public NHS as part of a major programme for its ‘modernization’. 
The expansion of private sector procurement that has ensued is clearly visible in the growth 
of independent hospital and clinical (IHC) revenues, based on estimates summarised by Laing & 
Buisson between 1992 and 2007. NHS purchase of acute care services from the private sector as a 
whole has risen markedly in the past two decades, going from under an estimated 4.9% (£53 mil.) in 
1992 to 14.4% (£615 mil.) in 2007 of total IHC revenues (Table 6.5). Growth has been particularly 
notable after the commencement of a more concerted procurement programme by the NHS, 
growing by 3% annually between 2004 (7.7% of total IHC revenues) and 2005 (10.8% of IHC 
revenues), compared with nearer 1% annually (and more frequently nearer 0.5% annually) in 
previous years since the early 1990s (Table 6.5). The considerably expanded market in public sector 
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procurement thus appears potentially lucrative for IHC providers if it continues to expand, though 
arguably, even if it remains relatively stable.  
After giving some background on the development of New Labour’s ‘pro-competitive’ policy 
position for healthcare services, I focus on two aspects of the new regime for a mixed economy of 
care which have had a variable impact on private sector strategy for gaining and maintaining market 
share. The first is a shift towards contracting directly with IHC providers to supplement NHS 
hospital capacity, while the second is the development of the ISTC programme which has seen units 
specifically catered to NHS procurement set up or occupied by IHC providers. Data in both cases is 
rather limited, and hard to come by due to commercial confidentiality clauses and bureaucratic 
obfuscation (House of Commons Health Committee, 2006; Player & Leys, 2008), but what figures 
can be given, I have drawn from data collected by healthcare market analysts Laing & Buisson 
(2008) in a more recent edition of their Healthcare Market Review. 
 
6.3.1. Competition as a mechanism for healthcare service reform 
The pro-competitive stance for direct healthcare service provision of the New Labour 
government was not immediately apparent upon election in 1997, and indeed it took until the 
second half of its first term in government to even begin to develop this position more 
thoroughly.101 Upon election in 1997, the New Labour government was relatively cautious in its 
approach to the private sector, having been elected on a mandate, amongst other things, to abolish 
the predecessor government’s internal market policies (Department of Health, 1997). Under 
Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson, the Department of Health issued planning guidance 
that clinical purchase of services from the non-NHS private sector should only be undertaken as a 
last resort measure, subject to approval by the NHS Executive (Department of Health / NHS 
Executive, 1997).102 Furthermore, its abolition of GP fundholding from 1999 eliminated ‘a small but 
significant source of private hospital revenue’ derived from the NHS (Laing & Buisson, 2005). 
                                                   
101 I distinguish the procurement of direct service provision from the tendering process for hospital 
construction under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which began already with the first contract in 1999. 
This had been one of the first elements of commercial ‘inclusiveness’ in healthcare policy under New Labour, 
although as this related initially to construction (and later of facilities management) contracts this is a rather 
different area of pro-competitive policy from that which I discuss in this chapter. 
102 The NHS Executive guidance (EL(97)39) stated that ‘Health Authorities, GPs and NHS trusts should 
explore the scope to make maximum cost-effective use of local NHS capacity before contemplating recourse 
to private sector hospital provision’ (my italics; Department of Health / NHS Executive, 1997, §17).  
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Even PMI was subject to a cooler reception, with a repeal of tax relief to company benefits 
(including PMI subscription) for the over 60s and the closure of an Insurance Premium Tax 
loophole in the 1997 budget (HM Treasury, 1997),103 followed by the extension of employer’s 
national insurance contributions as part of a bundle of wider welfare reform measures in the 1999 
budget (Laing & Buisson, 2005). 
Modernization: structural change in the public healthcare system 
The government’s rapprochement with the IHC sector had its roots in 2000, when it 
announced an unprecedented level of expenditure on the NHS. The investment would be released 
over a four year period from 2000 until 2004, raising government spending by over 6% each year in 
real terms; to increase total healthcare spending to 7.6% of GDP by the end of this period (HM 
Treasury, 2000). The commitment to increase funds for the NHS was extended in 2002, after the 
Chancellor Gordon Brown announced the increase to last until 2007/08 amounting to an average 
annual real growth of 7.4% (HM Treasury, 2002). A crisis of rapidly expanding waiting lists 
primarily for elective surgery by the winter of 1999/2000, but also a sense of frustrated public 
opinion on the state of the NHS conveyed through the government’s focus groups and the media, 
had given a strong political impetus to make a substantive intervention in the public sector’s 
capacity to deliver services more effectively and efficiently (NHS Executive, 2000, pp.134-6). 
Though policy documents and political and press release statements of the government 
continued to re-affirm their commitment to a public NHS that would be comprehensive, universal 
and free at the point of use, acknowledgement of a place for utilizing private sector capacity was 
increasingly becoming a fixture of the new agenda for healthcare. The government continued to 
underscore its commitment to maintaining a tax-based system of financing, rejecting any move 
towards a social insurance system or even one in which private insurance would become a stronger 
component (NHS Executive, 2000, pp.34-39): 
‘[…] the way that the NHS is financed continues to make sense. It meets the tests of 
efficiency and equity. The principles on which the NHS was constructed in 1948 
remain fundamentally sound’. (NHS Executive, 2000, p.40) 
                                                   
103 The removal of PMI tax relief (an indirect subsidy) was made on the basis that it did not significantly 
improve PMI uptake and would save money for the Treasury, while the IPT loophole enabled insurers to 
avoid payment of this tax at the rate of 4% by writing PMI in a long term fund (Laing & Buisson, 2005). 
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This position was also reinforced by a key report on the long-term financial viability of the 
healthcare system headed by Derek Wanless (2002) for the Treasury, in which he emphasised that a 
public tax-based system continued to be the most efficient mode of financing healthcare for the UK:  
‘The UK system of financing appears to be relatively efficient and equitable. It delivers 
strong cost control and prioritisation and minimises economic distortions and 
disincentives. A further key advantage of the UK’s funding system is its fairness, 
providing maximum separation between an individual’s financial contributions and 
their use of health care.’ (Wanless, 2002, p.141)104 
Whilst rejecting both social insurance and a private insurance model for the UK, the Report 
acknowledged that ‘the main weakness of public financing of health care (whether through general 
taxation or social insurance) is that it provides limited scope for expression of individual 
preferences and choice’ (Wanless, 2002, p.142). Moreover, in its concluding recommendations, the 
Wanless Report managed to reinforce the notion that scope for greater future cooperation between 
the NHS and the private sector should be explored in the delivery of services, stating (once again in 
reticet language) that:  ‘This should be seen as just one of the many ways in which the health 
service – like any organisation – is constantly examining new ways of working to deliver its 
objectives more effectively’ (Wanless, 2002, p.105).105  
That notion of greater public-private cooperation, was already something that had been laid 
out in the government’s keystone document for healthcare reform, the NHS Plan (NHS Executive, 
2000), in which it had outlined its strategy for modernisation and re-structuring for the NHS to 
accompany the new spending programme. By no means a central component of the reform strategy, 
it nonetheless allowed for a greater, if still somewhat restricted space, for the private sector within 
its overarching strategy.  Limited to the delivery of services on contract to the NHS, it stated that 
new planning guidance would be formally defined by a national framework for partnership between 
the private sector and the NHS (NHS Executive, 2000, pp.97-8). This came in October 2000 with 
the publication of a ‘Concordat’ between the private sector  - represented by the Independent 
Healthcare Association (IHA) at the time - and the NHS, setting out the details for putting NHS 
                                                   
104 This observation was derived from the Interim Report by Wanless, published in 2001, and republished 
under the 2002 report under Annex C (Wanless, 2002, pp.137-163). 
105 Though crucially, the Report made clear that this method of delivery should ‘not be confused with the 
method of financing’ (Wanless, 2002, p.105). 
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commissioning of elective, critical and intermediate care in the independent sector into practice 
(Department of Health & Independent Hospital Association, 2000, §2.6-§2.12).106  
The new structure of inclusiveness would function on much wider-reaching reform to the 
structure of the NHS, and this was much more central to the reform agenda insofar as it has focused 
on provider diversification. While the ‘internal market’ of the 1990s was formally abolished, a 
‘purchaser-provider’ split was nonetheless ultimately retained as a central feature of the (post-NHS 
Plan) ‘New NHS’ in the first decade of the 2000s. Though there is a whole gamut of purchasing 
and provider organisations within the current NHS structure (Talbot-Smith et al, 2006), two of these 
have been central to the expansion of IHC market share. Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) were 
established in 2002 to replace Primary Care Groups (PCGs) and would function as local 
commissioning bodies - ‘active purchasers of care for their geographical populations’ - and by 
2004, PCTs were in control of some 75% of the total NHS budget for primary, community and 
hospital services (Stevens, 2004, p.41).107 One of their key roles has been to commission secondary 
care services from NHS Trusts, which encompass a wide array of providers including acute 
hospitals, specialist trusts (i.e. orthopaedic or learning disability services), mental health trusts and 
ambulance trusts. The bulk of services commissioned are with these various NHS Trusts. However, 
since the mid-2000s, PCTs have also begun to commission services from NHS Foundation Trusts 
(FTs), a new quasi-public form of Trust, as well as from IHC providers (both commercial and non-
profit). While in the former case commissioning is through non-legally binding contracts (‘service 
level agreements’) overseen by the Department of Health, in the latter case contracts are legally 
binding. (Talbot-Smith et al, 2006) 
Essentially providers in the new ‘quasi-market’ equation, FTs (established in 2003) have 
become another key component of the new, pro-competitive, NHS. These are non-profit public 
                                                   
106 With regard to elective care, this could involve NHS Trusts renting clinical facilities or accommodation 
but with services delivered by NHS staff from the IHC providers, or NHS Trusts and Primary Care Groups or 
Trusts subcontracting directly (purchasing) services from IHC providers. For critical care, the Concordat, 
encouraged the NHS and IHC providers to be able to support each other (i.e. transfer patients between them) 
whenever clinically appropriate, though with cost arrangements needing to be agreed between collaborating 
parties. Intermediate care arrangements would be aimed at reducing NHS hospital occupancy by diverting 
preventive and rehabilitative services to the private and voluntary sector. 
107 PCTs were first introduced in 1997 in the New NHS White Paper (DoH, 1997). Their role is ‘to improve 
the health of the community, to secure high quality primary, secondary and community care services, and to 
integrate local health and social care services’. As such, they are the principle commissioning bodies within 
the NHS, overseeing commissioning undertaken by GP practices of all healthcare and community services for 
their local populations (Talbot-Smith et al, 2005, p.37). 
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companies (‘public benefit corporations’), controlled by local boards and accountable to a new 
independent regulator (Monitor) rather than the Department of Health. They are also free of the 
‘performance management’ that other NHS Trusts are subject to from local Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs), whilst also being free to borrow from the private sector for the purposes of 
supplementing capital investment from SHAs. This bounded independence has been in aid of 
promoting a more business-like functioning of Foundation Trusts compared with other NHS Trusts, 
including responsibility to manage their own budgetary requirements but also to face higher levels 
of business risk. For example: ‘an FT’s ability to service debt determines its ability to achieve a 
credit rating, the possession of which enables it to borrow on commercial terms’ (Talbot-Smith et 
al, 2005, p.65). For the long-term, the significance of FTs is the aspiration of the government to 
convert all NHS Trusts to FTs. 
Patient ‘Choice’ as the driver of provider diversification 
Though the NHS Plan/Concordat era made the initial steps towards including the private 
sector in planning for healthcare provision, a more substantive shift has taken place more recently 
which marks a potentially more profound basis for developing public-private partnerships in direct 
healthcare service provision. A central feature of Labour’s NHS strategy, following its second 
electoral victory in 2002, was to focus on cutting waiting lists and to create choice for patients in 
location and timing of treatment, leaning more towards the choice available for many years in the 
private sector. Since the early-2000s, as waiting lists began to reduce, the principal focus has 
increasingly been placed on the development of choice as a feature of using the NHS. Though 
certain pilot projects had been taking place since 2001, the current agenda for choice has been 
implemented since 2006, when NHS patients were given the right to choose from at least four 
hospitals selected by PCTs and would have to include an IHC provider in the list (Talbot Smith et 
al, 2006, p.40).  
By May 2006, the choice included any ISTC or Foundation Trust alongside NHS hospitals. 
GPs still act as gatekeepers to the choice process and, within the framework of PCTs, in principle, 
are expected to give patients full information about provider choice. By August 2006, after a small 
selection of IHC providers had already been added to the NHS patient choice list under local deals 
with PCTs, a formal contract arrangement known as the Extended Choice Network (ECN) was 
implemented which sought to formalise and extend the agenda for including ‘independent’ 
providers. With the implementation of the ECN, fourteen independent providers were added to the 
patient choice list (Laing & Buisson, 2007). 
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6.3.2. A new role for private sector providers 
Though the Concordat made a clear statement about the government’s wish to make use of 
private sector capacity, and while it signified a concerted break from its prior stance in the first 
couple of years after election,108 neither the NHS Plan nor the Concordat offered a strong 
commitment to private providers in the long-term. Rather, the NHS Plan/Concordat period, insofar 
as public policy statements revealed, still retained a sense of ‘partnership’ as being a quick fix to an 
otherwise short-term public sector problem, rather than actualising a blueprint for a more integrated 
mixed economy of healthcare. Moreover, as long waiting lists began to reduce, the apparent need 
for extra capacity from IHC providers seemed to diminish, and left open the question of whether 
this would be a sustainable relationship between the NHS and the private sector (at least with regard 
to elective care). 
The NHS Plan had proposed the opening of eight Diagnostic and Treatment Centres (DTCs) 
by 2005 which would kick-start the new ‘partnership’ programme. These were aimed more at 
routine diagnostic and surgery procedures to day-case and short-stay patients, already the mainstay 
of the private acute sector. The centres would divert patients away from NHS hospitals allowing 
them to concentrate on emergency and more complex elective cases, through free-standing units 
(organizationally and, in cases, physically) though still located within NHS hospital premises (‘co-
located’). 
Contracts with Independent Hospitals (G -Supp Etc) 
Initially parallel and separate to the DTC programme, was a system for providing NHS 
elective care by outsourcing to private sector providers, called General Supplementary Contracts 
(‘G-Supp’). Although it proved rather limited in scale compared to the extent of procurement that 
followed under the ISTC programme, several of the top UK independent private hospital providers 
benefited from these contracts. Initially these were contracts to provide supplementary ear, nose and 
throat (ENT), general surgery, and urology - areas that were experiencing long waiting times - 
while orthopaedic procedures were also added to the programme later. 
                                                   
108 In 1997, under-Secretary of  State for Health, Frank Dobson, the Department of Health issued planning 
guidance (EL(97)39) that clinical purchase of services from the non-NHS private sector should only be 
undertaken as a last resort measure, subject to approval by the NHS Executive: ‘Health Authorities, GPs and 
NHS trusts should explore the scope to make maximum cost-effective use of local NHS capacity before 
contemplating recourse to private sector hospital provision’ (my italics; Department of Health / NHS 
Executive, 1997). 
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Nuffield and Capio were amongst the chief beneficiaries of this programme, with Nuffield 
delivering the majority of its NHS contract work under the G-Supp programme between 2004 and 
2005. In May 2004, it secured a £40 million G-supp contract to deliver 17,000 procedures worth 
around £15-20 million. BUPA Hospitals secured several NHS contracts including a G-supp in 2005 
worth around £15 million, while General Health Group secured a major G-Supp general surgery 
contract carrying out 5000 procedures for the NHS in around half of its subsidiary’s (BMI) hospitals 
for total revenues of £22 million, along with a number of other smaller NHS contracts (Laing & 
Buisson, 2007, pp. 79-82). 
The G-Supp procurement period was quite fortuitous for IHC providers as, for example, 
Nuffield’s NHS patient volumes increased dramatically from around 7% in 2004, to 20% in 2005 
(around 32,000 procedures). By 2006, however, revenues from G-Supp for IHC providers fell back 
as both Nuffield’s and BUPA’s G-supp contracts were discontinued (Laing & Buisson, 2008). Local 
NHS commissioning began to be held back by fiscal tightening and this had a direct impact on the 
future development of G-Supp contracts. 
Independent Sector Diagnostic and Treatment Centres 
Perhaps due to its relative novelty as a service provision strategy in the NHS, the most visible 
outcome in terms of NHS procurement of ‘independent’ sector acute services following the 2001 
Concordat has been the contracting of a variety of diagnostic and common elective surgery 
procedures to private sector providers in so-called DTCs and ISTCs. The first wave of Diagnostic 
and Treatment Centres (DTCs), later re-named as Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs), 
were announced in 2003, while a second wave was soon scheduled to begin in 2005/2006. The 
awarding of contracts has developed incrementally over time so that the independent diagnostic and 
treatment centres that, as a generic and cumulative category are currently operational, have grown 
out of an assortment of different contracting phases and provide different types of healthcare 
services between them. I discuss them here as a group because I want to focus on a particular aspect 
that has been important for the private sector which has stemmed from the procurement process.109  
A common feature of procurement of ISTC services is that they work on pre-arranged bulk 
contracts. These contracts are nominally set at or below the same national tariff on which NHS 
                                                   
109 Though this is an ongoing process and new contracts have continued to be awarded and set in motion, the 
data I present ends at the end of 2007 for the sake of a cut-off point for my research. 
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hospitals charge commissioning PCTs.  A key feature of the contracting is that treatments are paid 
for in advance, regardless of the rate of actual bed occupancy and throughput of patients, or of the 
success rate in treatment outcomes. This is something that has attracted criticism for being wasteful 
of public resources but which private suppliers have defended on the basis that with unpredictable 
annual case loads, this would otherwise be a risky venture (Laing & Buisson, 2008).  
The main type of procedures offered by such centres include: general surgery (34% of 
procedures contracted for in Wave 1); orthopaedic and spinal surgery consisting largely of artificial 
hip joint replacement (33% of Wave 1 contracted procedures); and ophthalmology treatments such 
as cataracts operations (14% of Wave 1 contracted procedures).110 Other key services covered 
include urology, ENT, gynaecology and cardiothoracic procedures. The majority of both Wave 1 
and Wave 2 contracts have been with PCTs in South Eastern parts of England (nearly 39% of all 
operational contracts),111 although a handful of contracts have also been made in Northern 
metropolitan centres, the North West, East Midlands, South West, as well as one in Scotland (Laing 
& Buisson, 2008).  
The cumulative value of ISTC contracts operational between 2003 and the end of 2007 
ranges from an estimated £1,873 million to £1,923 million and is likely to account increasingly for 
the value of NHS procurement from IHC providers.112 I should make clear that these are only 
reported estimates of contract values and not a confirmation of actual transactions. However, it still 
presents the possibility that total value across IHC provision to the NHS is increasingly accounted 
for by ISTC contracts, given that total estimated value of NHS procurement from IHC providers 
between 2003 and 2007 amounts to around £1.9 billion. 
While continually emphasising that this was not going to be a marketisation of the NHS, 
public policy on the NHS has clearly retained a strong undercurrent of the competitive ‘tensions’ 
expected of market structures (Stevens, 2004). The post-NHS Plan structure of the NHS has still 
ultimately remained a ‘quasi market’ in nature even if not in name (King’s Fund, 2005, p.11). But 
                                                   
110 Figures calculated based on data from a Freedom of Information Request made to the Department of 
Health by Stuart Player and Colin Leys, and reproduced in Player & Leys (2008, p.9) 
111 South Eastern operational contracts have amounted to 12 in number by the end of 2007 (including the 
BUPA Redhill DTC contract which ended in 2007). Percentage is my own calculation based on data showing 
operational ISTCs in Laing & Buisson (2008).  
112 Reporting on individual cumulative values per IHC provider is not possible, since provider ownership 
structures have changed during the time frame reported, while some of the values reported extend beyond the 
end of 2007, so that it may portray an inaccurate picture per company. However, individual contract values 
have ranged from as low as £5 million to as high as £140-145 million (Laing & Buisson, 2008). 
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differentiating it from the Conservative laissez faire era towards the private sector, New Labour’s 
programme for provider diversification under a regime of NHS commissioning has been assisted by 
a number of regulatory levers. 
6.4. The ‘new’ mixed economy of care  
The new mixed-economy of care that has been steadily engineered through incremental steps 
of public policy, has provided a critical impetus for changes in the structure of the private IHC 
sector. On the one hand, it has created a stimulus for further intense intra-private sector competition, 
with larger players ultimately being the main beneficiaries of the new public sector commissioning 
regime, though with some newer market entrants managing to retain an important stake in the 
market so far. On the other hand, this competition has also created greater space for overseas market 
entrants to gain an even greater foothold in the UK market. Finally, the potential for destabilizing of 
the NHS as a consequence of government mandated competition between public and private sector 
providers sits uneasily on the boundaries of a controlled experiment with market-based instruments 
for health services reform and divesting an increasingly larger component of public service 
provision to private multinational commercial operators. 
The key outcome of the development of the NHS procurement programme for elective 
hospital care services has been for IHC providers to restructure their business towards meeting NHS 
commissioning requirements. This has not been a linear or straightforward process, but one that has 
seen several stages of change as the procurement process developed through G-Supp, to the 
currently predominant ISTC/DTC model of NHS procurement of private sector elective care 
services. 
Market share amongst the main private hospital providers has seen some important changes 
during the 2000s. Significant concentration in the IHC sector has occurred as key players have 
consolidated market share through acquisitions and mergers of smaller providers, while by the end 
of 2007, a number of larger providers had been acquired by recent overseas market entrants. One 
indicator of this changing market profile has been the shift in ownership of bed capacity, as between 
2000 and 2008 the top ten IHC providers (including hospitals with overnight beds, units with day 
surgery only, and ISTCs) increased their cumulative market share from 79.5% to 85.9% of private 
overnight bed capacity. Some of this has been accounted for by consolidation towards the top three 
providers as in 2000, the top three providers (GHG, Bupa Hospitals, and Nuffield Hospitals), held 
56.2% of total IHC market share by bed numbers, while by mid-2008, the top three providers 
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(Netcare, Nuffield Health, and Spire Healthcare) held 60.8% of total IHC overnight bed capacity 
between them (Table 6.6).  
This concentration of market share in bed numbers has been accompanied by net-reductions 
in IHC provider bed numbers, a trend that followed through from the mid- to late-1990s as a 
consequence of changing market conditions during this period (discussed in section 5 of the 
chapter). The largest decline was registered in 1999-2000 with total IHC bed numbers declining 
from 10,565 to 9,980 (a decline of 585 beds in total) between these years, and accompanied several 
hospital closures between 1995/1996 through to 2002/2003. Indeed, while units with overnight beds 
appear to have continued to decline somewhat in number, a distinct growth in day surgery-based 
facilities is a trend that would be consistent with the ISTC/DTC roster of services.113 As such, the 
net-decline in bed numbers and IHC facilities, seen periodically since the early 1990s, was halted 
temporarily following the start of the NHS provider diversification programme and commissioning 
of Wave 2 ISTCs, as the year 2004/2005 saw a net increase of 321 beds (from 9,256 in 2004 to 
9,578 in 2005), contrasting with the previous year’s (2004) net decline in the IHC bed numbers by 
216 beds (down from 9,473 in 2003) (See Table 6.6). 
In contrast to bed numbers, the top ten providers (including hospitals with overnight beds, 
units with day surgery only, and ISTCs) held 86.3% of total IHC market share by revenues in 2000, 
falling slightly to 82% of total IHC provider revenues by mid-2007. Of these, the top three in 2000 
(GHG, Bupa Hospitals, and Nuffield Hospitals) shared 59.1% of the market by revenues, while by 
2007, the top three held 50.8% of market share by revenues between them (See Table 6.7). Several 
new IHC companies entered the UK market in the early to mid-2000s in response to signs of a 
growing NHS commissioning market. Overseas entrants included the US consortium Nations 
Healthcare, US group New Park Presbytarian Healthcare System, Canadian InterHealth Canada, 
and South African groups, Netcare and Life Healthcare. If we consider that Bupa Hospitals (though 
UK-owned and legally a not-for-profit company) has international interests, if it is included 
amongst the internationalised providers group, its revenue share of the IHC market would raise the 
total market share (by revenues) of multinationals to 60.3% in 2007 (Table 6.7). 
                                                   
113 Although a shift towards day surgery was already evident during the 1990s, data differentiating overnight 
stay facilities and day surgery has only been available since 2004 – as reported in Laing & Buisson (2006-
2008) - making direct comparison over the long term rather limited, with the exception of a small number of 
studies conducted during the 1980s and 1990s on private acute sector case mix (Williams & Nicholl, 1994).  
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Meanwhile, of the 33 DTC and ISTC contracts operational by late 2007, more than half 
(52.4%) have been taken by foreign-owned companies (Table 6.8). This includes certain units that 
were originally held by UK-based firms but subsequently acquired by foreign-owned firms. While 
this is the most recent market structure, it does not accurately reflect the change over the previous 
five years when ISTC units were first begun, since there have also been acquisitions of formerly 
foreign-owned units by UK-based firms. Even so, a significant proportion of foreign-owned 
companies were successful in gaining contracts in the first phase of the contracting process.  
The largest groups initially adopted different strategies to compete for NHS business, but the 
common ground was that lower costs could only be achieved by maximizing throughput per 
operating session and reducing consultant’s costs (Laing & Buisson 2008, p.78). The restructuring 
delivered some results for those groups with a stronger position in the market. The NHS as a 
commissioner, applies pressure on providers to achieve value for money and high quality standards 
(Laing & Buisson, 2008, p.79). In terms of an overall impact on the private non-NHS sector the 
development of NHS commissioning has been important in several ways. Of these, one of the most 
important has been that demand for additional capacity has significantly expanded the non-NHS 
medical/surgical market, an expansion that has almost exclusively come from new entrants to the 
market since the early 2000s. Though these have been both UK-based and foreign-owned 
companies, the majority have been commercial firms.  Their entrance into this market segment has 
changed the structure of non-NHS private provision by creating competition over market share in 
NHS procurement. In turn seeking such contracts has meant a shift towards lower cost models of 
healthcare delivery as determined by NHS procurement requirements. 
A key point is that despite the rapid expansion in the market for private acute care services 
resulting from NHS commissioning, at least in the view expressed by market analysts and 
companies themselves, this remains a market with some significant uncertainty. Both the scale of 
future growth and the nature of future contracts are relatively unpredictable in view of the slow 
progression of the capacity to implement patient choice through the NHS (Laing & Buisson, 2008, 
p.79). Even so, the contracting that has developed over the past few years between NHS and 
‘independent’ sector providers has, in the analysis of Laing and Buisson, ‘formed foundation stones 
for future contracting in many areas should the appetite exist’ (Laing & Buisson, 2008, p.109). In 
their critical study of ISTCs, Player and Leys conclude that exactly such an appetite exists, stating 
that ‘…the next phase will be much more diverse. The ‘reconfiguration’ of secondary care […] will 
see much greater variety in purchasing from private providers, private provision being locally 
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procured but under central direction…’ (Player & Leys, 2008, p.111). Indeed, upon a thoroughly 
researched investigation of the ISTC programme, they stipulate how this has been a ‘crucial first 
step in a fairly well thought-out plan to create a private provider industry in the UK to compete with 
the NHS using NHS funds, and eventually to subject all health care to market principles’ (p.65) 
6.5. From accommodation to a new ‘pro-competitive’ mixed economy of 
healthcare 
Between the late 1970s and the mid- to late-2000s there has been a considerable shift in the 
position of the private healthcare services sector in the UK. While the private sector still occupies a 
relatively marginal position in the country’s overall healthcare spending levels, the balance has 
demonstrably shifted towards a growing market share for the private sector, as indicated by the 
consumption patterns for PMI and the now growing market in public sector procurement of private 
services. While from the stand point of public policy this growth has not been an a priori objective 
in terms of healthcare services reform - at least until more recent years - the state has also been 
complicit to some degree in a process of commercialisation that has, for the majority of the period 
from the late 1970s to the mid-2000s, predominantly impacted on the private sector.  
6.5.1. Public policy shift 
In the late 1970s, the post-war mixed economy of healthcare saw a rather dramatic change in 
the scale of private sector healthcare services, particularly in the acute care sector and the closely 
linked PMI market.  There was a period of rapid growth, instigated in part, by a combination of 
weaknesses in the public sector and an unintended development of public policy in the then Labour 
government’s attempt to disengage private practice from the NHS. While this may be regarded in a 
sense, as a policy failure for those public policy actors (under Barbara Castle) seeking to address 
what they saw as a fundamental contradiction in an otherwise socialistic project that was the NHS, 
in the long-term this juncture did not break massively with what would best be described as an 
accommodatory position towards the private sector. Even on the eve of the sea-change in UK 
politics that saw the rise of a neoliberal regime under the Thatcherite Conservative governments of 
the next decade, the House of Commons did not perceive much of a challenge from the private 
sector. The foundational compromise underlying the creation of the NHS required a continued 
position for the private sector.  
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With the entrance of the Conservative party to government in the 1990s, the NHS came under 
concerted pressure, even if taken in gradual steps, to develop a much more market-like structure. 
Yet, the momentum gained by the Conservative governments during their nearly two decades in 
power for market-oriented reform of the public sector, did not translate into a concerted and overt 
‘pro-competitive’ plan for the private sector. Rather, this was more laissez faire in nature, after part-
dismantling and part-reconfiguring the public sector. This was essentially a continuation of the 
accommodatory compromise that maintained a mixed economy of care, but with a desire to see the 
public sector NHS emulate private sector practices and restructure as a market-based system of 
healthcare.  
The current regime is at a completely different place from the 1970s-1980s juncture, and 
equally different from the 1990s period of ‘laissez-faireism’. Under New Labour, there has been for 
the first time, a more integrative approach in its pro-competitive policy for healthcare reform so 
that, despite political controversy and under an often obfuscating public policy arena, IHC providers 
have been given a ‘leg up’, so to speak, in a way that has been historically unprecedented. While the 
future development of public policy towards the private sector is hard to predict, given the 
uncertainties of contracting in a system (the NHS) that still in principle is focused on addressing 
population needs rather than individual consumer wants (as is the case for the private sector), it is 
difficult to envision a return to the more passive approach of earlier years. What has been common 
across all three junctures in public policy is, however, that the interaction between the public sector 
and the private sector with regard to the terms of service provision has been an important driving 
factor in shaping the changing dynamic of commercial expansion in the private sector over the past 
three decades. 
6.5.2. The dynamics of commercial transformation 
Commercial expansion has been one of the primary characteristics of the private sector 
market, particularly as overseas market-entrants increasingly sought a major stake in the UK’s 
complementary IHC market. Anticipation of liberalization of the public sector from the late-1970s 
and into the 1980s made the UK a key target market for US corporations. Already they have a 
decade or more of experience in gaining market share through aggressive acquisition and market 
positioning, backed by a home-market capital investment infrastructure that would put them in a 
strong position to compete with the UK’s domestic private sector, until then used to a rather limited 
non-existent field of competition.   
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Yet, despite some degree of liberalization by partial withdrawal of public sector coverage for 
certain aspects of public sector provision, and a concerted drive by public policy makers to inject 
competitive structure into the NHS, the private IHC and PMI sectors did not benefit as markedly as 
anticipated by both proponents and detractors, from a marketizing public sector (after the 
Community Care Act 1990) during the 1990s. Instead, intra-private sector competition for the 
remaining, though still relatively slowly growing complementary market, had been the defining 
feature of the 1990s for the private sector. What resulted was an even more commercialised and 
internationalised structure, as key providers fought over market share, while key PMI carriers were 
able to utilize their oligopolistic position in the complementary market to push market forces in 
their favour. The competition expressed through cost/price-based pressures and a focus on quality 
and standards of practice have been important levers in filtering out smaller and weaker competitors 
for the bigger players. Such state regulatory-based factors have been a recurrent determinant of the 
incremental commercialisation of the private sector, while international entrants have been able to 
establish a key position in the private acute hospital services market over the years. As can be seen 
in Table 6.9, the non-UK for-profit groups, both European and American, increased their share of 
beds from 17.8% in 1991 to 48.2% in 2008.  
The most significant changes for the private sector in the 2000s have been a return to pro-
competitive health policy, but this time with a clearer agenda for integration of the private sector in 
the programme of reform. Private sector providers were now expected to become fully integrated 
components of the mixed economy of care, not simply a mutually coexisting (even if ‘parasitic’ 
from the side of private acute provision) economy of healthcare that had characterised the UK 
healthcare economy since the post-war years. The intra-private sector competition for market share 
in public sector procurement has been a key driver for renewed structural change, as new market 
entrants have been given contracts in this emerging market.  
Already by the end of 2007 there has been a notable consolidation after further mergers and 
acquisitions have begun to filter out the smaller and weaker players in the UK IHC sector. While 
some of the companies with leading market share across the IHC sector are new, they have built on 
top of market share developed by prior overseas commercial market entrants. The current market 
structure has decidedly shifted towards commercial (for-profit) multinationals, even while some 
market leaders retain de jure non-profit status. Thus the latest market scenario has tended to favour 
larger players which, despite newcomers to the private sector scene taking advantage of the new 
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market in public sector procurement, has already resulted in some of the top players in the UK acute 
care market consolidating across both the IHC and public sector procurement sectors (i.e. ISTCs). 
6.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have been looking at the transformation of the UK’s private acute hospital 
sector and the PMI market in order to situate this structural shift within the context of market-
oriented changes in the national context of public policy for healthcare services and the emergence 
of an international healthcare service market. My analysis indicates several key developments since 
the contingent relationship between market penetration by foreign-owned firms and commercial 
transformation of these sectors began to take place in the late 1970s (Mohan, 1991; Rayner, 1986). 
One is the recurrently shifting dynamic in the relationship between the UK’s IHC and PMI sectors 
as the two sectors have developed to some extent in relation to changing priorities of public policy. 
As public policy has increasingly sought rapprochement between the NHS and private sector 
provision of healthcare services, the impact of public sector requirements of the private sector on 
the dynamic of the private sector market has been significant in influencing the competitive 
reconfigurations of market share within the private sector.  
Meanwhile, penetration of the UK’s private sector markets for acute hospital services and for 
PMI continues to demonstrate a contingent impact on the national private market structure, as 
overseas market entrants have all been commercial entities seeking to develop a stake in markets 
such as that of the UK where openings are emerging for such companies. As such, the importance 
of public policy remains high in shaping the terrain for both commercialisation and 
internationalisation, whether this has been a result of unintended outcomes of public policy such as 
in the late-1970s, or part of a more overt strategy for reforming the public healthcare system, as has 
been the case since the early 2000s. 
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Table 6.1: Total h ealth care expend iture in  the UK: N HS and  privat e sp ending fo r selected  years 1975 – 2006 
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Figure 6.1: PMI subscriptions UK (numbers subscribed and % of population covered), 1965-
2006 
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Source: Laing & Buisson (1999 & 2008) 
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Table 6.2: NHS income from private treatment & share of private acute healthcare market, UK 
1972-2006 
 
Year Beginning 
1 April 
NHS private patient income 
£million 
Market Share [1] 
% 
1972 14 48.3 
1973 13 39.4 
1974 17 41.5 
1975 22 42.3 
1976 27 44.3 
1977 30 40.5 
1978 32 41.0 
1979 37 38.9 
1980 48 33.1 
1981 56 25.3 
1982 54 19.5 
1983 60 18.2 
1984 61 15.8 
1985 67 14.3 
1986 65 12.3 
1987 73 11.7 
1988 83 11.2 
1989 99 11.5 
1990 113 11.1 
1991 147 12.9 
1992 164 13.3 
1993 185 13.8 
1994 209 14.3 
1995 229 14.6 
1996 249 14.7 
1997 288 15.7 
1998 309 15.2 
1999 321 14.6 
2000 334 14.0 
2001 359 13.4 
2002 388 12.9 
2003 389 12.1 
2004 401 11.0 
2005 417 10.1 
2006 429 9.7 
 
Notes: [1] NHS private patient income as % of (NHS private patient income + Total 
Independent Hospital Revenue)  
Source: 1972/1973 to 1993/94 NHS summarised accounts; 1994/5 onwards Laing & 
Buisson's NHS Trusts & Primary Care Trusts Financial Database 2003 & 2008: 1972-
2000 in Laing & Buisson (2002), 2001-2006 in Laing & Buisson (2008) 
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Table 6.3: Private medical insurance coverage in the UK: 1955-2005 (5 year intervals) 
 
 
Subscriber 
numbers at 
31 Dec 
Percent 
Growth on 
previous 
year shown 
Persons 
covered 31 
Dec 
Percent  
growth on 
previous  
year shown 
Persons  
covered 
Percent  
Growth on  
previous  
year shown 
 000's % 000's % % UK pop. % 
1955 274 - 585 - 1.2 - 
1960 467 +70.4 995 +70.1 1.9 +58.3 
1965 680 +45.6 1445 +45.2 2.7 +42.1 
1970 930 +36.8 1982 +37.2 3.6 +33.3 
1975 1087 +16.9 2315 +16.8 4.1 +13.9 
1980 1647 +51.5 3577 +54.5 6.4 +56.1 
1985 2380 +44.5 5057 +41.4 8.9 +39.1 
1990 3300 +38.7 6692 +32.3 11.6 +30.3 
1995 3430 +3.9 6673 -0.3 11.4 -1.7 
2000 3677 +7.2 6867 +2.9 11.7 +2.6 
2005 3574 -2.8 6474 -5.7 10.8 -7.7 
 
Sources: Laing & Buisson (1999, 2005 & 2008)  
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Table 6.4: PMI provider market share by subscription income, UK 1992-2006* 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 £ millions 
BUPA - - 994 1,113 1,193 1,263 1,335 1,381 
AXA PPP 
healthcare - - 673 675 675 685 724 775 
Norwich Union - - 227 255 270 [1] 280 [1] 281 309 
Standard Life 
H/care - - 167 [1] 173 [1] 194 [1] 207 [2] 200 [1] 244 [1] 
CIGNA - - 90 96 94 86 na 106 
WPA - - 113 [1] 109 [1] 102 [1] 101 [1] 100 [1] 101 [1] 
Simplyhealth 
Group [3] - - 21 na na na 80 84 
Pru Health - - na na - - 9 [1] 36 
Exeter Friendly - - 22 25 30 34 35 36 
CS Healthcare - - 15 na na 18 19 19 [1] 
Clinicare [4] - - na na 30 31 36 [1] - 
FirstAssist 
(R&SA) [5] - - na na 121 105 na na 
BCWA [3] - - 58 62 65 63 [1] - - 
AIG Europe - - na na 13 na na na 
Other insurers [6] - - 156 235 193 181 326 173 
ALL PMI 
CARRIERS [7] - - 2,657 2,879 2,980 3,053 3,145 3,263 
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Table 6.4: continued 
 1992 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 % of total PMI subscription income 
BUPA 44.0 37.0 37.0 38.5 40.0 41.5 42.5 42.5 
AXA PPP 
healthcare 28.0 29.0 25.0 23.5 22.5 22.5 23.0 24.0 
Norwich Union 3.5 7.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.5 
Standard Life 
H/care 3.0 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.5 7.5 
CIGNA 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 na 3.0 
WPA 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 
Simplyhealth Group 
[3] <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 na na na 2.5 2.5 
Pru Health - - - - - - < 0.5 1.0 
Exeter Friendly <1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
CS Healthcare <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 na na 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Clinicare [4] - - - - 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 
FirstAssist (R&SA) 
[5] 2.5 2.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.5 na na 
BCWA [3] 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 - - 
AIG Europe - - - - 0.5 na na na 
Other insurers [6] - - - - 6.5 6.0 10.5 5.5 
ALL PMI 
CARRIERS [7] 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Notes: [*] Ranking at 2006 figures; [1] Taken from annual report & accounts; [2] Estimated 
from 13.5 month period reported in annual report and accounts; [3] Simplyhealth Group 
includes BCWA (acquired 2002) and HAS Personal Medical Plans; [4] Clinicare acquired by 
Groupama Insurances Group in October 2005. Groupama’s subscription income and market 
share for 2006 included in ‘Other Insurers’; [5] First Assist’s PMI business acquired by 
Standard Life Healthcare in September 2005. Royal & Sun Alliance prior to 2003; [6] ‘Other 
private medical insurers’ includes providers with market shares in excess of 1% which do not 
wish their premium income figures to be published separately and no other income figure is 
publicly available in their accounts (or their accounts are not yet available). Also includes 
insurers with market shares below 1%; [7] Sum of market share may not be equal to 100 due 
to rounding.  
 
Source: 1991-2002 from Laing & Buisson (2002); 2003-2006 from Laing & Buisson (2008) 
 
 
195 
 
Table 6.5: NHS procurement from independent hospitals and clinics (IHC), UK: By revenues, 
1992-2007 
 
Year 
Total IHC 
Revenue [a] 
(£ millions) 
NHS purchase of independent acute medical/surgical 
services [b] 
£ millions % of Total IHC revenue [c] 
% change on prev. 
year [c] 
1992 1073 53 4.9 - 
1993 1154 63 5.5 0.5 
1994 1249 75 6.0 0.5 
1995 1350 83 6.1 0.1 
1996 1445 88 6.1 -0.1 
1997 1541 96 6.2 0.1 
1998 1720 108 6.3 0.0 
1999 1884 149 7.9 1.6 
2000 2059 136 6.6 -1.3 
2001 2318 170 7.3 0.7 
2002 2611 190 7.3 -0.1 
2003 2927 205 7.0 -0.3 
2004 3291 255 7.7 0.7 
2005 3753 405 10.8 3.0 
2006 3972 470 11.8 1.0 
2007 4274 615 14.4 2.6 
 
Notes: [a] Figures for ‘Total IHC Revenue’ are derived from value estimates of the non-NHS private 
hospital and clinical sector (£millions) quoted in Laing & Buisson (see Sources). These figures are 
strictly estimates for ‘independent’ hospitals and clinics, and do not include revenues from NHS 
PPUs (including PPUs managed by private hospital and clinical providers). Estimates are based on 
revenues reported in the Fitzhugh Directory of Independent Healthcare (period 1992-1999), and 
reports from audited accounts of hospital operators reported in Laing & Buisson’s Healthcare Market 
Review (period 2000-2007); 
[b] NHS purchase of acute medical/surgical treatment and mental health services from independent 
hospitals are estimated from Department of Health ‘Reference Costs 2003/04: Non NHS Providers 
Schedule’ & ‘Reference Costs 2006/07: Non NHS Providers Schedule’ in England, published 
expenditure totals on centrally procured elective and diagnostic services, and published accounts of 
ISTC operators;  
[c] Percentage figures are my own calculations based on data presented in Laing & Buisson’s 
Healthcare Market Review (see Sources) 
 
Sources: Laing & Buisson (2003, 2004 & 2008) 
196 
 
Table 6.6: Independent Hospital and Clinical (Acute Care) Providers: Market Share by Units, UK (2000-2008) 
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Table 6.7: Independent Hospital and Clinical (Acute Care) Providers: Market Share by Revenues, UK (2000-2007) 
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Table 6.8: Market Share of Operational [1] ISTC and Diagnostic Contracts with NHS: by number of contracts and number of procedures contracted for (2003-2007) [2] 
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Table 6.9: Acute hospital percentage share of bed numbers by ownership type, 1991-2008[1] 
 
 
Ownership Type [2]: 1991 2000 2004 2008 
British For-Profit Groups 32.7 50.4 44.6 24.3 
European For-Profit Groups (15.4) na na na 
American / Other  
For-Profit Groups [3] (2.4) (9.7) na na 
Non-UK For-Profit Groups [4] 17.8 [5] 9.7 [5] 20.7 48.2 
Not-For-Profit Groups [6] 25.3 21.1 21.1 16.6 
Not-For-Profit Non-Affiliated [6] 14.5 12.3 10.6 7.1 
Non-Affiliated For-Profit 9.7 6.6 3.1 3.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Summaries [6]:     
For-Profit 60.2 66.6 68.3 76.2 
Not For Profit [4] 39.8 33.4 31.7 23.8 
Groups 75.9 81.2 86.4 89.1 
Non-affiliated 24.1 18.8 13.6 10.9 
UK 82.2 90.3 79.3 51.8 
Non-UK 17.8 9.7 20.7 48.2 
 
Notes: [1] Figures for years shown are for mid-year; [2] Figures relate to acute 
medical/surgical beds in hospitals with one or more operating theatres, registered to 
take in-patients, including establishments specialising in termination of pregnancy; [3] 
Classed as 'American (joint-venture) for profit Groups; [4] For years 2004-2008 the 
distinction between ‘European’ and ‘US/Other’ For-Profit Groups is not made in the 
Laing & Buisson data but presented in aggregated for as ‘Non-UK For-Profit Groups’; 
[5] Shows sum of above two categories in brackets; [6] ‘Not-For-Profit’ is variably 
classed as ‘Charitable’ and ‘Charitable/ Religious’, or just ‘Not-For-Profit’ in Laing 
(1991) and different editions of Laing & Buisson data; [6] My own calculations based on 
above data. 
 
Sources: Laing (1992, p.15); Laing & Buisson (annual editions 1999 through 2008) 
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7. Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis has made a contribution towards analysing the relationship between globalisation 
and the commercialisation in the healthcare services sector and - the way in which these changes are 
articulated in the healthcare systems of OECD countries; a group of countries that in principle share 
a broadly similar socio-economic status as ‘developed’ countries. In this thesis I set out to examine 
the actual substance of globalisation as an explanatory concept with regard to particular areas within 
the healthcare service sector which have been experiencing a substantive trend of commercialisation 
over the past few decades. The empirical focus of the study has given weight to examining the 
public policy context for commercialisation of healthcare services in OECD countries. Furthermore, 
I have examined a number of key dimensions of the internationalisation of commercial relations 
regarding the healthcare services sector, in this case focusing more on particular segments of the 
healthcare service market.  
A more focused historical investigation of key segments in the US and UK private healthcare 
services sector has provided a more concrete analytical basis to ascertain how the relationship 
between globalisation and commercialisation is articulated in a national context. Although not set 
out explicitly as a comparative study, a historical examination of the experience of these countries 
with a commercial transformation in their respective healthcare sectors brings to the fore issues that 
resonate with the OECD countries more broadly. The substantially different context in which 
commercialisation of healthcare services has taken place in each of them also provides a more 
diverse viewpoint from which to interrogate the relationship between globalisation and 
commercialisation as developments that have become increasingly important dimensions facing 
public policy over the past three decades. 
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7.1. Key findings of the thesis 
While an increasing amount of literature has engaged with the challenge of globalisation in 
relation to health and the healthcare sector since the late 1990s, my view is that little of this has 
explicitly considered the substance of globalisation as an explanatory factor with regard to 
qualitative changes experienced in the healthcare sector. Ultimately, my argument is that 
globalisation offers an inadequate conceptual framework to explain the emergence of an 
international healthcare services market and the commercial transformation of healthcare services 
against the background of market-oriented reforms that have become a widespread trend across the 
OECD member states.  
While the varying degrees of adoption of market-oriented healthcare reforms have been 
important in opening up space to the private sector in many OECD countries, the bottom line is that 
the specific national regulatory environment, together with public policy priorities for healthcare 
reforms, are key defining factors in driving particular patterns of commercialisation in individual 
countries. As such, an understanding of the internationalisation of trade in healthcare services 
requires vigorous analysis of these mechanisms driving commercialisation in the specific national 
context.  
This, however, does not preclude the importance of internationalisation of healthcare service 
firms and its impact on national market structures. As shown by the analysis of private healthcare 
services in the UK, market penetration from foreign-owned firms has been an important factor in 
changing the structure of the private sector healthcare market. However, this development could not 
have taken place without either particular regimes of accommodation and later of pro-competitive 
public policy in either the US and the UK. While one might extrapolate international diffusion of 
ideas between countries about healthcare reform, the specific dynamic that the regulatory structures 
implemented in each country has generated in their respective private healthcare service sectors is 
very much related to the particular public policy objectives of each of these countries and the 
political economy structure of their respective healthcare systems. In the rest of this section, I 
briefly reflect on the key findings of the thesis. 
Shifting in the public-private mix 
I have shown that there is wide variation in the experience of market-oriented healthcare 
reform in the OECD countries. For instance, spending limits through wage, price or budget controls 
have, in most cases, been both a product of incremental changes over extended periods of time and 
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changing public policy priorities within broader reform programmes. As such, wage, price, and 
budget controls provide a contextual background within broader reforms rather than having an 
immediate impact on the public-private mix. Budgetary caps and price controls may also be a 
stimulus to divest certain activities from public sector provision. However, budgetary constraints in 
the case of hospitals have also tended to work in tandem with policies to rationalise overall hospital 
capacity. 
While the marketisation of healthcare provision has been an important trend over the past 
three decades, the expansion of increasingly largeer commercial healthcare corporations is mainly 
predicated on the space either left unoccupied by the public sector or where the private sector is 
already firmly established. The most obvious case is the US, where private provision makes up the 
bulk of healthcare service provision and financing. In the UK, the space opened for the private 
hospital sector, while initially based on residual gaps in NHS provision and the foundational 
compromise with medical professionals, has in most recent years been a product of government 
priorities for restructuring the NHS in a ‘pro-competitive’ form. Overall, between the 1990s and the 
early 2000s, the growth of private healthcare sector provision and financing has been a key 
development in several OECD countries, but it is still a tentative trend. It appears rather unlikely 
that a complete reversal from incremental privatisation will take place, particularly since 
governments are still keen to diversify the choice available to patients, taking into account both the 
limits of public financing and the need to meet changing demand patterns. 
International comparison of commercialisation trends  
The trends of privatisation and commercialisation in contemporary OECD healthcare 
systems, as discussed in chapter 3, provide clear indications for an expanding international market 
in healthcare services. Changing structural economic conditions that have been accompanied by a 
shift in public policy favoured a more ‘market-oriented’ approach to the financing and delivery of 
healthcare services. The evidence supports that the private sector is increasingly expanding its share 
in the public-private mix in most OECD healthcare systems. Moreover, it is the commercial private 
sector which has tended to capitalise the most on the ‘pro-competitive’ turn in healthcare policy. As 
such, it is not only the public sector per se that is being affected, but also the private non-profit 
sector which has been losing ground to commercial modes of financing and provision. 
This trend has mostly been a national and rather localised phenomenon: that is, commercial 
healthcare providers have expanded their market share within national boundaries, while cross-
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border commercial expansion has become a more notable feature of the healthcare services market 
since the early 1990s. Moreover, while international market penetration by commercial providers is 
overshadowed in scale by national-level developments, there is already evidence showing the 
capacity of such cross-border commercial penetration to have a transformative effect on national 
healthcare service markets. 
In the context of the current international agenda for liberalisation of trade in services, the 
possibility of an intensifying commercial transformation of healthcare services, facilitated by public 
policies for liberalisation and for privatisation of healthcare financing and provision, the 
international expansionary activities of commercial providers merit further examination. Due 
attention should also be paid, to developments of international trade in healthcare services. 
Following the four modes of supply, comprising the basis for the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, there are indications of a significant growth in international exchanges in 
healthcare services. 
Internationalisation of healthcare service providers 
The internationalisation of healthcare services is highly variable with regard to the 
development of its different dimensions, being highly uneven between firms and sectors, and 
largely dependent on the facility for commercial opportunities to develop. I have noted considerable 
variation in the degree of overseas market penetration across different segments of the international 
healthcare services market. Nonetheless, there are a number of cases of large multinational 
conglomerates amongst both health insurance suppliers and hospital providers.  
In the former case, the trend has been for absorption into ever larger diversified insurance and 
financial product companies. This allows parent companies to spread risk more easily across their 
different fields of business. It also demonstrates a tendency to focus on the most profitable areas of 
health insurance such as the ‘corporate market’ supplying professionals in other multinationals or 
large national corporations. 
The US experience  
The US system is closer to being a market-oriented healthcare economy, whereas the UK is 
closer to a state-funded healthcare provider. Nevertheless, both systems are composed of extensive 
regulatory structures, with quality of care problems being prevalent in both countries. Private 
healthcare service provision has been a ubiquitous feature of US healthcare from its early days. 
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However, historical analysis indicates that the commercial dimension of healthcare has been a much 
more recent development in the US and has been contingent on a combination of the particular 
political-institutional structure of the federation and the recurrent political compromises, illustrated 
by historic efforts to reform healthcare service provision and financing.  
The continuous accommodation of particularly strong capitalist interests in US public policy 
has been a key factor in enabling the rapid corporatisation and commercialisation of US healthcare 
service provision and financing, to the extent that this has become a deeply entrenched feature of 
the US healthcare economy. A relatively small number of healthcare service firms have in turn 
become even stronger through increasing market share. The US case provides a basis for examining 
the process of commercial transformation in a location where such a process had been historically 
unprecedented in other countries. It also provides an impetus to understanding the causes for the 
internationalisation of commercial healthcare service operators, given the relatively large number of 
US firms seeking to expand their activities into overseas markets.  
The UK experience  
Since the establishment of the NHS in 1948, changes in the UK’s public-private mix 
healthcare services by the clear dominance of the public sector as the primary payer of healthcare 
services since that time, retaining its position at above 80% of national health expenditure. Indeed, 
the transformation of the UK’s private acute sector and its strong relationship to the PMI market is 
indicative of the private sector market for healthcare as it is, on the other hand, of its changing 
relationship with the public sector over the past three decades.  
In the first case, commercial expansion has been one of the primary characteristics of the 
private sector, as overseas market-entrants increasingly sought a major stake in the UK’s 
complementary IHC market. Anticipation of liberalisation of the public sector from the late-1970s 
to the 1980s made the UK a key target market for US firms through aggressive acquisition and 
market positioning, backed by a home-market investment infrastructure of market entrants.  
Yet, despite some degree of liberalisation and a concerted drive by public policy makers to 
inject competitive structure into the NHS, the private IHC and PMI sectors did not benefit as much 
as anticipated from a marketising public sector during the 1990s. Instead, intra-private sector 
competition for the remaining complementary market intensified, thus driving it towards a more 
commercialised and internationalised structure. Price competition and a focus on quality have been 
important levers for the bigger players in filtering out smaller competitors.  
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The most significant changes for the private sector in the 2000s have been a return to pro-
competitive health policy but with greater interventionism. Private sector providers are now 
expected to become fully integrated in the mixed economy of care. The intra-private sector 
competition for market share in public sector procurement has been a key driver for structural 
change in both the private acute sector and the PMI market. By the end of 2007, there has been a 
notable consolidation after further mergers and acquisitions have begun to filter out the smaller 
players in the UK IHC sector with the current market structure decidedly shifted towards 
commercial multinationals.  
In the second case, there has clearly been a sea-change in the way the private sector has been 
given greater space by public policy. Yet, the current regime is at a completely different place from 
the 1970s-1980s juncture where accommodation of the private sector would best characterise the 
approach of public policy to IHC providers and PMI. The momentum gained by the consecutive 
Conservative governments for market-oriented reforms during their term in office, did not translate 
into a concerted pro-competitive plan for the private sector. Only under New Labour has there been 
an integrated approach in its pro-competitive policy for reform so that IHC providers have been 
given a ‘leg up’, in a way that has been historically unprecedented. 
7.2. Key Reflections on commercialisation and internationalisation of 
healthcare services 
Commercialisation of healthcare services encompasses a broad set of changes that are 
articulated to varying degrees in different national contexts. In the most specific sense, services that 
are commercialised are those rendered for a fee, which is clearly aimed at the generation of profit 
margins for the benefit of private owners, as opposed to being reinvested in the organisation for the 
benefit of its users as is typically the case for non-profit or public institutions. 
While the boundaries of ownership are relatively clear from a legal perspective, from an 
operational system perspective, the boundaries can be more fudged and have become increasingly 
ambiguous over the past few decades. Public sector funding may cover private sector provision, as 
is the case in the German social health insurance system, the UK’s ISTC programme, or the US 
Medicaid and Medicare programmes. Private sector provision may be undertaken by ‘non-profit’ 
and ‘for-profit’ owned organisations under the same organisational umbrella, as is the case with the 
Blue Cross Blue Shield network in the US or the BUPA network’s hospital portfolio.  
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Moreover, the commercial nature of healthcare services contains a further layer of meaning in 
this context. Where public participation is scaled back, minimal or absent, the space left is de facto 
ceded to private sources of financing. With the majority of costs of care being out of reach for most 
individuals and households, this means an expanded role for private health/ medical insurance. This 
is the case for acute hospital-based services, for long-term care for chronic conditions and the 
elderly, mental health, dental and ophthalmic services, but also for many prescription 
pharmaceuticals. In the absence of, or with scaling back of public investment in the provision of 
healthcare services, private sector provision is likely to fill the remaining gaps, as is the case for 
long-term care, mental health facilities or dental and ophthalmic services. 
Key mechanisms encouraging or facilitating commercialisation may include: active public 
policy measures as a means to promote deregulation, which would allow greater scope for expanded 
market share of commercial operators at both national and international levels. In addition, putting 
forward pro-competitive policy measures as a means of generating anticipated efficiency gains and 
cost reduction focusing on actions such as marketisation policies (UK) specified for different 
segments and Managed Care initiatives (US), or encouraging the expansion of private operators 
through: competitive contracting (UK) or competitive relations within the managed care fold (US). 
However, some public policy action facilitating commercialisation has been decidedly passive, such 
as the accommodatory stance and laissez-faire periods of UK policy towards the growth of the 
private sector, so that intra-market structural changes have been un-anticipated outcomes of 
regulations for the public sector, whilst applied unevenly to the private sector (i.e. the establishment 
of preferred provider networks in the UK). 
The growing international market presence of large corporate healthcare service firms has 
brought an additional dimension into the picture. Even so, the global reach of such firms is quite 
uneven, with substantial variation in the degree of market penetration across different segments of 
the international healthcare market. For instance, hospital service providers have generally been 
limited to relatively small numbers of overseas operations. By contrast, the health insurance sector 
demonstrates a bifurcation between larger multi-product insurance firms and specialised health and 
medical care insurers.  
In both provision and financing, the larger players have been at a distinct advantage in 
establishing overseas ventures, being also commercial firms with significant stakes in their 
domestic markets. Although early stages of overseas market penetration had preceded the degree to 
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which market-oriented healthcare reforms have become commonplace since the 1990s, this enabled 
commercial firms to expand further at international level.  
7.3. Policy recommendations 
Although I have not set out to make policy recommendations in writing this thesis, a few 
points arising from my research I feel ought to be laid out briefly which I think are important for 
public policy. Whether the advance of commercialisation continues to develop more intensively in 
the coming years or whether such a development is curtailed, as national governments find 
alternative methods of addressing the challenges to healthcare service financing and provision, my 
points rest on both long-standing issues regarding commercial healthcare services and the 
implications of continuing or future commercialisation of healthcare services. 
On an instrumental level, and with direct implications for both public policy formation and 
academic research, is the issue of collection of quantitative data. Data regarding the private sector in 
healthcare services is considerably limited, particularly in the UK. In an era of ‘evidence-based 
policy’, if the use of market-oriented healthcare reforms is to have an impact other than ceding 
responsibility and control to private sector organisations for the delivery and financing of healthcare 
services, this is a crucial issue for governing and regulatory agencies to pay attention to. It is 
especially important for national governmental agencies, tasked with monitoring provision, 
financing or regulation of healthcare services, to compile reliable and more systematic, high-quality 
data - not only for expenditures but providing a wider coverage for the activities and performance of 
private sector providers and insurers - and to ensure that this is transparent and accessible to all. 
The regulation of healthcare services in all countries tends to be a fragmented patchwork of 
self-regulatory institutional arrangements, semi-formal state regulation, and full-on state regulation, 
with intersections between private self-regulation and public/state regulation varying between 
market segments and aspects of healthcare service provision and financing. Commercialisation, in a 
strict sense, implies a shift from state control and regulation to greater private sector control and 
self-regulating practices. However, in practice this shift is not definitive, especially considering the 
multiplicity of institutional forms that prevail in both highly market-oriented healthcare systems 
(US) and more public-oriented systems (UK). Moreover, historical analysis of the evolution of 
these systems indicates that regulation becomes an increasingly important factor as market-based 
structures become more pervasive. As such, regulatory competence needs to be improved including 
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through increasing quality of regulation, and enhancing the existing structures of monitoring and 
public accountability of both regulators and the regulated. 
If commercialisation continues to be pursued in public policy it should be done extremely 
cautiously. Although market-oriented reforms have helped to highlight certain deficiencies of public 
owned and controlled healthcare, extant examples of market-based healthcare financing and 
provision put into question the validity of commercialising healthcare. It is likely to create greater 
inequalities, reduce transparency and accountability with choice being limited, by necessity, to the 
packages that serve the interests of commercial providers rather than the immediate or long-term 
needs of patients. 
7.4. Developing the research agenda 
The research and analysis undertaken for this thesis points to a number of issues that require 
further research and can be considered as part of a future research agenda developing out of this 
thesis. A growing body of research can already be seen exploring how market-oriented reforms 
have been and are transforming healthcare systems and specific sub-sectors within these. However, 
I think that there is still a lot to be done to analyse how market-oriented reforms and international 
commercial regulatory frameworks are transforming domestic/national private sectors, and also 
how these have been changing over extended time-frames. In the first instance there is a need to 
devote more research to such issues as the motivations and strategies of private sector healthcare 
providers (whether hospitals, long-term care providers, primary care providers or public health 
organisations) and financing organisations (i.e. insurers). Studies exploring how their market 
position, the structure of their respective markets, and the interactions between these market 
segments are being changed by public policy and also how they are impacted on by other economic 
and political factors are still very much in the minority. In the second instance, I am arguing for 
more extensive historical research on the transformation of private healthcare services, whether 
non-profit or for-profit. As several authors have pointed out, history has a habit of repeating itself, 
especially as ideas about how to think about certain problems go through fashions (Light, 2007; 
Hunter, 2008), while many of the problems at the root of social, economic and political relations 
continue to be present (Stevens, 2006; Marmor, 2000) 
Related to these points, key questions that should be part of ongoing research need to focus 
on such issues as the constraints and opportunities for commercial providers generated by 
international trade agreements and to what extent commercial healthcare services are engaged in 
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driving international liberalisation. This has been the case in other areas of international trade 
liberalisation, but there is currently little or no research on the role of healthcare services firms in 
this context. A further issue that requires analysis is the role of investment capital in the 
development of commercial healthcare services. So far, from my limited research on this question 
with regard to the hospital and insurance sectors, it appears that investment capital tends to follow 
from opportunities arising out of national deregulation. However, with a few cases shown of major 
investment capital groups buying out some of the top players in these sectors (even if for short 
term), this is a tendency to observe in future. 
7.5. Final concluding note 
International economic changes highlight what are already grave pressures on healthcare 
systems, they do not in themselves generate these pressures. Yet, the role of states remains central 
to the commercial orientation of healthcare services and will continue to do so in the near future. 
Decisions about the allocation of public resources remain central even in historically more market-
oriented systems (US) and this is unlikely to be avoided even as the commercial provision and 
financing of healthcare are encouraged. While I believe that commercialisation in healthcare 
services is a trend that should be regarded cautiously by public policy makers and citizens alike, it is 
difficult to envisage the current trend for commercialisation being reversed, since it is hard to 
dislodge these relationships once they are in place. Indeed this is a key reason for resisting the 
commercialisation route in the first place, since the solid gains made in the post-WWII era for 
healthcare which are already being eroded by the market-oriented turn. 
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